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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM 
l. The problem stated. 
Our problem is essentially that of the 
identification of Hocking's type of ~ticism and of its 
application to his philosophy. Some defining marks, then, 
of the approach and use he makes of lll\1Sticism are a JIBS-
requisite to any general discussion we may enter into. Such 
marks as we have come across are not revealed on the surface, 
but they are contained within the context of his lfb.ole thought. 
Therefore, our investigation will carry us into the center 
of his logic, his epistemology, and of his metaphysics. We 
will attempt to show that there is no mysticism, of the kind 
he uses, apart from these three main divisions of his philos-
ophy, for his m,ystieism appears to stand at the center of 
all three of these divisions as their unity. Whatever use 
he makes of the application of mysticism religious];y is for 
some further clarification and demonstration of his philos- ,, 
ophy. Mysticism with Hocking, we hope to shcnr, is a philos-
ophiial discipline. We would not go so far as to say that it 
is nothing else, but whatever else it is with him is incidental 
to the other. The kernel of what Hocking means by mysticism, 
lli th reference to the manner in llb.ich he appears to use it 
generally in his philosophy is implied in the fol.lowi.ng 
l 
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quo'Wion, where he sees logic as not only embedded_!!! 
Kature but as constituting Nature: 
Not because logic controls Nature, but 
because logic is Nature, in the only 
form in 'Which Tature can now be approached 
by human consciousness. 1 
That there is ~sticism of some kind in that 
kind of assertion is apparent. But that the ~sticism 
there represented is distinctive is also apparent. The 
question concerning the involvement of epistemology and 
of metaphysics in the above quotation, and in Hocking 1 s 
writings generally, will, we hope, receive its affirmation 
as we attempt to disclose the meanfng which Hocking places 
in ~ticism. 
After several unsatisfactor.r attempts to state 
Hocking's mysticism in standard terms, i.e., as pure 
immediacy, simple union~ Reality,2! ~~ or as content 
,2! religious experience, the effort was given up. It 
was discovered upon continued inv~stigation that Hocking 
does not consider that mysticism is an end or a satisf'actor,r 
stopping place. Instead, it is, as he uses it1 a means 
to his kind of idealism in philosophy. The meaning, then, 
1. MGHE, 573. 
2 
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of his mysticism will be found in the matrix of his total 
thought--in the between-the-lines and the cross reference 
of his logic. His ~ Meaning ,2! Q!2 _!! Human Experience 
offered promise as a primary' source. But the real ground 
of this investigation, the real source of inspiration and 
the writing Which indicated the direction that our investi-
gation would have to take, was Hocking's unpublished doctoral 
thesis, 1 a volume of great attraction and appeal, because 
of its nascent mysticism and also because of its form. As 
to the former (its ground for mysticism as a war of knowing 
the thing world, other self, and the individual self as 
lmower) 1 embedded in its depth of dialectic 1 epistemology 1 and 
its metaphysics, is the germinal basis of practica~ every-
thing Hocking has written since. As its title indicates, 
it covers the field of human, physical, and logical-meta-
physical relations in "elementar,y experience". Here, for 
example, was observed for the first time 1 by the present 
investigator 1 the operation of what Hocking calls the "judg-
ment of experience", and it is in this particular type of the 
judgment that his philosophy is seen to take hold of mysti-
1. The Elemen~ ~rience of Other-conscious ~e!jg in its 
Relation to t e men tar~ ~erience of Phys c ami -
Refleiive .... Ot)Jiets, Harvar versftY,l:9o4. -
3 
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cism. It was in the operation of the judgment of experience 
that the theory of mysticismwas seen to take precedence over 
its practical function, in the use which Hocking makes of it. 
However, Hocking's use of theory in mysticism is not merely 
"speculative" or abstract. On the contrary, as judgad from the 
use he makes of it philosophica~, it is quite practical. 
It is only when we think of mystici8Dl from the point of view 
of religion, as its end rather than as its making) that we 
are reminded of its possible abstract emphasis. This is a 
distinction which we hope can be made clear as our thesis 
proceeds. 
It has become more and more apparent in this 
present investigation that our point of view, with respect to 
Hocking's mysticism, has to be philosophical rather than 
religious, in the strict sense of these terms. What might 
be referred to as the "content" of mysticism in Hocking, in 
attempting to distinguish between an emphasis which is not 
fundamental to his use and one which is 1 is there in consequence 
of a method and an approach to mystici8Dl as a practical and 
operating method of knowing. Therefore, what we may call the 
"function" of mysticism is truly theoretical if we have religion 
in view 1 but it is practical if our interest is in philosophy. 
4 
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~!!do not!!!!! religion,~~ practical expression 
in Hocking; !! !!!!!, !!!_ theory, i!! philosophy• We do not 
find in Hocking a series or descriptions or other portrayals 
or religion or religious experience. He does not give a 
catalogue or experiences which mi.ght show the practical 
workings or, let us say 1 immed1ac7 in the divine-human re-
lationship 1 religiously. Whatever of immediacy we find in 
him is embedded in the theory of religious experience it-
self, philosophically. 
In our attempt to reveal the elements or 
mysticism in Hocking 1 s thought we were compelled to the 
view that mysticism as he uses it is as a mediating IDDd,or 
"common thirdtt 1 between idealism on the one side and realism 
on the other. The problem which Hocking attempts to solve 
by means of ~sticism is that or the relation of universals, 
ideas, and essence to particulars, facts, and existence. 
Thus we can say that 1 instead or using ~sticism as an end 
product or philosophy, the reverse is true, and philosophy 
turns out to be the result of a use of mysticism. That 
the philosophy thus achieved is some sort of idealism we 
hope to be able to show. 
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Because Hocking's ~sticism is so deep~ 
embedded in his philosophy, we found it necessary to employ 
his epistemology as the primary source for an uncovering 
of m;ysticism, with metaphysics(largely in the form of the 
ontological argument) assumed throughout. There!!~ 
other way whereby!!! mysticism, ~ its base of origin, 
can be lmown. or this much we are certain at the moment. 
Therefore, what appears to be epistemology 
in this investigation is such only as instrument and aid 
to the discovering of m;ysticism. It is not intended to 
serve as Hocking' s system of epistemology. Whatever of 
system is found here, so far as epistemology is concerned, 
must be understood as being secondary, not primar,yz its 
use is to serve as medium only. Keeping this fact in mind 
we will not be overcome with what appears at times to be a 
disregard of system and of arrangement. _!! is mysticism 
!!. .!!! after primariq, ~ epistemology• However, as might 
be expected, the mysticism which is revealed stands frequently 
as critic of such system and interpretation as may at times 
have been assumed. Let us keep this fact in mind. What we 
want, so far as this present investigation is concerned, is 
mysticism. What we have found is m;ysticism embedded profoundly 
6 
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in Hocking's epistemology and in his metaphysics. Our 
problem is the analysis of these sources, so far as we 
are able, in an effort to discover our product, mysticism. 
Our most important labor, then, is not so much in favor of 
system per !! as in what lies at the base of system. If 
system and order, in neat arrangement, come out of our in-
vestigation, well and good. Let that be as it may. Our 
obligation is to discover mysticism in Hocking's thought, 
making use of such system and of such logic as have been 
built out of those strong undercurrents which belong to 
mysticism and which Hocking asserts lie at the center of 
Reality. 
7 
CHAPTER I 
THE PROBlEM 
2. ,!!!! importance of mysticism,!! Hocking. 
It is the opinion of this investigator 
that Hocking's use of mysticism is essentially as means, 
a means toward the production of a rationa~ acceptable 
idealism in philosophy. His sincerity concerning mysticism 
is unquestioned, as his interest in it is genuine. But he 
employs its values in behalf of such "cognitive fruits" as 
will serve as the basis of a metaphysics, as a doctrine of 
Reality which will give "grit" to the understanding. This, 
it is believed, is his first interest. Mysticism, in dealing 
w.i th that which is essentially "original" in experience 1 
can contribute greatly to a wider interpretation of exper-
ience by being taken up into some form of idealism which 
can give it its best expression. It is this wider interpre-
tation of experience which is meaningful to us as we make 
our investigation. Both Jlli1Sticism and idealism are "caught" 
in it. It is Hocking's emphasis on a "wider empiricism" 
that gives rise to his mysticism, and to his idealism as 
well. The follOl'li.ng quotation links mysticism directly 
with such an empiricism, lrilile idealism is implied: 
Bergson opened up a wider empiricism in 
8 
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the name of "intuition",; I had opened up a 
similar development in the name of"~ticism"; 
and Bergson in the later work "Two Sources", 
comes around to recognizing the mystical 
element in knowledge, not a thought-empty but. 
a thought-crammed empiricism. The primary 
object of this type of awareness is the Thou 
of the world, God; and God is always Thou, 
never a mere Absolute, i.e., a mere dialelti-
cal. necessity,-he is this and more too. 
Hocking calls his particular kind of mysticism 
"realistic". Although it was not called realistic explicit~ 
in his great work, - ~Meaning of God~ Human Experience, 
in a later reference to that work 2 he mentions its realism. 
I was attempting to present a realistic 
mysticism, one which turns its back on circum-
stance and the world's concerns on~ to find 
the Real, and thereby to renew energy and 
grit for the particular task, and to regain 
certitude in action, that deta:Ued action 
lfhose integral sum is history. _ ... 
This "realistic mysticism" we may set down, then, 
as a preliminary definition. As our investigation progresses 
we will see how this definition is expanded in the "judgment 
of experience", which is Hocking's most effective m;ystical 
instrument, serving principally as method ~ knowledge · but 
also arranged in such a manner as to constitute philosophical 
1. MGHE, 573. 
2. LRWF, 1. 
9 
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value in and of itself, a tttrue form for truth getting", as 
it were. The method of this definition is the holding of 
two worlds of seeming incompatibility together in such wise 
as to extract their values and their truths, funding both 
in some greater wisdom which the self can use in his com-
munication with other selfhood, both finite and infinite. 
The two worlds which are thus taken up may be partially 
symbolized as intuition(immediacy) and intellect(mediacy). 
"Intuition is not wisdom.; and intellect is not wisdom: wisdom 
is the union of intuition and intellect." 1 
Hocking's determination to claim the physical 
world and the ideal world at one and the same time, making 
both available to the finite self as the means of some 
"participation in God" which will meet the needs of creative 
expression in the self, has given rise to the ~stical problem. 
Both the thing object and the introspective object are "dark" 
and purposeless when they are out of proper relation to the 
whole of reality. They are out of such relation when they 
are not in real communication, one with the other. But 
communication is possible to them on~ when they are caught 
up in the same purpose, the same Reality. What Hocking's 
1. TOP, 212. 
10 
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mysticism seeks is "the presence of purpose in the whole 
of things." 1 This is in a sense the foundation upon which 
he builds his "realistic mysticism". 
Between the world of physical things and the 
world of the introspective object is the purpose and the 
meaning Which can be put under the direction of the self, 
taken up into himself and put to work upon the objects. 
A further meaning, found in Hocking, asserts that the work 
of the self must be within these objects. It is from within 
them that their meaning is disc{4tsed to the self 1 and it is 
from this internalized emphasis that the Whole of Reality is 
found. 
When the finite self has become conscious of 
himself !! finite, that is to say, limited, he looks about 
for that which can complete him and render him not limited. 
Having looked within and having found there a limitation, 
the self is compelled to cast about for the perfection which 
he lacks. In this way, so ~ocking holds, the self is made 
to turn normally to the "ontological Other". Both the finite 
and the infinite self are empirical discoveries. 
1. SIG, 112. 
ll 
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Experience enters large~ into the problem of 
Hocking's ~sticism. Experience, as used by Hocking, is 
a part of that method in ~ticism 'Which leads to knowledge 
and it is also some large part of the connection which 
m;ysticism makes between the thing and the thought world. 
Hocking agrees with Royce's comment that the m;ystic is the 
"thorough-going empiricist", 
Royce's often-quoted phrase which describes 
the ~stic as the "tharough-going empiricist" 
is strikingly true of the Jey"stic 1 s method of 
knowing. But the mystic 1 s peculiarity is that 
he applies this method to objects which empiri-
cists general.ly insist cannot be given in any 
such immediate, unreasoned manner, namely to 
totals not to elements; to souls, not to 
sensations; to resultants(llke history, or 
society) not to factors; and finally, to 
God himself. 1 
Perhaps enough has been said to indicate the 
direction of Hocking's interest. The preliminary definitions 
will serve as guide to our thought for the moment. 'hey are 
like intuition itself, which is always ahead of knowledge, 
for they await their fulfillment. 
1. MGHE, 387n. 
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3. Other studies of ~ problem. 
Although several Ph.D. dissertations have 
already been done on a variety of phases of Hocking's 
philosophy, none of them has approached the problem of 
~ticism in the manner undertaken here. Neal Bond Fleming's 
Hocking's Philosopny !f the Human~ 1 does not presume 
to deal in any comprehensive manner with the ~tical aspects 
of Hocking, nor does his solution to the problem of the 
human self reveal enough of the metaphysical qualities of 
that self(as judged from a study of Hocking 1 s mysticism) 
to satisfy the demands which mysticism would make upon it. 
Richard C.Gilman made a thorough investigation of !2! 
General !letaphysicf .. :2f William Ernest Hocking 2 and covered 
the problem of epistemology as a part of that metaphysical 
study. But he did not deal with that phase of Hocking 1 s 
epistemology which coneerns mysticism, that is, from the 
standpoint of the judgment of experience, in its multi-form 
nature as given in the meaning which lies behind Hocking 1 s 
general epistemology. Alvin A .Ahern's dissertation, William 
1. Boston University, Graduate School, 1941. 
2. Boston University, Graduate School, 1952. 
13 
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Ernest Hocking's Philosophy .2£ Religion~ its Contri-
bution~ Contemporary Religious Thought~ America, 1 
while -taking up the problem of m;rsticism as a part of the 
religious emphasis he was investigating, he does not deal 
with it in its fundamental nature and according to the 
type which Hocking proposes. A further doctoral study, 
H ocld.ng ' s Idea 2!, God, by Paul G .Rademacher, 2 whiie 
taking up the problem of religion in Hocking, has not 
indicated the direction of his thought. And, although 
many have written books whieh contain general treatments 
of. Hocking's philosophy, and some have made critical 
appraisals of his mysticism, 3 no writer is knolfi'l to the 
present investigator who has approached Hocking's ~ti­
cism from the point of view of the judgment of experience 
or, as Hocking sometimes calls it, "the widened net of 
empiricism". According to Hocking's own word on the 
subject, the only writer who has come anywhere near t.he 
treat.ment proposed in this diss~rt.ation ~ Babri·ei M&l!eeil., 
in his Journal ~taphysique. 4 But ~eel does not actually 
~ his study on Hocking. His study is general and quite 
independent. 
1. New York University, 1941. 
2. Boston University, Graduate School, in process. 
3. Cf. J.A. Martin, ~irical Philosophies of Religion. 
4. Personal correspcm ence,1952. -
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4. Sources employed _!!! this study. 
The chief and primary source used in this 
study has been that of Hocking's The Meaning ,2! ~.,!!! 
Human Experience, 1 together llith his Ph.D. Thesis, ~ 
Elementary Experience 2£ Other Conscious Being _!!! ~ 
Relation to ~ Elementary Experience of Physical and 
Reflexive Objects, 2 as a second main reference. Some 
personal correspondence with Professor Hocking3 is relied 
upon substantially. Most of his books and articles have 
been read and have made their contribution. A number of 
treatments of :m;ysticism by other writers was read. Several 
of the :m;ystics themselves were read, especially where there 
appeared to be any direct relation between what they were 
saying and "'''hat Hocking has said. Considerable attention 
has also been paid to Kant, Spencer, Royce, James; and 
others were studied with a view to discovering the extent 
of their possible influence on Hocking's :m;ysticism. 
5. Method~ procedure. 
It is this investigator's firm conviction 
1. Already referred to as MGHE. 
2. Harvard University, 1904. 
3. All in 1953. 
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that Hocking approaches whatever is truly rational in 
both philosophy and religion from the point of view of 
Jlli1Sticism1 as source. That is, 11\YSticism is used in the 
construction of his philosophy and his religion, never 
wholly separated from either. MYsticism establishes a 
process, ~ experiential dialectic, out of which both 
philosophy and religion grow. Its primary direction, 
then, is toward philosophy~ toward religion, even as 
a continuous movement within them, serving them by bring-
ing up material to them from experience and remaining in 
their patterns of operation as a furthering of interest and 
of direction. 
Hocking's DlY'sticism has a double nature. In 
one of the emphases of its nature it is content of knowledge, 
immediacy, a support of reason but not dependent upon it. 
In its other emphasis it is process ~ knowledge, a process 
which brings all value 1 all purpose 1 all knowledge of immediacy 
upward and into the arena ot rational consciousness. As 
process it is what "ties together" that which is merely 
immediate in all experience wi. th that which is mediately or 
rationallY produced conceptually, as, for instance, in 
philosophy, or as conscious dependence and striving for value, 
16 
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as in religion. It functions retrospectively in terms of 
the immediate and it functions prospectively in terms of 
the fulfilling of value and cognition. Yet the movement 
which Hocking::. discovers in mysticism is never mere:cy simple 1 
or in one direction at a time. It is, instead, a network of 
lines, all intermea11ed.. Looking at it from the point of 
view of the human self, it is as complex as is the self., 
with connections which extend to the infinite as well as 
to the finite. 
Our investigation here will attempt to show 
how ~sticism serves as means to the elucidation of the 
human self as a whole, with relations which extend to his 
social others, through physical things, to the world self 
and to God. The world selt will be seen to stand as near 
to experience as the individual finite self, whose body is 
part and parcel of the world self, through participation. 
Likewise the mind of the finite self is bound in with the 
world self, and wi. th God, through participation. These 
facts are not self-explanatory. If they were there would 
be no need of this or a.rrr similar investigation. The 
"revelation" of these facts will be by way of attempts at 
17 
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placing before us the essential problems involved. 
Chapter II is an attempt to indicate how 
Hocld.ng 1 s own type of m;y-sticism came to its maturity. In 
chapter III we try to show what mysticism means to Hocking. 
definitions necessary to this study are given there, as are 
certain descriptions Whieh are deemed helpful to a further 
clarification of the definitions involved. Chapter IV seeks 
to present us directly into the problem at hand, namely the 
identification of the chief mediating vehicles in Hocking's 
mysticism together with the use to which he puts them. At 
this point we see the judgment !£ experience in operation, 
and with it Hocking's understanding and use of ~· Chapter 
V shows us something of the complexity of Hocking's notion 
of the human self, in which is involved the primar,y workings 
of his ontological argument. The proposition Which is set 
forth in this chapter is that the human self and the ontolo-
gical proof of God are fundamental to Hooking's mysticism. 
In chapter VI we move on to an investiation of the nature 
of God, finding him, as we think, the "Thou" of mysticism 
which is intimately associated with the human self and in 
"Which the human self participates oreativel3. Our last 
18 
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chapter, number VII, seeks to present mysticism, functional~ 1 
through the practice of religion and of science. Here ana 
revealed the practical w0rkings of mysticism. Here also is 
shown the manner in which experience is made to "thicken up11 
with meanings so that nothing of importance to the self as 
a co-producer of values is lost. 
· The method which we employ is that of balancing, 
so far as we are able, the inunediate in experience against the 
mediate, the subconscious( as, far instance, feeling, instinct, 
the grounds of intuition, and the 'Will) against the conscious 
( such as concepts and ideas) 1 the judgment of experience agid.nst 
the self, the Absolute against God, change against the changeless, 
and scientific knowledge against mwatical certainty and idealism. 
We have tried to show how Hocking's mysticism 
is fundamental to his idealism and to his religious faith. We 
also have tried to demonstrate the value of the judgment of 
experience for mediacy in mysticism, along with its immediacy. 
Such union as is possible of the individual self with other selves, 
and of the human self with God, we have sought to prove by means 
of the principle of "apprenticeship in creativity" through the 
jutlgment of experience and of the ontological argament. The 
human self, we have concluded, is a complex of~ .!!!2 ~' 
so related as to be able to mould his own and the world's nature 
into Nature. 
19 
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The ~stic may claim that some truth bas 
been privately revealed to him1 or he may be 
a mystic mere~ because he feels prfoundl.y 
the mystery of existence. 1 
1. ! mwstic described. 
We must lmow, first of all, who it is that 
Hocking calls a my-stic. Of this he says, "The mystic is, 
in the first place, an original. knower of old truth." 2 
The mystic is certain of his lmowledge. He "lmows that 
'this is God'; there is a sense of arrival, of having 
reached goal, that seems to banish all possibility of 
doubt." 3 However, what at one moment is his certainty, 
at another may be his doubt. "The mystic himself frequently falls 
·into doubt ••• about the authenticity of his experience." 4 
As knower of "ancient truth", so Hocking tells 
us1 he knows what it means to possess his own soul.. "The 
ancient truth of the mystic is nothing else than the truth 
about originality, about what it is to awn one's own soul." 5 
He is, then,~~ discovers~ .;.;;hims __ e_lf_, depending upon 
his own ideas before making use of the ideas of others. There 
is, so we may assume that he detects, some "fallacy of the 
1. Townsend, PIA, 58. 
2. MGHE, 448. 
). Ibid., 449n. 
4. Ibid. , 449. 
5. Ibid., 450. 
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universal" in general ideas. 
The true idea may constitute a wall which keeps 
God out, !?it is adopted as an idea simpq,-
that is to say1 as a repetition1of other men's insights, as a universal idea. 
Whatever of reality the mystic may discover must 
serve to explain himself to himself. "God, who is truq said 
to explain man to himself, must explain !! _!:2 myself. "~hat 
is, what he knows about his world and the human comrade is 
the result of some prior discovery of himself. "The mystic 
consciousness is .!!!!-pre-occupied; and the knowledge that 
comes from it is very largel.1' knowledge of itself." 3 
What appears in the above is an emphasis of the 
content of the mystical experience. It is something which 
is settled, a knowledge of something. Of the two movements 
or emphases in Hocking's mysticism, this is one. Let us 
follow it through a little farther. "No one", says Hocking, 
"insists more than I that it must contain something, and 
can be no pure ineffable zero." 4 This is spoken of the 
content of mysticism, something which is there !! content. 
What is this content? We have thus far seen it as the self 
in the presence of himself. But God comes before the ~ ;= 
1. :MGHE, 450-451. 
2. Ibid., 451. 
3.Ibid. J 451'· 
4. Ibid., 455. 
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in his •elf knowledge. We have the matter negative~ in 
the following quotation: "And wherever in all life the 
individual vanishes from my grasp, there has vanished first 
the individual God." 1 And "it is the love of God which 
naturally includes and places all the rest." 2 Furthermore, 
it is the mystical knowledge of God which is alone directly 
accessible. "God is the only one always accessible by direct 
pursuit." 3 That does not mean that the finite self cannot 
be found as an immediate object of knowledge. The distinction 
here must be seen to be in this, namely, that God stands 
~ in order of the contents of mystical experience. Both 
God and the self as knower~ be objects of immediate experi-
ence, but on~ God can be first in order in that experience. 
Immediacy refers to content already there and available, as 
of something already known and therefore readi~ available 
for any future knowledge. 
But content is not all of the ~stical experi-
enee and enterprise, as mere immediacy is not all. In order 
to bring this fact out we must see that what Hocking means 
by mysticism is something more than mere simple unity in the 
1. MGHE, 434. 
2. Ibid., 435. 
3. Ibid., 435. 
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knowledge whieh the ~stie has: it is that, and it also is 
something else. The ~stical interest, in its over all, must 
consider more than "one world". 
The ~stic might be broadly described as 
the man who is w.illing to drop one world 
of assurance While he seizes another, con-
fident that realit.y w.ill harmonize them 
both, though he cannot yet p-asp the idea 
which does harmonize them. 
Just what is the nature of the problem here? 
Is it some interference of physical nature with a "pure" 
inner rapture? If it is, the matter is not in the least 
disruptive of the ~stical experience. That something li.ke 
the problem of holding two worlds in balance, one against the 
other 1 is normal to the true ~stic appeaz-s to be taken for 
granted by Hocking. There is a fuller certainty, a deeper 
~sticism, Which tends to unite this kind of opposition. 
"But the true ~stic is he Who holds to the reality of both 
worlds, and leaves to time and effort the understanding of 
2 their union." That is, Hocking appears to be saying, the 
union of simplicity, in which there is but one real world, 
is not the union of mature ~ticism. If mysticism were to 
mean that the experience Which a ~stie has is limited to 
. 1. MGHE 1 439. 
2. Ibid., 399. 
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his own subjective or introspective object, that would 
indeed be a thin and evanescent experience 1 truly inef'.f'abl.e 1 
because unrelated and simple. What is needed is contrast .for 
the introspection o.f' the selt, a contrast or other selves and 
o.f' a physical world. But such contrast as does appear is not 
normally destructive o.f' that which it meets o.f' sel.f'-reality. 
Whatever o.f' disjunction ar opposition appears is the result of 
some imper.f'ection ~~process of' relating experiences, a 
process which is within Jey"sticism itself'. Hocking calls it 
"disconnection". 
The element o.f' 1 mystery' or 1 inef.f'ableness' 
in ~stic experience is large~ 1.f' not com-
pletely due to the .fact o.f' disconnection 
alone, not to any inherent Jey'Steriousness 
or unnaturalness in the content o.f' the experi-
ence. l 
This statement is quite crucial to much that 
will follow in this investigation o.f' Hocking's interpretation 
o.f' mysticism. It is becoming clear to us that Dzy"Sticism, to 
Hocking, means more than mere or simple immediacy, o.f' simple 
relatedness w.l..thin the self', a subjective experience. There 
is a problem be.f'ore us. It is · precisely this: 1.f' the mystical 
1. MGHE, 398. 
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experience is not simple and united in simplicity, how can 
it be explaned in terms of immediacy? 
The least complex answer, as a place of 
beginning, which we find in Hocking is that immediacy is not 
lost when the mystical plot thickens. What happens to it, 
then, if not lost? It appears to be given a function of 
greater meaning to the experience and is able to produce some 
work which it was not free to do before, except surreptitious~. 
That is, the work which pure immediacy has been thought to do 
alone and by itself has been done rl th the aid of something 
other than itself. Yet, as was said a'bove, immediacy has 
not fallen upon any evillfhen it is relieved of some of its 
responsibility. · The element of "mystery" which has tended to 
bring mysticism into disgrace before the world is to a large 
degree lessened if we can know how mysticism operates in its 
real nature. 
As we have seen, mystery arises when there 
are two bodies of truth in disconnection, one from the other. 
But, as Hocld.ng says: 
Mystery does not lie in either of the two 
bodies by itself; it expresses the effort of 
each to make terms with the other, and the 
CHAPrER II 
THE MEANING OF MYSTICISM IN HOCKING 
beginning of success. It is the state of 
mind of one who begins to see. Mystery is 
thus the characteristic quality of every 
incipient idea, not yet Wholly seized by 
the milxl. 
This is an important point, we may believe 1 
which Hocking has just made, namely, that :mystery results 
from the unfinished and the incomplete. We may understand, 
in the first place, that Hocking is rejecting certain basic 
'defective attitudes of "mantic and theurgy-mysticism of 
supernatural exploit, seeking short-cut to personal goods." 2 
Along with this self-seeking type of "mysticism" we may 
include the "world avoiding, illusion-casting, zero-worshipping 
mysticism." 3 The practical results, so far as mysticism is 
concerned, are essentially the same, at least as concerns the 
finding of a comprehensive form of mysticism, which both of 
these particular emphases fail to do. How, then, shall 1ve 
understand Hocking's concern and his criticism? We can 
believe that the answer lies within ~ ~ ~ meaning 
of idea, especially as idea, together with its meaning, 
applies to the self and to the ltlole o:t Reality. "The true 
mystic has known well enough that his e:zperience is ••• "ftho~ 
l. MGHE, 398. 
2. Ibid. J xviii. 
3. Ibid., xviii. 
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a response to his awn meaning and within his awn unbroken idea." 1 
However, both the meaning and the idea may be partial, with 
reference to the whole ot all actual and possible experienceJ 
all of which is to say that Hocking's ~sticism is not one ot 
mystery within~ is already~~~ experience but, 
rather,within ~!!!,!not yet been .f'~ brought within~ 
control of' the self'. What is there as content must in sane 
---
way remain open to more content. This, we can believe, is 
implied in the following quotation. 
The ~stic may be regarded, I think, as one 
who is confronted quite empirically with a 
body of' new experience and idea in such wise 
that he is a possessor ot two bodies ~f experi-
ence, neither of which he can doubt. 
We are beginning to catch hold of some of the 
meaning which Hocking places in mysticism. One thing we see 
is that, to him, it is not pure immediacy, an immediacy "fihieh 
takes account of but one world, a wor J.d. of inner experience 
which does not take full account of an external and objective 
world. Yet, to live in the world which experience brings 
from the external and objective world, as though it were the 
only one, is as defective in its immediacy as is the other, 
1. MGHE, 388. 
2. Ibid., 398. 
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that of the introspective object. The solution to the 
problem before us 1 as Hocking gives it 1 is that of combining 
the two, of interjecting process into the two kinds of content. 
A hint of this process is given in the following: 
There is some deep-going practical principle 
here concerned, whose existence we can note ••• 
It is a principle which suspends the operation 
of the ideals of reason, from time to time, 
without in the least questioning or supplanting 
those ideals. We must have consistency in 
the end; we flst have connectedness; we must 
have unity. 
Here Hocking apparently is referring to his 
"principle of alternation", a kind of psychological law or 
limits in the attention-span of the finite mind. But it is 
more than a psychological law; it is also a law of ~tical 
insight 1 metaphysical.l.y. or this we shall see more later. 
Suffice it here to say that the introspective object and the 
physical object are in a constant alternation within the 
self's pattern of reality, a kind of putting out of its "hooks" 
for more definite hold upon Reality. In some manner of deeper 
mystery itself the alternating relation of the experience of 
physical things and the experience or introspective objects 
(both "objects" in a limited sense but not independently so, 
their reality so far being contingent) seek independence and 
1. MGHEI 399. 
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freedom. 
Instead of spinning connections, the ~stic 
strives to be rid of connections, and to reach 
an object which is behind and prior to all 
distinctions. He has practised recollection, 
and has become total. He wishes to be, rather 
than to think; as&Wii:ing that theri is a distinc-
tion between being and thinking. 
The implication in the above quot&:tion is in 
keeping with what we have been saying, and at the same time 
it adds something. That something which is added applies 
to the process within mystical lmowledge. That is, no matter 
what we may discover concerning the knowledge which mysticism 
may present concerning whole Reality, as a content, entirely 
ultimate and therefore non-contingent, so long as we are con-
fronted with contingent lmowledge; being ~ thinking will 
be bound together, i. e., content and process will be one. 
This fact will stand forth more clearly in succeeding sections 
of this investigation, particularly" as we study what Hocking 
means by the judgment of experience, which contains his 
essential inte~etation of mysticism. 2 
The question before us at the present time, 
therefore, is this: llu.st we view ~sticism from the human or 
1. MGHE, 387 • 
2. Given as his position in personal correspondence with 
Professor Hocking, 1953. 
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finite perspective alone? To this question Hi>cldng wou1d 
answer in the following manner: 
· The self' 1 so far from being a wholly 
evident and graspable being 1 as Descartes 
and Berkeley seemed to as~, is infinite 
in its depth and DJiY'&tery. 
The mystic is the one who 1 more than anyone 
else, sees that the finite is bound in with the infinite, 
for it is matter of his awn experience. 
The mystic is simply the person who does 
consciously and with the whole man that 
which we are all doing spontaneously and 
in fragmentary fashion in every moment of 
our effective living. 2 
It is the understanding of the present investi-
gator that lrilat we have in Hocking at this point is still both 
content and process in ~ticism. But let us not lose sight of 
the mystic himself', for he is the one through whom we obtain 
the evidence in support of mysticism. At the present time 
it is not either content or process of experience so much as 
the m;ystic' s individual self'hood that counts. But we will 
knOW' alao that he cannot be ful.ly separated out of the 
mysticism which he experiences. However 1 we do not want to 
1. TOP, 440. 
2. MGHE, 404. 
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lose sight of him, if we can help it. We can leave to 
other sections the analysis o£ the experience. Our desire 
here is to set the m;ystic himself before us, describing him 
in some manner which will give us hints of meaning which are 
contained in the mystical experience. What further can we 
say about him, then, that w.ill be helpful to u.s in our 
investigation? 
He frequently is solitary. "He is not a 
mystic until his 01'ltl spirit has made its solitary leap to 
God, like a tongue of f'la.me out of the midst of the fire." 1 
He is original. "He who merely imitates is 
but a false mystic-for the thing to be imitated is a burst of 
original impulse." 2 
He is one whose insight brings together some 
essentials of self'hood. "mystic insight ••• is a flowing 
together, after some artificial separation, of universal 
and particular." 3 And what experiences is important to him. 
1. MGHE, 402. 
2. MGHE, 403. 
3. MGHE, 428. 
The mystic experience of God's presence is 
either important to the m;ystic or it is 
fraudulent. It cannot be regarded by him 
as a commonplace. In principle it is his 
revelation and has the character of al~ 
revelation--that it authorized him to 
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speltk, and with assurance. Perhaps, 
through him, God is attempting to open 
a new chapter of religious insight. 1 
He, the ~stic, is a person with an idea, 
particularly .!:1 idea of Idea itself, of totality, of 'Which 
he as yet can give no full account, for "there is nothing 
in the ~stic experience not expressible in ideas, except the 
experience itself." 2 The experience and the form go to-
gather and must be lived out in order to be explained. That 
. . .. -
is, the experience of totality has to be put back into the 
setting of the non-total, of the finite situation, and must 
there re-interpret the finite to itself. 
The ~stic is sure of the value of his 
experience. That is, the certainty 'Which the ~stic fails 
to put into ordinary thought-patterns, a.t the moment when he 
is asked to do so, may have little if any of the what of the 
experience in it. 
May it be that the mystic is more sure that 
he is 8ure than of what he is sure,--except 
that he is sure of ~and of his own relation 
to God? In these matters, the that actually 
precedes the what, both in time and in 
importanee. J--
But is the mystic that person among us who 
1. Art.(l944), 191-192. 
2. MGHE, 4.51. 
3. MGHE, 4.53-4.54. 
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can be excused from his ideas? In the first place Hocking 
would saY' that the mystic is not an "observer" of life but 
a "sharer" of it. Whatever his defects maY' be with reference 
to his failure to make clear in ideas what he has experienced 
will be made up in some new "action-meaning" 'Which he will 
produce, which he!! under obligation to produce, William 
James notwithstanding. 
In spite of what James tells us, that the 
mystic 1 s knowledge is not Winding on any 
but himself, it is obvious that the mystic 
is under some radical necessitY' of propaga._ 
ing his truth: is he not ihe most vehement 
propagandist of history? 
It is not so much with ideas as with deeds and 
actions that the my-stic will make known to the world his insights. 
Ideas do not conv&Y' enough of duration, of time-span, for the 
mystic to make much gain by them. There is too much in his 
thought to be presented, except through some "unique action" 
of his life. 
1. MGHE, 363. 
2. LRWF, 167. 
The cosmic demand which comes to him that 
he consider his individual life as a com-
mission, in which the spread of righteous-
ness is to take place through his unique 
action-this is an his~oric and particular 
aspect of God's will. 
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What have we found of value in our investigation 
of the type of ~stie whom Hooking supports? In the first place 
we woulq have to say that Hooking has presented us with ! total 
~, total in the sense, as we have seen, that he is, through 
his experience, bearer of t1ro worlds at one and the same time. 
His task is to reconcile them, for they cannot be independent 
of each other. One of these worlds is the mwstie 1 s own sub-
jeetive nature, his introspective self. The other is the real 
world of his outer experience, the world of physical things. 
His obligation, together with his acceptance of it as his own, 
is what gives meaning to his truth, for he accepts responsibility 
for it. 
What the mystic lmows, then, is "no ineffable 
zero11 , for his knowledge is interpretable through his deed. 
Furthermore, 'What the mystic has fouM. of Reality is no zero, 
no mere Absolute, a "mere neeessity11 • To the ext.ent that he 
is real himself, the ultimate rlll be real also. That is, 
if the mwstic has found his own character, his "whole-idea", 
he has done so through some relation to the character of the 
world and of Reality. Far it is the purpose of his life to 
come into relation to the "~hou" of the universe. 1 
1. A position set forth by Hooking generally but repeated in 
personal correspondence, 1953. 
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The mfStic 1 as experiencer, in Hocking's empla.y-
ment of mfSticism, is made more rather than less valuable to 
the world of fact and idea by virtue of his repeated return to 
what is original in reality. It is he who becomes the world 1 s 
"prophet" and its voice lifted_!!! favor 2£!!!! world. This 
fact is somewhat more distinct in Hocking than in ~sticism 
general~.1 In Hocking the mystic tru~ faces his world, he 
"participates" in it by going to its "heart". 
The 11\Y'Stic who lmows himself is a Jey'stic 1 
not because he finds his world so bad that 
he must effect a spiritual retreat from it; 
but because he finds his world so good that 
he must perform a spiritual journey to the 
heart of it. 2 
In this emphasis, of the ~stic's acceptance 
of the world of fact and of experience, and of the finite self' 
as worthful in his own right 1 Hocking is not in the main streaa 
of historic mysticism. That is, so far as his interpretation 
ps.ychologically and metaphysical~ of the mystic's mood and 
character are concerned, he finds ~sticism more affirmative 
than negative with regard to the physical world. Looking at 
Hocking rationally, i.e., philosophically, we can detect the 
1. We base our statement here largely on the summation of 
mysticism given by Royce, Vol.I, WA.I, 144-145. Hocking 
objects to Royci!!Js "speculative mysticism" as being final. 
cr. Art.(l912), 42. 
2. Art.(l912), 56. 
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reason which lies back of his desire to have the world of 
things, facts, and experiences included in the ~stic's 
understanding of reality. It is because nature assists man 
~ ~ diseoverz of himself~!!_ Nature. There is something 
about ~~ for it is the ground of our experience, as the 
place from which we begin; within its facts and with it as 
a central fact. First of all1we may say about it that it 
is our "plain fact". It is here. 
But however far we succeed in describing, 
explaining, mastering the processes of 
nature, there remains to our insight the 
refractory residue--plain fact. 
A second attitude remains, nameq, that 
of willing acceptance. 
,;To "accept the universe" has a certain 
modest dignity as well as Carqle' s approvalL 
And there is wisdom in Alfred Whitehead' s 
genial platform, "Hang it all, here we are; 
we don't go back of that, we begin with it." 
We must indeed begin with the fact; our 
2 question is, must we also end wit.h it.? 
The ~ic whom Hocking recognizes does both. 
He accepts its fact, but he also interprets the fact. There 
is no attempt to escape from fact or from the world and to 
discover a reality which is removed from this world. On the 
1. Art.(l950), 5. 
2. Ibid., '· 
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contrary, the problem is to remake and recreate this present 
world in terms of the needs. tccording to Hocking, facts are 
not "brute". Speaking of facts, he says: 
As it first presents itself, it is 
certainly not brute: it is the measure 
of our vitality, the definiteness and 
color of our life, its thread of concrete-
ness. It becomes1brute only if it remains to the end dumb. 
The implication to be drawn from this 
quotation is to the effect that fact, as it stands, without 
such interpretation as the mystic can give it, is dumb. And, 
if the ~stic permits fact to remain dumb, such ~sticism as 
is expressed thereby is false, is an abstraction, such as 
Royce renounces. 2aocking1 s position is that a11 of nature, 
a11 of its facts and its contribution to experience, is an 
aid to the mind, for "nothing can stir the 1 depths' of the 
mind, but total out-of-doors.~ 3This is a fundamental attitude 
and approach held by Hocking, and it is primary in any con-
sideration of his mysticism. It is this fact whieh makes his 
mysticism "practical" as we11 as "realistic". For facts, 
assisting as they do in the promotion of experience, become 
1. Art.(l950), 6. 
2. Royce, Vol.I, WAI,144-145. 
3. MGHE, 105. 
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valuable in proportion as they are found to be means to 
the mystic's own self-consciousness, that they are "particulars" 
lf'hich can lend their particUlarity to the self, as pa~ of 
his essential nature. 
The human self is more than a thing of 
nature, because it is more than a fact: 
facts are not conscious of facts,--the 
self is; facts are not values,-the self 
lives on values and is a valueJ facts 
are particulars, not universals,--the 
self is both; facts are presint1--the 
self spans past and future. 
The mystic, according to Hocking's description 
of him, is the one 19ho, more than any other, makes full use 
of all of the factors and the values in nature and in experience. 
For example, his consciousness reaches down into all of its 
various levels, and it reaches into its upper levels as well. 
By "lower" we mean the subconscious as contributor to the 
conscious, and by "upper" we mean what Hocking calls "con-
science". But we are given to understand by Hocking that 
there can be no arbitrary divisions of consciousness. For 
practical reasons we can mark it off, but its unity remains. 
In general what Hocking means by the subconscious, as part of 
the conscious, is given in this statement which follows: 
1. TOP, 442. 
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Our subconsiious at any time may be 
roughly described as that remainder of 
consciousness which persists outside the 
sphere to Which in our various practical 
efforts we deliberate~ narrow our interests.1 
Whatever of apparent separation or division 
there is in the human self, to the ~stic, becomes united 
through his insights into his own and the nature of the world. 
His business is to unite. This is what Hocking is steadily 
declaring. In focussing his attention on reality, the ~stic 
is becoming total, for "whatever may occupy attention, occupies 
the man; it is ~ as a total self, mind-total, who for the 
moment gives himself to that object." 2 This statement is 
an introduction to what later on will be said concerning 
Hocking's use of "whole idea". 
There is something in Hocking's interpretation 
of consciousness, as the unity of the self, Which is basic 
to his interpretation of the true ~stic. For Hocking does 
not view the mental and "practical" nature of the self as 
divisible into abstract faculties. The self is a whole, 
and it is so as a result of its "participation" in nature, 
fellow man, and in God. We can look forward to some further 
1. MGHE, $27. 
2. Ibid.' 131. 
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ward on this topic When we come to the discussion of 
Hocking's interpretation of the human self. A.t the present 
time we may simply point out some of the mare evident relations 
between the self as currently identified and the self 1thich 
Hocking gives us in mysticism. In Hocking, for example, we 
are more and more made aware that all of biology and physiology 
enter into the equation of the self, as does also all of 
the physical world-all levels of experience having their 
bearing upon his total character. But not the physical world 
alone has bearing upon that character, for the whole of the 
spirit of Reality also bears upon it. None of this encounter 
1d th llind am. matter in the total of the self's experience is 
artificial. On the contrary, it is very real, for all of 
it assists both in the growth and the definition of the self. 
In other philosophers, usually, there is a marked tendency 
to emphasize either the body or the mind. An example of the 
latter is E.S.Brightman, who, in defining personality, gives 
"self" a lower rank than he gives to "personality11 , the latter 
being indicated by evidencing more "self-consciousness". 1 
Hocking, on the other band, appears to place a higher value 
1. Brightman, POR, )SQ. 
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upim the self. 
Our point here is that Hocking's self is 
purported by him to be more meaningful than mere personality 
as a direct result of mysticism 'Which he employs in defining 
the self. That is to say, the self as mystic is Hocking's 
most meaningful evaluation of self. And this self as mystic 
is "simple", not complex. Its simplicity appears to stem 
from its oneness and its unity within its own nature. "It 
is thus an effortless self, and therewith a necessar.y will, 
that we must seek. · And for the same reason, it is a simple 
self, not involved in our artificial distinctions." 1 Its 
simplicity "is both subjective and objective, and whose ! 
2 priori, or 'antici]:ated attainment' is concrete." 
The mystical self which Hocking is 
attempting to give us is a self "connected-in" with all 
of nature, but proceeding on to Nature, with real participation 
in each. This mystical self is concrete in the sense that 
it is one 'With the whole of its experience. It is "bNiAAica.l" 
as well as "psychological", in other words, it is "realistic". 
This point is given support by turning to a description of 
"knowledge" which Hocking gives us, a description which has 
1. MGHE 1 437. 
2. Ibid., 437n. 
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value for the mystical self, iaasmuch as he is not to be 
separated from his knowing. This is what Hocking refers to 
as the "germ-cell" theory. He says : 
The progress of knowledge has rather more 
in common with the development of a germ-
cell than with the building of a brick wall; 
something of the whole present ~ active in 
that cell from the beginning." 
He then moves on to a rejection(partially, at 
least) of the germ-cell metaphor and makes reference to a 
"germ-thought", still borrowing heavily, we feel, from the 
other. But his meaning is clearly implied. The whole is 
present in its beginning. Reality, in other words, is 
'Whole Reality at any time that a whole self meets it, just 
as, for instance, the universe is whole. Our experience of 
it is never fully complete(ideally) but ~ effect upon us 
is complete, and during the whole of the life-span. The 
lmowledge 19hich it is possible to have of the universe(as 
also of Reality, so Hocking would hold) is gained by 
yielding to it and by taking its "necessity" into ourselves, 
effortlessly. Such is the manner and the quality of the 
"participation" of the mystical self in Nature. 
1. MGHE, 95. 
CHAPTER II 
THE MEANING OF MYSTICISM IN HOCKING 
Hocking's mystical self, we must hold1 in 
the final analysis, must be described in terms of such 
nascent wholeness as is possible in any area of his experience 
or his lmowledge. In other words 1 he has wholeness placed 
within himself' 1 to which he must measure up1 as it were. 
Is not this ideal of wholeness, which also 
is the "concrete individual", mystically considered, something 
akin to Plato's Ideas? This question, together with other 
matters concerning the kind of idealism we find in Hocking, 
will now be taken up. 
2. The relation of Hocking's 5rsticism ~ his philosophy. 
The statement that all philosophy is idealism 1 
lays down some broad lines concerning idealism without being 
very determinate as to~ of idealism. The general implication 
of the statement is that "the world has a meaning". 2 
What is Hocking' s"type" of idealism? He 
calls it a "realistic m;rsticism",3 which perhaps is as good 
a designation as could be found. 
1. MGHE1 xx:. 
2. TOP 1 438. 
3. LmiF, 7. 
Both realism and mysticism thus appear as 
aspects of an idealistic world-view 1 which 
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explains and places them both; while they 1 
in turn, make clearer the practical necessity 
of rhythm or alternation. An element of 
supernaturalism (asceticism and world-flight) 
must be taken together wi. th an element of 
humanism to maki up a working programme o:f 
the good life. 
That is, philosophy, according to Hocking, is 
the theory about reality. "Philosophy finds its Real in the 
third person, not in the second: it ends in the announcement, 
2 
•Lo, he is there,' not in the address, 1 Lo1 Thou art here'•" 
The m;ystie is he who, finishing his philosophy, 
or more frequently, anticipating its conclusion, 
breaks through the film of objectivity involved 
in the theoretical relation and adopts toward 
his God the vocative case. In that new relajion 
lies all that is distiiictive in m;ysticism. 
Accordingly, the m;ystic, as philosopher, reaches 
his object with a deeper penetration of understanding than does 
the cognition of the theoretical reasoner. Such a theorist, 
though, presumab~, could not be an "idealist" in Hocking's 
sense, for according to his statement a satisfactorily complete 
idealism . includes ysticism, along 1li. th realism, as one of its 
essential aspects. However, it does not necessarily follow 
1. TOP, 421. 
2. Art.(l912), 41. 
3. Ibid., 41. 
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that mysticism~ reach its object via the theory of 
philosophy. Likewise, following the same course of reasoning, 
it does not necessarily follow that mwsticism will present 
the individual to his object, theoretically, through theology. 
Yet, in atteq>ting to grasp the kernel of 
Hocking's meaning concerning the relation of mysticism to hi• 
type of idealism, we should not expect to find mysticism 
standing apart from it. The idealism lthich he supports is 
bound-in with mysticism. Before we can say much about his 
idealism we should try to bring forth some more of his mean-
ing of mysticism and then attmmpt to bring the two together. 
Exactly what Hocking means by mysticism is 
not superficially clear. If it were, it would not be mysticism 
sufficiently profound to be the primary support of a philosophy 
such as his. We are compelled to look beneath the surface of 
ordinary ideas and common meanings. Even the usual definition 
of mysticism as immediate knowledge,or relation to~ object 
!2 ~ manner of direct approach, does not fully satisfy. 
As we tried to show in the first section 
of this chapter, the difficulty which we face is due to the 
material at hand, Which does not pattern on precise definition 
45 
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but wbieh,rather, follows more closely the word-pictures 
and idea pictures of' analogy and metaphor. Ideas alone 
cannot do justice to the thing which is alive and which 
appears to be in some process of' alternation between change 
and the changeless within itself'. "Hence in identifying 
the living thing, we naturally look toward nucleus and germ, 
behind the differentiated and explicit." 1 
Whatever may be meant by the metaphors 
and other picture-language which6'£ related to conscious 
life and its history in a human self, the fact remains that 
what is needed is some interpretation and understanding of' 
'Wholeness, within the self and also without the self'. The 
intellect and its ideas are not the total of that wholeness. 
They are, as it were, feelers, sparks, 
signals, thrown out by the deeper reality, 
and subject forever to its own ultimate 
ends. Ideas crop out like leaves; if they 
are cropped off, the r~ot lives on--and 
produces more leaves. 
The whole is not yet. But a solution to 
the problem has to be forthcoming from some quarter, perhaps 
the result of some additional meanings or some new definitions. 
Hocking does offer some hope of a solution 
1. MGHE, 45. 
2. Ibid., 45. 
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through idea itself 1 of which we will see more in a following 
chapter. Suffice it now to say that his notion of idea is 
one which puts feeling and change at its center, attempting 
to make of it an expression of the self. Idea, so considered, 
will be seen to contain some pragmatic value as well as some 
metaphysical meaning. 
some kind. 
By philosophy Hocking assumes meaning of 
It follows that every philosophy of whatever 
type is bound to assume that the universe 
has a meaning (or a system of meanings) ; a 
meaning which is objective 1 in the sense 
that it is there whether or not you or I 
disciver it 1 but which can be discerned by 
us. 
That is 1 reality !! meaningful. And, although 
our particular philosophy may not intend to convey that meaning, 
the meaning is there and will reveal itself as thought works its 
way toward any kind of conceived whole. 
Philosophy, strictly because the universe is 
meaning packed, cannot help but deal with something of the 
wholeness and the certainty which is present in reality. The 
reason for this fact is due to the nature of the world, which, 
as Hocking holds, is a self. 
l.TOP, 437. 
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This proposition, that the world is a self, 
I regard as a point of certainty in philos-
ophy. And therewith I confess another be1ief1--
the belief that philosophy aims at certainty, 
and can be content with nothing !iss. 1 
The direction of all philos q:>hy is toward 
certainty, which is a kind of ontological content presumed 
as the basis of philosophy. This could mean that Hocking 
intends to say tba t systematic thought will come out in meaning 
because it rests on certainty, eTen though it may not be aware 
of that certainty Which lies at its core. Something !! alreaqy 
given, as a beginning content. Or he cou1d. mean that what is 
foun:i to £! given is no "blind" or 11 dumb" datum, sim:p1y there 
to be impressed upon the waiting but passive mind, but, instead, 
it is reality waiting for the active mind to "participate" in 
it for the completion of its meaning. If this latter position 
is the correct one 1 with reference to Hocking' a notion of 
philosophical certainty, then we must say that the soecalled 
"content" of experience is a content which is fashioned by some 
kind of furthering action upon it. And, if Reality is not so 
independent as to require no participating factors within its 
nature to reveal its meaning, then we may correctly assume, so 
1. TOP, 443. 
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we believe, that llbat we may view as being the content 2!:, 
Reality!! never simp1y there, ready made and somewhat menacing 
with regard to the reality of the finite self. Some eo-operative 
response is needed in Reality if selfhood is to contain the 
integrity which we experience as belonging to it. Neither the 
ultimate nature of reality nor the basic reality of the finite 
self can prove to be meat ingful for each other, in terms of 
Real.ity, without some co-operative effort which will reveal 
their practical value. Neither "side of the shield", by itself, 
is the whole shield. What else could the follalfing quotation 
imply ? 
And since meanings are abstractions unless 
they are somehow known or felt or appreciated, 
the existence of objective meaning in the 
world implies some kind of mental life at 
the core of reality. 1 
We believe we are getting closer all the time 
to Hocking's JllSticism. Could it be that by mysticism he means 
. to say that it is~ mediating influence~ the center of 
idealism which brings forth the co-operative activity of the 
the self of the world,and of reality in general, ~ the 
1. TOP, 437. 
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finite self, reducing the abstract in each in proportion as 
they reach ~ch other, indeterminately, by some action which 
is natural in each but not a limitation of each other? We 
believe we have foum this to be the intention of Hocking 1 s 
philosophy, via his mysticism. Let us proceed with the proof. 
"Content" is not what Hocking means by 
mysticism, although it is ii'IV'olved in it &Bd is! result of 
of it. This fact, we believe, will stand clear as we relieve 
mysticism of the charge of simple immediacy 1 'Which cannot be 
accomplished at this point or our discussion but Which, we hope, 
will be proven before we are entirely through with this present 
investigation, in its wholeness. Some portion of our eon-
elusion can, however, be given as we proceed. The conclusion 
toward 'Which we are working, ire believe, is this, namely, that 
m;ysticism is the method of knowledge, making constant~~ 
its findings!! content;~ order to progress toward~ knawledge. 
More particularly, mysticism as used by Hocking, is.! method 
of knONledge. As.! method, we further believe that it is a 
particular type of dialectic, which Hocking calls the judgment 
,2! experience. 
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In no place in his writings, so far as we have 
been able to determine, does Hocking give a specific eaample 
of what he JJBans by this judgment of experience. What he 
appears to mean by it must be shmm as the context of his 
general discussion. However, we hope to show something of 
the judgment of experience, as an operating principle, through-
out the remainder of our discussion, particular~ in our section 
on the judgment of experience in relation to Hocking's use of 
idea, in chapter IV. Here we may indicate something of its 
nature by saying that it involves the discovery of the self 
-- -----
~relation, always,~~~!!:!!:. moment,~ other selves, 
~thing world, and to.! world .!!!!• The amount of reality 
which is a given element of this whole relationship is, at 
its beginning, a mere "That", a sense of abstract wholeness 
which has an intention of becoming a "What". The ~ of 
mysticism, so Hocking holds, must be identified with .!!!l ~ 
happiness, for, as he says, "Reality must be defined as the 
region wherin I oan identify my happiness with my own success." 1 
That is to say, the connection which the individual has with 
Reality is such that the individual does not lose his own 
1. MGHE, 502. 
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reality. 
In some manner,which requires further investi-
gation to make clear, the mystical enterprise, presumab]Jr 
through the judgmmt of experience, has to interpret Reality 
intimately. But, as has been said, the relation which the 
1 individual sustains to Reality is one of "participation". 
That is to say, mysticism provides the true basis for such 
participation, a participation whiCh philosophy merely 
describes. 
Philosophy finds its Real in the third person, 
not in the second: it ends in the announce-
ment, "Lo, he is there," not in the address, 
"Lo, Thou art here". Before that presence, 
we, as philosophers, stand dumb and awkward,--
we have nothing to say. The mystic is he Who, 
finishing his philosophy, or more frequently, 
anticipating its conclusion, breaks through 
the film of objectivity involved in the theo-
retical relation ~d adopts toward his God 
the vocative case. 
That is, the Reality of mysticism is non-
competing but is co-operative instead. This is a fact which 
the judgment of &Bperience makes clear to us. Hocking says 
concerning what is generally called the 11 supreme power" of 
Reality, "I suggest the principle that the supreme power in 
1. Given in personal correspondence with Professor Hocking. 
2. Art.(l912), 41. 
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every case is a ~-competing power, one which may seem at 
first glance even irrelevant to the point at issue." 1 
This position is, although not wholly new in ~sticism, given 
a new emphasis in Hocking. The question Which presents it-
self to us is 1 how is this new emphasis possible?· 
The answer in part is fourrl in Hocking 1 s 
phj'losophy, but more particularly it is found in his ~sticism, 
out of which his conceptualized and generally mare abstract 
theory of reality emerges. And within ~sticism the emergence 
takes place within the judgment of experience, "effortlessly", 
because intimately and co-operatively, "participating" in 
the Reality which it discovers, rather than standing on the 
outside and viewing the Real externally. This fact of partici-
. ! ' 
pation, an "apprenticeship in creativity" 1 is a much deeper 
an.d more significant understanding of Reality than is ilmned.iacy. 
How is participation made actual? Hocking indicates that it is 
through the ttdialectic", but, interpreted according to his 
own use of the term, it is the judgment of experience, in which 
participation and intimacy in and with Reality is, not only 
possible 1 but actual. 
1~ MGHE1 221. 
2. Given through personal correspondence, and implied generally 
in his formal treatises, especially his THE and the MGHE. 
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Not that we are ready for the main argument in 
r~vor of the judgment of experience as being the primary 
'functioning principle in Hocking 1 s mysticism which can sustain 
the primacy of mysticism over philosophy and other theoretical 
systems, but only that we do need to see some of the operation 
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of it so that we can nake some statements and make some distinctions 
between his philosophy on the one hand and his mysticism on the 
other. We are ready to proceed 1d th some of the general program 
or the judgment of experience, as a process which can give us 
the understanding or the self, out of 'Which understanding our 
theory in terms of concept can develop. But before we do so 
we should pause to recognize that our organization or the judgment 
of experience into conceptually comprehended terms is thereby 
making of it a philosophy rather than a mysticism, which, perhaps, 
is wh.a t Hocking means philosophy to be-an explanation in such 
universals in idea as will be sharable w.i.th other selves. 
The judgment of experience, as the basic 
operation within mysticism, takes the raw experiences of life 
and subjects them to an analysis of "necessity". That is, 
It does full justice to the empirical and 
experimental geni us of our age, -while recog-
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nizing, as empiricism does not, that the 
last truth in order of discovery may well 
be a necessary truth,--one which has been 
from the very first an unrecognized factor 
in our thought. The final success of the 
inductive method 1sthe uncoveririg or necessary 
~ ! priori truth:-1- -
Experience by itself is immediate, but its 
immediacr.Y is so ultimate and far-removed as to constitute no 
knowledge. The judgn:ent of experience takes the ultimate, the 
necessarily abstract and undifferentiated, out of experience 
and places it in ever new situations which are propetious for 
new and enlarged understanding. In this manner the abstract 
and overly particular(particular because bearing so closely 
on the origin of the self) is given some universal character, 
some usable form, made gnerally available for distribution as 
some truth, even some ! priori truth, which all selves can 
consume. This is, so we should be led to understand, the meaning 
of the following statement. 
1. TOP, 434. 
2. TOP, 442. 
The ultimate evidence for the selfhood of 
the whole is not primarily the evidence of 
argument, however, nor of analogy, but that 
of immediatl experience, interpreted by 
dialectic. 
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The primary difference between mysticism 
and philosophy is that which is usual~ understood as bbtaining 
between knowledge of something by acquaintance with it and 
knowledge about it, indirectly. Mysticism is the direct, 
or better, ~ participation knowladge which we have of selves, 
whereas philosophy gives us knowledge through opposition or 
in contradistinction to the self or thing as known by a 
conceptualizing knower. 
The mystic has his denials, but they are 
primarily a casting away of distinctions, one after the other, 
until some new method of approach is found, w.i thout conceptual 
distinctions, discovering objects of "effortless appreciation."1 
That is, the object upon which the mystic has "benttt his 
attention "becomes actual~ significant of ~ llhole •" 2 
That is, the mystic finds that the objects which can be 
entered, through participation, are the ones which are 
significant of the whole, for they have the whole in them-
selves through their own participation in it. 
To the extent that Hocking holds that mysticism. 
is involved in the matter of discovering whole truths and 
1. MGHE, 422. 
2. Ibid., 423. 
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whole meanings he implies a significant relation between 
philosophy and mysticism. And the manner in which the two 
are involved is in the way which each attempts the discovery of 
parts and wholes in our world of experience. 
In the world of minis, the part can include 
the whole 1 and is cootinually engaged in 
doing so, however partial a member1it may be of any whole to which it belongs. 
This is the point of criticism in Royce, we 
may understand, of the Absolute in mysticism, that it does~ 
submit to being participated in on the part of the finite with-
out the loss of the finite into nothingness. Hocking's position, 
as we have seen, is that there is participation without such 
loss. Of the danger of loss in abstraction, Royce says: 
It follows that if Mysticism is to escape 
from its own finitude, and real~ is to mean 
by its absolute !eing anything but a Mere 
Nothing, its account of Being must be so 
amended as to involve the assertion that 
our finite life is not mere illusion, that 
our ideas are not merely false, and that 
we are already~ even as finite, in touch 
with Reality. 
It is in the fact of wh•leness which is 
present to the finite mind wtuheh causes the finite to regard 
1. MAS, 368. 
2. Royce, WAI, Vol. I, 182. 
58 
CHAPTER II 
THE M&ANING OF MYSTICISM IN HOCKING 
itself _!! finite, but which at the same time gives it a 
"hope" lfh.ich is its release from finite limitations, so we 
beiieve Hocking would hold. It appears that Hocking asserts 
the presence of ~sticism in just such situations as these. 
Such ~sticism is a manifestation of process, the operation 
of which is in the judgment of experience. Still the experi-
ence of wholeness in the finite and participation is so 
continuous, or nearly so, as to constitute some content as 
well. Actually, it is not content and process which are 
at variance with each other within Hocking's "realistic 
~stieism" so much as it is immediacy and union on the one 
side and participation on the other. Content and -process 
go together in Hocking's judgment of experience, as does 
also the notion of participation. -But immediacy and union 
seem to threaten the reality of the individual self, which 
is contrary to the spirit of Hocking, as we have seen in 
part but as we will see more fully as we proceed. 
It is in the judgment of experience, then, 
where the self knows some escape from his own finitude. It 
is his opportunity to decf.'Ue his "everlasting yea", in the 
presence of the "no" of separation and of limitation which 
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is the constant despair of the merely finite. To have 
such a hope is itself an indication of some normalcy, as 
a lack of it would be some evidence of illness. 
A life lived ••• without a sense of the cosmic 
demand, is already, whether it knows it or 
not, sick, off from normal, its values in-
59 
fected with the dry rot of mortality, intrinsi-
cally unhappy because unreal, driven subconscdiUsly 
by a need wbfch same day it is bound to recognize 
and define. 
But the positive approach to the world of mean-
ings does not permit us to cut off that world as in itself an 
illusion. That is, the reality of things is a part of that hope 
which is the salvation of the finite. To be saved from itself 
stands as the greatest need of finite selfhood. To kncnr itself 
as an end to its knowledge is its despair. For this reason 
the finite individual asserts the otherness of himself. In 
doing so is his only safeguard against isolation and annihilat-
ion. All finites must be considered to be real by reason of 
the fact that the whole functions through them and that they 
need each other for self-fulfillment. It we say that the only 
reality which things have is that which comes from our om 
knowledge of them we do ourselves and these objects an injustice, 
1. SIG, 49. 
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for we then are saying in effect that the whole is not to be 
found in all of the parts 1 but only in some of them. 
Both ~sticism and philo$0phy, in Hocking's 
use and interpretation of them, are in the business of truth-
building and of truth-getting. Philosophy builds upon ideas 
and concepts, upon insights which it has built out of and 
derived from mysticism. Mysticism takes its truth from experi-
ence, the result of some ever-present participation in Reality, 
from which meanings for selfhood constantly accrue. But the 
thought, as is sometimes expressed, that ~tical knowledge is 
original in the sense that it had no beginning in experience 
is false, far mysticism is fashioned out of that insight, 
that its deepest and most meaningful knowledge did arise at 
the same moment that the finite knower became conscious of 
himself t and therefore was "parented". This is one of the 
-----
most important contributions of' Hocking's srsticism!2 ~ 
field 2! conceptual,~~ philosophical, knowledge. Of 
this original knowledge Hocking sayss 
Many of the judgments 1Vhich the ~stic now 
coins, judgments contributory to science and 
the arts, will appear to him unparented. They 
simply arise in his mind. The same 1 I think, 
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may be said of all our unparented lmowledge, 
that lmowledge which we attribute vaguely to 
1 inspiration, I and of which we speak dogmati-
cally, saying, 11it must be so": all such mow-
ledge bas as one parent this same original 
knowledge of the eternal. 
The11parented11 knowledge, or lmowledge based on 
some prior lmowledge, without at the same time running the risk 
of losing the value of that lmowledge because of an "infinite 
regress" of knowledge, is difficult, if not impossible to under-
stand, except as it is placed within the frame of mystical 
experience. But once it is placed in that particular frame of 
reference it can begin to bear meaning in conceptual terms. 
This appears to be the interpretation which Hocking intends 
to give it. The "Thou" of the universe is the parent in which 
the "germ" of our mm individuality participates, in "love", 
through the "world self" ,and through that in turn to fellow-
selfhood, via idea. Thus idea is not the beginning of knowledge} 
experience is. "For what is the myatic experience but finding 
the idea of the whole, as love finds the idea of a person?" 2 
The position which we are taking here, in our 
atteq:>t to interpret what Hi»cki.ng means by mysticism, is that 
1. YGHE, 461. 
2. Ibid., 433. 
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the notion of participation is more significant than is 
the notion of immediacy, that participation is more akin 
to love than is immediacy. Further 1 we believe that the 
notion of love constitutes a more fructifying principle 
than does immediacy 1 far love is a power which reciprocates 
and ldlich is constant within the process of parenting knowledge. 
Out of love, much more than out of immediacy 1 is born the idea 
'Which is the basis af philosophy itself. Therefore, ~ base 
~connection between mwsticism~· philoeophy ~~notion 
2!, participation-in-love 1 as constituting Hocking's primary 
meaning of the relation of the finite self to the infinite 
Self 1 and vice versa. 
Love is a revelation like that af the ~stie1 
full of significance ••• This is the central 
fact of all mysticism: namely', that the dis-
covery of the individual is always a discovery 
of truth, of a powerfully synthetic idea, and 
yet not by way of effortful thinking. 1 
The meaning of the notion of "love" as used 
here is not such that it can "create" another self 1 ~ ~ ~ 
create the knowledge of another self, through participation 
in him. And, if this is so, we are able to reverse the statement 
1. MGHE, 433. 
b2; 
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that~~!!~~ perceived and say, rather, that~ be 
~ !2 ~ loved. This kind of love is that "powerfully synthetic 
idea" mentioned above. It is "synthetic" in the sense that 
it participates creatively, relating independents in a kind 
6). 
of dependency which does not destroy but which gives individuality. 
This, we may believe, is what Hocking means when he says, "This 
perception of the other as an individual being is Love, in 
its special meaning." 1 
Mysticism, then, seeks its object through love. 
And, at the moment that the object is found, a close bond is 
established between it and its knower, with the result that 
some additional m!!aning is imparted to each. This appears to 
be in part what is implied in the following quotation: 
1. MGHE, 432. 
2. Ibid., 434. 
In this idea it is able not to sink but to 
suspend its criticisms of existence; it is 
not reconciled to defects, but it sees same-
thing more than dead fact, even some meaning, 
in their presence ••• For the idea Which thus 
of itself absorbs our hostilities, binding 
our many and divergent judgments in powerful 
8,1nthesis, is won not by the effort of the 
theoretic will, but by coming effortlessly 
upon the spirit of the world, as an individual 
being, simple, wonderful, and in close union 
with the individual in oneself. 2 
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Hocking's ~sticism is a counterpart of his 
idealistic philosophy ~ich"parallels"it in the following 
l!eS}:'B ct: (1) It contains and uses an epistemology, for it 
is a nway of knowing", with a system, which is found in the 
dialectic of the judgment of experience. (2} 11It is a definite 
metaphysical doctrine • 11 (3) And it is "an ethics or way of 
life." 1 His type of mysticism is limited to one kj"pd., "which 
2 is activistic, and moralistic". But it is hardly correct 
to say that the two "parallel" each other, for there are 
w.t thin the structure of his idealism elements of mysticism 
throughout. We are, as it were, thrown back once more upon 
the figure of the "germ cell", wherein we see that some of the 
whole is present to the parts and the parts to the whole through-
out. Reality, we are given to understand, is not constructed 
like a brick wall, brick at a time. Rather, it is a living 
whole, a reality by its very nature. 
The philosophy which seems best able to support 
the interests of mysticism is composite, the "synthesis" of 
which, according to Hocking, is a combination of realism and 
idealism, resulting in what Hocld.ng calls "radical idealism", 3 
1. TOP, 382. 
2. Martin, EPR, 15. 
3. M:GHE, xx:. 
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with elements of all types of other systems included, so far 
as these systems contribute to the meaningful kind of empiri-
cism which operates in mysticism. 
We hold that nothing in all that Hocking says 
about mysticism, 'Whether this latter is colilidered from the 
point of view of its theory or of its practice, is of greater 
consequence to an understanding of what he means by it than 
his assertion that it is discovered in and through the "judgment 
of experience" and that its nature is that of empiricism with 
meanings added which can complete the 19hole of essential experi-
ence and human need. A direct quotation from Hocking should 
make this position final in our thought. He says: "You are 
entirely right in seeing mysticism through the light of the 
judgment of experience. It is the ideally widened empiricism. 
But all empiricism is provisional, aiming to an eventual under-
standing." 1 
Hocking's emphasis upon the judgment of 
experience is restated here for the reason that it has bearing 
upon his "idealism" as well upon his mysticism. Whatever is 
found to be valid within mysticism and from its point of view 
1. Personal correspondence(l953). The above quotation indicates 
the direction which this study must take. 
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will also be valid for his idealism. That is to say, Hocking's 
idealism appears to be but an interpretation, in terms of some 
further understanding, of his ~sticism. 
As to the form of Hocking's radical idealism, 
we may here say that what the metaphysics, epistemology, and 
ethics of his mysticism turn out to be, so will his philosophy 
be also. We have thus far indicated that his ~sticism does 
have a metaphysics( we may here state in anticipation of some 
defining marks of what he means by "experience" that Hocking 
holds this latter term to be metaphysical in nature). Some 
of it we have hinted at in connection with the term which we 
have called "participation". A word of similar meaning we 
found to be "love". His use of epistemology in the judgment 
of experience(as we shall see farther along in our study) 
assumes the reality of the objects of sense, and of other 
selves, including that of the physical world, and of God. His 
ideas( as we hope to show in chapter IV) do not "absorb" their 
objects; they participate in them. All empiricism is, as Hocking 
says,"provisional, aiming to an evt.l4:'tk~l understanding." 1 
Therefore, ~ objects .2f experience must be held to be pro-
1. ~feet above in connection with Hocking 1 s mysticism. 
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visional also, aiming toward some understanding, 'Which 
understanding means ~ and for selfhood, which is Hocking 1 s 
ultimate metaphysical concept ( and experience) • But self 
is more than "mind"; it is mind, plus body, plus the tension 
between the two which extends through them to the world of 
other selves and of physical things. Morally, man is respons-
ible for the acquiring of immortality. "One life is given 
1 
us; another may be acquired." "Present history", says 
Hocking of man, is 11his sphere of divine control." 2 The 
implication of this latter quotation may be assumed to be 
obviousl 
The "activism" and the sense of moral duty, 
both of which are defining marks of Hocking 1 s mysticism, are 
employed in his understanding of the relatien of fact and idea. 
The following quotation will serve to illustrate what he means 
by both as they apply to the idea and its object. 
1. MGHE, 514. 
2. Ibid., 514. 
In knowing, there is something tentative. 
I 11attend11 ; I stretch toward the object to 
gain from it its power; as I do so, I have 
a growing sense of my own power; I am aware 
that the time is coming when the roles 'Will 
be reversed, the object will attend to me. 
As with completet' .• bserva.tion, I extract 
from the object more and more of its essence. 
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I build my world of ideas, and rejoice in 
it for its awn sake; but I am also building 
lightning into my cloud. There is increasing 
tension, almost duplicity, as I push apart the 
world of idea and the world of fact. In action, 
this tension is released; the two worlds resume 
their union. 
Such objectivity as this union of our world 
suggests, whether in the field of philosophy proper or in 
that of mysticism, carries with it the determination that its 
objects shall be real objects, ~ that there 1!, ~way to 
them, morally. This is what the judgment of experience, a 
kind of "synoptic reason", requires. The llhole self must be 
found in the whole of a real world, potentially, but possible 
of fulfb.lment( .As we · have seen, the principle of participation, 
or love, is essentially moral. Its operation creates the whole 
of the •U~which Hocking posits in the self. Thus we 
find both process and content in Hocking's mysticism, a 
combination which we have no reason to deny as belonging to 
his radical idealism as well.) This, we believe, is what 
Hocking means by mysticism, and what is carried over into 
his radical idealism. Physiologically, a similar emphasis 
is seen in psychology, which is called the "all or nothing" 
1. Art.(l951), 338-339. 
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l. theory ··· now being applied to the self as a total response 
to value in a world Where both value and response are not 
merely possibilities within the framework of our experience 
but where they are demands made upon us. The "illusive 
meaning of our lives" is resolved by a discovery of value 
and by an adequate response to it. It is the ~stic who 
repeatedly makes this discovery for us, as it is the ~stic 
who keeps us from falling back into values of "middling 
worth.n 2 
The ~tic is the one llho takes the world 
at its own estimation, not as superficially given but as given 
through a morally responsible approach to experience. Neutrali-
ties, the ~stic has found, have no place in the experience 
of living, for nature, providing us with example, is always 
taking sides. The choice of an "either-or'' is ever before 
us. 
We find it very difficult, if not altogether 
impossible 1 to make a choice of "both-and" wi. th regard to 
ultimate values. We must choose between good and evil, 
1. Art.(l951), 338-339. 
2. Munn, PSY, 381 344-345. 
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value and no value( or gradations of value), God or no God. 
But when we narrow the matter down to a final choice, one 
which touches on our own reality as a metaphysical entity, 
we are forced to choose that as ultimate in nature which 
best suits Nature. That is, the physical and material of 
our experience must give way to value and purpose. causes 
must be taken up in the judgment of experience where they 
will be shown to be valid or invalid, but not as ends, 
merely as means which rationality employs. 
Superficial realisms, pragmatisms-in fact 
all naturalism--, and subjective idealism as well, all come 
from the limitation of Reality to nature. To the extent 
that the self is limited to its own subjectivity, imposing 
its own terms on the physical world, it is productive of 
that kind of idealism which is "intollerably 1mfinished." 1 
On the other hand, idealism is episte:mologically dualistic, 
metaphysically monistic, and morally challenged to enter 
into a relationship of participation with God, an "apprentice-
ship of creativity", 'When it is based on a mysticism such 
7Cl 
1. Cf. "Preface" of .MGHE, and TOP, 262-272, also SBF, Chapter III • 
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as we find in Hocld.ng. 
In being thought of, the se~f is made a 
member of the wor Ia: of experience, and 
aelmowledged as active there. It is 
thought of, because in being thought ~' ithas had differences to make. 1 
So also 1li th regard to the Absolute. It is 
"empty" and abstract if our notion of the self is empty, for 
the empty self of subjectivity becomes the objectionable form 
of the Absolute which can make no real di.fferences to a real 
world for the reason that is not valid for the world. In 
being purely subjective, in the ease of the human self, or 
wholly transcendent, with reference to the Absolute, reality 
represents nothing but irrationality. 
The abstract universal, either in the Absolute 
or in the psychological subjectivity of an epistemological~ 
monistic idealism, is, perhaps, chargeable to the fact that 
the finite mind has no faculty, of a special nature, for the 
!mowing of physical objectivity. 2 
1. MGHE, 201. 
2. Cf. THE, "Preface", iv, and MGHE, 62, 370-371. 
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3. The relation of Hocking's mysticism to psychology. 
As in the ease of Hocking's mysticism becoming 
his idealism, his philosophy, giving it its distinctive mark-
ings, so also, perhaps, in the case of ps.ychology, what it 
will show itself to be ldll be determined by the JI\YSticism 
which lies at its root. This is one consideration Which it 
devolves upon us to try to show. A further matter which will 
focus our attention here is the relation of general psychology 
to the elucidation of immediacy, while still another will 
concern the relation of the human self's mind to his boqy, 
psychologicall¥• 
If we begin with psychology 1 we will end up 
with a science of experiences of the physical self or with 
experiences of a mental self 1 both of which, taken singly, 
are defective When viewed from the standpoint of mysticism. 
That is, as we will see more fully later on in this study, 
Hocking's mysticism requires that body and mind do not stand 
in isolation of each other. Mind and body "participate" in 
each other by reason of their whole, which is the self. 1 
Mind and its interpretations are indicated analogically on 
1. This is the topic under investigation in chapter V of 
this work. 
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one side of a cloth, 'While body is found similarly on the 
other, both sides belonging to a single cloth. For where 
introspective "self-expression falters the signs of meaning 
may still be read in causes and effects." 1 That is, the 
physiological or boqy side of the cloth, in psychology, is 
a kind of getting perspective, as it were, on the mind side, 
'Which latter usually stands so close to the self that it 
cannot be appraised without some aid from some more "objective" 
relation to itself. 
The thread of meaning, often lost to the 
~stic himself in his ecstatic moment, 
may at that very moment appear, so to 
speak, on the reverse of the cloth, as 
something accomplished in th~ active 
disposition of the subject. 
This, as we can see, is not a11taking sides" 
with any particular school of psychology, nor is it 11eclectic 11 • 
It is an attempt to practice some general good judgment as 
a result of some combination of experience and interpretation 
arising out of ~sticism. For, let us remember that Hocking 
defines mysticism as judgment ,!!! experience, or, in other 
words it is is the pure immediacy of experience interpreted 
by reason. That 19hich comes out of experience, then, the 
1~ Art.(l912), 38. 
2. Ibid., 38. 
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"causes and effects", must be brought under some interpre-
tation Which is able to include them in the meanings gained. 
Thus it is not physi~ogy alone, nor is it mind alone which 
gives us the general structure of a true psychology, in 
Hocking's terms. 
Before a psychology of ~ticism can be 
given, the general status of mind and its objects must first 
be determined, particularly with a view to knowing whether 
the experience is, on the one hand, either primarily physical 
or mental, or,on the other1whether theze is not some relation 
between the physical and the mental which is itself the real 
basis of our experience. This assumption of a primary ground 
other than either the physical or the mental objects as such 
may seem to reach out beyond the limits of psychology itself, 
to a metaphysics in Which is contained some principles of 
psychology, which is precisely the case. That is, to the 
extent that psychology involves evaluations~ mysticism 
psychology itself will have to come under the regulations 
which are given by mysticism. 
-
Both kinds of objects, those Which are physical 
and those which are mental, can be placed only on condition 
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that they are grounded in the dominant motive of the mwstic, 
which is to discover Reality, which he finds in Other Mind 
and in self-consciousness. The self-knowledge which results, 
but which also is the motive, is the most difficult of all 
knowledge to obtain. 
Self-consciousness is subtle and elusive; 
self-knowledge, or significant self-conscious-
ness, is the most difficult of lmowledges. 
Success in swizing that in self upon which 
one would turn, in self-analysis, self 
expression, discerning of one's actual motive 
or actual state of feeling, depends upon 
a certain gift, a genius of self-capture, 
a skill in fixing the retreating shadow; 
and for this there seim to be no rules of 
technical procedure. 
But this lmowledge must be obtained. It 
must be there in essence before psychological analysis can 
begin. The lVhole self, present to psychology in its physiology 
and in its mim, is the only basis for psychology • This is 
a fact which is assumed by Hocking. But he does not stop 
with finite self-knowledge. A totality is nothing short of 
the whole which it implies. Therefore Other Mind becomes a 
part of the equation, prior to any psychological analysis 
of self or of the motive of the self. Other Mind is drawn 
1. MGHE, 472-473. 
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into the equation by reason of the fact that self-knowledge 
is dependent, largely, upon Other Mind. "The Other Mind 
is the chief aid to self-knowledge, the only environment in 
1 
which it can attain high development." 
In general the implications Which we can thus 
far draw concerning Hocking 1 s psychology of mysticism is that 
he seeks through it to establish the reality of the objects 
of experience, to establish that self-consciousness and self-
knowledge do not swallow up reality 1 that which he resists in 
the form of idealism which is subjective, i.e., that idealism 
in whi ch the objects of sense are purUy "pantomimic". Such 
idealism he calls "immoral". 2 
What we have thus far seen in Hocking's 
psychology is that both physical and mental objects do not 
stand in independent relation to each other, nor is onw 
absorbed by the other. Both are representative of a reality 
which is inclusive of them. causes and effects, physiologically 
speaking, assist the introspective object, mentally speaking, 
to relate itself to a real world through its own self-
1. MGHE, 473. 
2. THE 1 iv. 
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consciousness. A metaphysical basis is provided in the 
recognition of Other Mind, Which alone can give certainty 
to self-consciousness. 
Hocking warns that we should not understand 
that, just because an experience, as for instance, of self-
consciousness, or of experience arising within the senses, 
seems to be subjective in its content, is no reason for 
accepting that subjectivity. At this point ps,rchology can 
assist the understanding, making careful that it does not 
fall "into that gratuitous and damnable mistake" 1 of 
assuming that "objects make no difference, the essence of 
religion being in the experience aB subjective fact." 2 The 
interpretation of the experience, psychologic&aly, can be 
given from the point of' view of self-consciousness, but 
the content ~ ~ experience must not be limited, subjectively. 
That is to say, because the experience of 
that wholeness of reality discovered to self-consciousness 
with the aid of Other Mind seems to constitute its unity as 
the result of some use of a principle of abstraction, it does 
not follow that what is found thereby is itself a mere 
1. Art.(l912), 38. 
2. Ibid., 38;. 
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abstraction. For llbat is found to be the case when the 
abstraction as psychological function in the process of 
discovering self-consciousness is applied to the meaning 
or content itself is that a false abstraction sets itself 
up as the real. 
What I want to point out is, that these words, 
unitary, immediate, ineffable, which at all 
events apply to the mystic's ~rience, are 
precisely the words which the me aphysician 
applies to the mystic's doctrine. And I 
suggest that the misinterpretation of mysti-
cism here in question is due to the fact that 
what is &' psychological report( and a true 
one) IS taken as a metaphksical statement 
(and a-r&lse one.- From t e fact that one's 
experience of God has been 11one, immediate, 
and ineffable," it does not follow that God 
himself is merely "one, immediate, and 
ineffable, 11--and so a Being wholly removed 
from all concrete reality. 1 
Here Hocking lays the ground for a fundamental 
rejection of inmediaey in the nature of God and(by implication) 
in the nature of the self and in physical and material. nature 
as well. That is, through a clarification of psychology and 
a setting of its limits Hocking has lessened the threat of 
subjectivity and has gained access to an epistemological 
objectivity which sets the real world before us. 
1. Art.(l912), 43. 
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God, the physical world, other selves, and 
also the introspective object as well, are ~ immediate in 
their own natare and in their own individuality. The 
immediate is not content. Whatever value it~_!!!! process, 
as psychological operation within knowledge. But it is not 
all there is either of process~ of knowledge, as we hope to 
show when we take up the general discussion of Hocking's 
formula for the development of knowledge within ~sticism, 
his judgment ~ E!!Cperience, in chapter IV. H ovrever, we can 
point out here what we believe we have found through the 
judgment of experience that immediacy is. Immediacy_!!! knowledge 
represents ! funding of ~ ~ been judged ~ ~ reliable 
~ certainty. Certainty, in turn 1 tends to lower the tension 
between objects of difference and brings them into a relation 
of acceptance of each other. This appears to be what Hocking 
means by love when he says concerning it that "it is a presence 
of the individual to the individual, a 1 flight of the alone 
to the alone.'" 1 This same love accepts the self of the world 
through worship. "Worship seeks the self of the world as an 
1. MGHE, 433. 
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individual being." lp.rom the self of the world and from the 
discovery of individual sel:f'hood we are brought into presence 
2 
of 11the individual's idea." That is, by means of an attitude 
of certainty which has arisen out of a process of judging 
our experience, we now have gone from love( as an acceptance of 
and a giving to those objects of our experience 'Which we have 
found to have interests and experiences similar to our own) 
to idea, and to 11-.fhole idea". 
He is an individual vision of reality; and 
in knowing him, I do at the same time know 
his vision and ma.ke his vision my O'ftile This 
is the central fact of all mysticism: namely, 
that the discovery of the individual is 
always a discovery of truth, of a powerful]¥ 
synthetic idea1 and yet not by way of effort-
ful thinking. J 
Thus immediacy, from the point of view of 
the psychology of mysticism, serves a purpose, not directly 
but indirectly. And here we think we see how psychology can 
correct its own error, namely, that of suggesting to us that 
the immediacy Which it takes from the process of knowing is 
identical with the object known, putting immediacy at the 
center of the being of the self, as a metaphysically real 
1. MGHE, 433. 
2. Ibid., 433. 
3. Ibid., 433. 
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entity. Immediacy, so we believe we have found from a 
contextual study of Hocld.ng, may be called a psychological 
device which points outward to objects through an orderly 
construction of the emotions. Having had its inception 
through the reciprocal workings of experience and judgment, 
it moves on to provide abutment for additional experience. 
Thus the process continues to evolve, · j_udgiileri:~ ;! and expe rl.ence 
making their deposite of immediacy, with psychology demonstrating 
the emotional values of immediacy in terms of certainty and 
of love. 
Therefore, if the simple thereness of objects 
of sense, as in sense experience, and in introspective experi-
ence, is not given as an end or final quality of experience 
which is absorbed into immediacy, but, instead, arising out 
of an antecedence of meanings drawn from experience, given as 
some extension of that meaning in the emotional structure of 
certainty and of love, could it not be as well that some 
continuing princi~le of psychology could serVe to join the 
mind and the body? That is, could not psychology indicate 
some current of meaning which would take body and mirxl up 
togethe,r and present them to the sel:f'? 
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The psychological principle which may assist 
us in lmowing how it is possible for the body and the mind 
to be brought together appears to be that of instinct. But 
the definition by Which we seek to grasp its meaning must be 
"hybrid", as Hocking points out. He defines instinct as 
"any specific form of the will-to-power which reaches its 
end by the use of innate motor mechanisms, common to the 
species." 1rn this definition the physiological"interests11 
are found in a will of meanin_g, which puts the problem of 
mind and body where it can be taken up into self-consciousness 
and purpose. But this is exactly what Hocking is driving 
toward in his mysticism, namely, the union of "two worlds" 
which appear to be opposite, but both of Which are essential 
to the fulfillment of meanings which are taken for granted 
by both common sense and mysticism. The physical is needed 
by the mental. "Without the stuff of sensation 'What we have 
is not mentality, but only ideas devoid of instances." 2 
Reason takes the facts and transforms them into meaningful 
ideas, toward wholes. 
1. Art.(l921), 95. 
2. MGHE, 334. 
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If mind is imposed upon the body, as its 
"master", and if we begin with mind, the body assumes its 
rightful proportion within the hybrid mixture. That is to 
say, the psychology which unites mind and body is a meaning-
~ psychology, and the mirxl in l'lhich it operates is already 
cast in the role of controller. How is this possible, that 
is, how do mind and body"lmow" which one is in control? This, 
apparently is a matter which psychology has to leave to some 
more ultimate cri terion of values to indicate. But the 
operation of some discriminating agency Which stands outside 
ps~ology does arrange the physical and the mental in their 
proper relation to each other, a fact which suggests that 
we begin with conscious factors. 
If we begin with conscious experience, the 
facts of physiology are not ultimately alien 
entities: on purely mental grounds we should 
require the experience of nature, and all 
the bodily machinery that action within a 
wor J.d. signifies. In other words, we can 
derive the whole set of behavior phenomena 
in principle from the demands of consciousnesss 
but we cannot in turn derive the fact, nor 
the need, of conscious life from the principles 
of the bodily organism and its world. 1 
1. Art.(l921), 96. 
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Psychology-, even"metaphysical psychology", 
cannot itself name the entity Which will take up into itself 
the full meaning of its implications. Such is not the province 
of psychology to do, but is the responsibility of philosophy. 
Psychology-, operating within~~ within physiolog,y, can do 
no more than present its ~ most ultimate entity, and leave 
to philosophy the naming of some entity or entities in which 
psychology can function. 
Hocking names psychologj' 1 s ultimate as "mind". 
Mind is the most concrete entity we can ever 
discover, for the discovery of an entity 
supposedly more concrete would reveal the 
discoverer as one stage more concrete still. 
This deduction, furthermore, a kind of meta-
physical psychology, is the only satisfactory 
science of the mind. 1 
But mind is still but a principle of operation, 
albeit an ultimate one, of psychology. It is the highest 
category of psychology. Therefore its use wi thi..ll psychology 
as the place from which physiology is viewed and interpreted 
is fully justified. The hybrid nature of Hocking 1 s definition 
of instinct is lessened if we remember this fact. The physical 
naturally comes under the dominancy of the mind, for it is 
1. Art.(l926), 203. 
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the base upon which mind rests and from which mind draws its 
general data, as well as being its chief means of expressing 
itself, through "cause and effect". 
An ultimate instinct is given by Hocking. 
It is the following: "The love of God is the one natural 
instinct of man 11 • 1 But here we discover values, ~ ~ 
principle of value, taking over, indicating that psychology 
lends:_its support to some higher principle or principles 
which do not lie within its own province to define. The 
recognition of mind as its own highest principle, in relation 
to principles yet to be defined by some more inclusive "science! , 
appears like a moment of hesitation between some partial and 
a complete explanation of Reality, which psychology itself 
cannot give. But in setting mind as the controlling agent 
of the body, without in any sense denying the reality of 
body, psychology has rendered a service of great value to 
Reality,or a function of Reality~ which Hocking believes is 
revealed through ~sticism. 
Before we continue with our investigation 
l. MGHE, 517 • 
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of further meanings of Hocking' s mysticism we should pause 
for some SUIJllll8l"Y statements which are found either directly 
or indirectly set forth in this chapter. 
4. Conclusions. 
The notion of the ~ical self which Hocking 
describes is both more complex and simpler than is the term 
"personality", as this term is generally used, i.e., with 
its primary emphasis on consciousness and self-consciousness. 1 
It is more complex in that its meaning implies a more general-
ized process of self-consciousness. What is not at any moment 
conscious within its experience appears to outweigh the element 
of consciousness. That is to say, in Hocking's treatment of 
the self the "well" of the subconscious carries meanings for 
for the self far in excess of any rational consciousness, even 
potentially, than he will ever have. In fact it appears that 
the subconscious phase of the self is what governs, or should 
govern, the conscious self. In other words, Hocking shifts 
the emphasis from consciousness to subconsciousness, but 
without at any time appearing to injure consciousness. Another 
way of stating the situation is to say that self-consciousness 
1. Brightman, POR, 350-3.54. 
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is more dependent on what at any given time is not within 
consciousness than it is on consciousness itself. This 
conclusion seeme paradoxical, but it means only that the 
emotional and volitional structure of the silf is the real 
foundation of the self as it is able to view itself rationally 
in its own consciousness. 
Hocking's self is simpler in that it is held 
by him to seek and find its object-world through the direct 
process of experience, meaningfully, in terms of the felt 
needs of the self in the presence of the objects. The Whole 
of meaning is given, all at once, in experience. The details 
incidental to various applications of Whole meaning to Reality 
do not materially affect the whole meaniag itself. A part 
of 'What he appears to mean at this point is that the human 
self is a natural participator in Reality by virtue of the 
fact that it is some expression of Reality. Therefore the 
participation of the self in Reillty is 11effortless11 • 
Hocking's philosophy may be termed a "radical 
idealism". Because it takes objects and experiences into 
self-consciousness through meanings, and because the physical-
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thing world is known( and shared with others) through ideas, 
it is an idealism. It may be termed "radical" because, in 
addition to its employment of mind as an instrument which 
reveals reality, it also employs the physical as "partner" 
to the mind in such revelation of reality as is possible to 
the self, self being a more ultimate term than mind, or 
than thing, or than both together. That is, radical idealism 
considers self ~ ~ ultimate entity possible to knowledge 
and experience, ideas and physical things(objects) being 
instrumental. Participation of the human self(! 'Whole meaning) 
in the infinite self( the Whole meaning) produces the provisional 
and thus promissory participation of human selves reciprocally. 
But participation is a matter of sharing, intimately, the 
creative functioning of the self with God, primarily thrOUgh 
acts of worship(so we may here declare in anticipation of 
some future word in this connection) ~ ~ overt action_!!! 
in participation, through which the self is enhanced and 
through which enhancemmt its individual selfhood is increased. 
The values Which accrue to the self through participation are 
expressed through moral deeds. Such union of selves as we 
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discover through the principle of participation is moral, 
a blending of wills and purposes of the finite selves with 
the infinite Self. 
In Hocking's use of ps,ychology we see how 
the functional term "immediacy" has been misunderstood and 
misinterpreted. Instead of representing immediacy in the 
infinite Object, such immediacy as we find is a matter of 
function of the finite mind, an operating principle, a content 
of idea, as it were, but not stationary. As content, it is 
such functionally, as some element of p~chological proce~s, 
a ki.nd of abutment upon which meanings can run out to further 
meanings. Immediacy is a means, then, to something else. 
Its meaning -which psychology implies is that of certainty, 
a much more meaningful term than immediacy itself. A further 
meaning, which stems directl.y from certainty, is that of 
love. Certainty and love are emotional factors Which are 
implied by the term immediacy, when immediacy is understood 
as representing a psychological principle. Immediacy, then, 
is no "end term", a stopping place in the lmowing process. 
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Its meaning is strictly p~chological, and should be so 
understood. It is a term Which arises out of the tensions 
of experience itself, particularly as experience is "thought-
filled" and meanings are distilled from it. It is, as it 
were, the meanings held ready for action, by the mi:rxi, with 
reference to the knowing process and the objects of knowledge. 
Some of its close-held meaning is released into .! term of 
mea~ing when it is passed on to certainty, and still more 
of that confined meaning is relea-sed into love. These are 
emotional releaseli, which perhaps explains why inunedia.cy has 
been ineffable within the knowing process. And it may be that 
through some reinterpretation of immediacy will be seen how 
to reinterpret other terms in mysticism, to render them less 
ineffable than they now are. That is, ineffability may be 
entirely due to an attempt to taking a "psychological report" 
and making of it an empistemological or a metaphysical doctrine. 
Hocking 1 s psychology reveals further that 
another of these psychological-report terms may be of assistance 
in lmowing how the mind and the body belong together. The 
term which appears valuable in this instance is that of instinct. 
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As a report-term instinct, like immediacy, is ambigUous 
and loaded with the possibility of error unless it is 
interpreted according to some meaning which can take it 
in. The meaning which the term instinct has for the mind-
boqy situation comes at the point of some union between them 
Which it is able to effect. Some interest mind and b~ 
must hold in common, which, perhaps, can grow out of the 
ambiguous term. It may be that some new principle, like 
that of participation, through which immediacy appears to 
have been able to generate needed activity, can be found. 
In fact Hocking implies two such terms. One is !!!!- and 
the other is idea. He suggests the "'will to power,' then, 
as a rough description for the common and uniting element of 
instinct." 1 Idea is suggested by way of consciousness, as 
the chief tool of consciousness. Therefore, to suggest 
that the team-term to bring about the release of body and 
mind from their imprisonment of opposites seems altogether 
fittingly represented in will and idea. 
If it is true, for instance, that .!!!l will 
can be traced in my world,2 then it is also true that my 
l. Art.(l921) 1 96. 
2. MGHE, 158. 
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will should be traceable in my consciousness( as idea} and 
in my body as my deed. The true union is always function 
and activity. Instinct is the term Which represents both 
idea and deed, automatically, in a limited pattern of action. 
Will is its broader representation, servL~g the self. 
CHAPI'ER II I 
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1. Approaching maturity. 
Aside from the more obvious developmental influences 
of his home and the early years in college, most of which time he 
was occupied with Herbert Spencer's First Principles, Hocking's 
first real signs of future promise came when he began to withdraw 
his "discipleship" from Spencer and to cast about for a more stable 
anchor. This latter he felt he had found in William James' 
Principles, of 1890, "A book which I happened to pick up in browsing 
through shelves of the library at Ames. 111 Of this book Hocking says: 
I cannot say what its argumentative value was at 
the time; it proved nothing, so far as I recall--
it was merely a release; it left all the systematic 
work to do. But it irrigated certain tracts that had 
become desert. I began to regain confidence that the 
mystic's sense of the universe is in substance a true 
sense, quite apart from his theological symbols. I 
was sure that the real world is more like the world 
of James' imagination than like the world of Spencer, 
and from that time it became my first fussiness to 
define the difference and to capture some rational 
account of it.2 
Moving along to the next major stage of development, we 
find Hocking at Harvard studying under men such as William James, 
Josiah Royce, George Herbert Palmer, Munsterberg, and others. 
But, from this point on, according to his own testimony,3 he no 
longer was able to be a full-fledged disciple which had passed 
1. Art. (1930), 385. 
2. Ibid., 388. 
3. Ibid., 389. 
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with the passing of Spencer's domination. 1 His failure ever again 
to be a disciple in any strict sense is the further mark of his 
maturity which we wish to note. 
Other indications of progress in development are evident 
in his general outlook upon the world. Something was lacking in 
the ideas of the great scholars under whom he was studying or 
whose works he was reading. The "intellectual majesty and moral 
greatness112 of Royce held him but did not fully convince him. 
Leaving Harvard to study for a season in Germany, he made the 
acquaintance of the leading minds there, but could not follow 
any of them as a disciple. Each one offered something which 
appealed to Hocking but each one failed to satisfy the student. 
Royce was a good "starter" as well as a good system-
atizer. It was 11under Royce's guidance113 that Hocking began what 
probably was the settling of his maturity and the grasp of the 
certainty which he appeared to be seeking. A "morphology of 
experience", ·undertaken by Hocking at this time, was finally 
developed into 11The Problem of the Knowledge of Minds Other than 
Our Own",4 and became the pivot about which the remainder of his 
philosophy was to turn. This was the study which turned into that 
1. Art. (1930), 389. 
2. Ibid., 389. 
3. Ibid., 391. 
4. Ibid., 391. 
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most-important-of-all treatise (to this present investigator) 
~hich was the basis for his Ph. D. Thesis. 
2. Maturity in Ideas. 
The work which Royce inspired in Hocking during his 
early graduate days at Harvard resulted, as we have indicated, in 
the important doctoral thesis, which, we hold, contains the germ 
of his later works and thought. This great work, although never 
published, has become the basis of a good share of this present 
investigation. This work "catches at every thread in the garment 
of his mysticism." Speaking of this work twenty-six years later, 
he says of it: 
It is impossible now to trace the sources of 
convictions that grew during that time, some 
of which have remained. One such, which came 
to me with the force of intuition, was that the 
supposed isolation of minds is an illusion; that 
we share identical objects, and in so doing 
actually merge or coalesce in our being; that 
whatever meaning can be attached to the phrase, 
to be within the mind of another, is realized in 
the actual situation. For Nature is veritably a 
common object; there is but one Nature-- not one 
for each person: and while for every pair of 
communicating minds perspectives and qualities 
differ, space itself is identical, and continuously 
identical.l 
The notion of an "active self" as the meaning of Nature, 
as found in this important investigation into the "relation of minds 11 
1. Art. (1930), 391- 392. 
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(Hocking's doctoral thesis) gives some appearance of a right 
beginning for mysticism. 
says: 
Speaking of this underlying and substantial self he 
In this underlying and substantial self I recognized 
the Absolute of Royce's teaching. But I further 
recognized it as the object of that mystic experience 
whose significance James had begun to do justice to. 
With this identification, a great strand of speculative 
and religious tradition could be interpreted and saved 
for human as well as philosophic users. Royce's 
dominantly negative attitude towards mysticism, which 
he so profoundly interpreted, beca~e unnecessary.1 
Each of the axiomatic propositions which Hocking lists 
twenty-six years after writing his doctoral thesis, and which he 
continued to use as the basis of all his philosophy during his 
lifetime up to the present, is implied in that first great writing 
of his. That is, his pattern was set, though the movement of his 
mind within that pattern was as "tentative" as was each of the 
axioms itself. 
The principle of ambiguous simplicity, stated axiomatically 
years later, can be found in essence in his doctoral work. The 
axiom: "Neither the world nor anything in the world is unambiguously 
complex or unambiguously simple. 112 The statement in the thesis 
follows: 
1. Art . (1930), 392- 393. 
2. Ibid., 393 . 
96 
CHAPTER III 
THE ORIGIN OF liTSTICISH IN HOCKING 
Physical worldliness as object of knowledge consists 
not in this, that I find anything true that I prophesy , 
but in this that there shall be possible predication 
because of the fact of connectedness; it is not that 
I have grasped the law, but that there is ~ law, and 
that I~ !!.2li reckoning with it in the very quick of 
illY current living; not that I can gauge distance or 
adjust my strength, but that as I walk along the per-
spectives of things shall change with distance, and 
that the ground and my body shall play upon one 
another in regular interaction; not, in short, that 
I have the one hypothesis in my possession, but that 
I have the one hypothesis \-Jhich each judgment in 
faith acknowledges and strives to conform to ••• whose 
that, though not the what, is present to my touch in 
the continuous movement of transition.1 
Likewise with others of his axioms, all of which can be 
taken up into and can be explained in terms of this early work, which 
goes to prove the consistency of his position and that he had hold of 
some phases of truth which could receive their amplification only 
through the ki nd of mystical insight as is contained in the above 
statements. 
A further, and even more meaningful, insight is to be found 
in another quotation from Hocking's thesis, which indicates even more 
value for mysticism, for it shows some of the working of the judgment 
of experience, particularly as the element of immediacy is shown in 
the predicate. 
1. THE, 55. 
The universal character of the judgment, in the 
most primitive cases, is peculiar to the predicate . 
It is within certain bounds an "independent variable": 
it may have any degree of scope, or rashness, or 
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determinateness. At the limit of evanescence, 
when it is the mere that of a universal , the 
judgment has a new aspect; it appears as a 
judgment of1the given, particularly present, as object. 
This kind of dialectic becomes more pronounced in the 
movement of the several kinds of objects in experience as they 
are brought into relation to each other. And, just as here in 
this lfprirnitive" or extremely limited type of the judgment, a 
universal element of truth is carried along, which always means 
the possibility of object whenever there is a functioning pre-
dicate reaching forward toward the fact of objectivity. Call 
this movement "coherency" in reason, or whatever we may choose, 
the truth is that it is moving in the direction of mysticism, in 
a discovery (although nascent as yet) of a basic certainty, which 
can serve as a base from vrhich to reach out for more. Here is a 
kind of 11 iramediacy11 in logic which is developing, and it is 
anticipating that more comprehensive judgment which will be able 
to reach out from the merely immediate in experience and in reason 
to some ne'\oily found greater identity of the objects of experience 
to place alongside the old (immediate) truth. Truth is thus added 
to truth, and union to union, until all kno'\olledge (possible and 
actual) have been worked through and have been given the degTee of 
1. THE, 59. 
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certainty in experience which can establish their objectivity 
(individual and distinct from the experiencer, yet caught up by 
the same frame of the judgment of experience). 
During his graduate days Hocking caught hold of the in-
sight that it is 11wholes 11 which are meaningful in terms of relations. 
That is, a judgment is incomplete \.rhen it treats "parts" only or i n 
isolation. It is complete, and filled with significance for realit y, 
when it contains all of the distinct parts which are necessary to t he 
formation of a whole in one single judgment. That is, the i ndividual 
human sel f, other selves, the physical things, and the world i t self, 
all taken up into one complete judgmental form-- provided that the 
rational experience of the ~•form" is continuous in its certainty of 
a "that" upon VJhichit can build its 11what11-- is the means whereby 
"understanding" takes place. 
Hocking is beginning to grasp the notion that knovJledge is 
not given "immediately" of things or of selves, that whatever there 
is of immediacy in knowledge, as the certainty which knowledge seeks, 
is given by way of something else, and there is mediated". Mysticism 
in Hocking takes on the shape and the color of such intelligence as 
can find its place in reason itself, as something which has a rational 
pattern, but which at the same time determines what the kind of pattern 
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must be. This idea will be followed out in the rest of this 
investigation. 
3. Hocking's rebellion against Spencer. 
As the judgment of experience developed in Hocking's 
thought certain reactions to all less-than-coherent systems of 
thought set in. We see evidence of such reaction as early as 
his first reading of James while he was still atthe College of 
Agriculture and Engineering at Ames, Iowa. The early satisfaction 
which he enjoyed with Spencer was now steadily lessening. It is 
needless here to go into the reasons which lay back of this reaction 
to naturalism, except to point out that Hocking's concept and ex-
perience of reality as being both knowable and explainable were 
not satisfied with certain limitations which became apparent to him. 
Spencer failed to provide a satisfactory overall summary of reality. 
He says of Spencer, prior to his change from Ames to Cambridge and 
Harvard, that 11 some of Spencer's discussion of physical ultimates 
1 t d . . t" Ill appear e emen ary an un~ag1na 1ve. 
The follovdng is a list of ideas in Spencer which could 
have caused Hocking's rebellion: 
1. Art. (1930), 388. 
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(1) The inadequacy of the nature of thought to reach 
other persons. 
So that the personality of which each is conscious, 
and of which the existence is to each a fact beyond 
all others the most certain, is yet a thing which 
cannot truly be known at all: knowledge1of it is forbidden by the very nature of thought. 
This position of Spencer's became to Hocking one of his 
greatest challenges. The fact that something could be known and 
yet not be available to knowledge through the channel of thought 
was, to Hocking, contrary to all rules of intelligence. 
(2) A similar untenable position was held by Spencer with 
regard to "ultimate scientific ideas". 
Ultimate Scientific Ideas, then, are all represen-
tative of realities that cannot be comprehended. 
After no matter how great a progress in the colliga-
tion of facts and the establisrunent of generalization 
ever wider and wider-- after the merging of limited 
and derivative truths in truths that are larger and 
deeper has been carried no matter how far; the 
fundamental truth remains as much beyond reach as 
ever. The explanation of that which is explicable 
does but bring out into greater clearness the inex-
plicableness of that which remains behind.2 
The recognition of a reality which was beyond the grasp of 
knowledge suggested to Hocking the basic defectiveness of thought 
itself, not of reality. 
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2. Spencer, FP., 65-66. (All references to Spencer in this section 
are from First Principles.) 
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(3) All ultimate ideas are merely Sj~bolic of reality. 
Ultimate religious ideas and ultimate scientific 
ideas, turn out to be merely symbols of the actual, 
not cognitions of it. 
The conviction, so reached , that human intelligence 
is incapable of absolute knowledge, is one that has 
been slowly gaining ground as civilization has ad-
vanced ••• All possible conceptions have been one by 
one tried and found wanting; and so the entire 
field of speculation has been gradually exhausted 
without positive result: the only result arrived at 
being the negative one above stated-- that the reality 
existing1behind all appearances is, and must ever be, 
unknown. 
The one conditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the 
unconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot 
positively be construed to the mind; they can be 
conceived, only by a thinking away from, or abstrac-
tion of, those very conditions under which thought 
itself is realized; consequently, the notion of the 
Unconditioned is only negative,-- negative of the 
conceivable itself.2 
Thought is only of the conditioned; because, as we 
have said, to think is simply to condition. The 
absolute is conceived merely by a negation of con-
ceivability; and all that we know is only known as 
"von from the void and formless inf inite. 113 
These, and many more passages like them throughout the First 
Principles, appear likely to have been the kind of stimulus Hocking 
needed to set him with determination to rearrange thought itself and 
1. FP., 68-69 . 
2 . FP., 74. 
3. FP., 75. 
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to make it less a victim of its O\~ stupidity. However he went 
about it otherwise, we know that he turned to James with satis-
faction, finding there some hope for knowledge, especially in such 
practical avenues as were given by James• treatment of the "stream 
of consciousness" and suggestions in him that the will can often 
produce results that the discursive mind fails to reach. 
The follo•dng list of references from Spencer could have 
influenced Hocking positively: 
(1) Knowledge requires a double-action-- both assertion 
and negation. The Absolute serves as the principle of negation. 
Some of this idea is found in Hocking, but in a reverse motion. 
Instead of denying the Absolute, Hocking denies what is not the 
Absolute. Spencer's statement follows. 
The Absolute ••• is a term expressing no object 
of thought, but only a denial of the relation 
by which thought is constituted. To assume 
absolute existence as an object of thought, is 
thus to suppose a relation existing when the 
related terms exist no longer. An object of 
thought exists, as such, in and through its 
relation to a thinker; while the Absolufe, 
as such, is independent of all relation. 
l. FP., 78-79. 
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To say that we cannot know the Absolute is, 
by implication, to affirm that there is an 
Absolute. In the very denial of our power to 
learn what the Absolute is, there lies hidden 
the assumption that it is; and the making of 
this assumption proves that the Absolute has 
been present to the1mind, not as a nothing, but as a something. 
And on contemplating the process of thought we 
have equally seen how impossible it is to get 
rid of the consciousness of an actuality lying 
behind appearances; and how, from this impos-
sibility, results our indestructible belief in 
that actuality.2 
Hocking's notion of the Absolute, as we have said, differs 
from that of Spencer's and becomes a positive, rather than a negative, 
factor in the knowing process. And it appears entirely possible to 
this present investigator that Hocking's mysticism had its origin, 
so far as its basic theory is concerned, at this point. The 
Absolute to Hocking is a "dialectical necessity 11 , 3 not as ~resultant 
of dialectics but as its beginning. This fact appears to represent 
a fundamental turning point in Hocking, and becomes a chief con-
tributing factor to his mysticism. 
1. FP., 88. 
2. FP., 97. 
3. Stated in personal correspondence with Hocking, and implied 
in his works. 
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There is much in Spencer, quite apparently, that assisted 
Hocking 's thought, much beyond that which has already been mentioned . 
A small group of such possible influences are listed in the follow-
ing section. 
(2) This list is partial, but suggestive of possible trends. 
For instance, Spencer's notion that ~enomenon and noumenon are but 
two sides of the same reality;1 the affirmation of the concept of 
alternation; 2 his position that Matter , Motion, and Force are 
"symbols of the Unknown Reality 11 ;3 and his notion of evolution4 
suggests the possibility of some great underlying purpose in the world . 
4. Kant 's idealism criticized. 
Hocking feels that Kant sensed a basic inconsistency in his 
system of idealism without knowing how to remove it. But the problem, 
which Kant appeared unable to solve, was used by Hocking to set the form 
of his own philosophy and make it one of internal consistency. As Kant 
held that the knowing self is limited, in the knowledge he can obtain, 
to the external nature of a thing, with never a glimpse (so far as 
knowledge is concerned) of its inner reality, so Hocking holds that 
man knows both external and internal thingness. 
l. FP ., 170. 
2. ~1? ., 540, 542, 551. 
3. FP., 557. 
4. FP., 546. 
Note: It is the present investigator's opinion that much of 
Hocking's "ontological argument" is rooted in both Spencer and Kant . 
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Kant's "transcendental idealism", of categories which 
are assumed to be more or less independent of the inner experience 
of the thinking self, appears to get into Kant's own way to cause 
the "great thinker" to bring his notion of the inner nature of a 
thing into confusion with the reality of the thing 11in itself". 
Hocking attempts to clarify what Kant must ~ as over against 
what he says. The following quotation is from Hocking: 
But the point which has occasioned most of all 
the feeling that a certain discontinuity or 
even disharmony exists between the Widerlegung 
and the rest of the Critique, especially the 
first edition, is the fact that Kant's own 
idealism, which he distinguished carefully from 1 
all others as transcendental, does not stand clear 
above the shock of his own polemic. The Ich-denke 
of transcendental apperception comes into damaging-
ly close relations with the Ich-denke of current 
inner experience and the T-world takes on an 
independence which threatens to remove it from 
the dominion of this all-grasping transcendental 
self. In the whole range of philosophy I know 
of no remarkable passage than this, in which the 
great thinker with tremendous travail is working 
toward harmony ~th himself, and none more directly 
to our own purpose. 2 
The problem in Kant which Hocking seeks to rectify and to 
solve is primarily in connection with the abstract _separation of 
the knower from that which he knows, both within himself and without. 
1. Note: Hocking does not underline Kant in his THE. 
2. ·rHE, 71. 
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That is, unless the experience which serves to unite the idea and 
its object has metaphysical status and value, although a dualism 
between thought and thing is recognized, that dualism can become 
a f undamental obstacle, causing both idea and thing to surrender 
their fundamental meaning and reality. It is not enough, so 
Hocking would say, to hold that there is some 11 transcendental 11 
set of categories which both thought and thing can use, if these 
categories have their existence or their reality in any sense apart 
from the idea and the thing which they seek to explain. Unless the 
transcendental can be claimed for the Ich-denke, lifting the Ich-denke 
to its own level, and unless it also can be claimed for the thing 
itself, and in the same manner in which it claims the Ich-denke, it 
does not serve any real purpose as category within the knowing 
process. That kind of "outwardness" which Kant shows as belonging 
to the "empirical idealist11 , and which falls short of having any real 
outwardness, Hocking holds to be true of Kant also. 
The argument in favor of dualism of thought and thing, 
according to Kant, among the so-called 11 empirical 11 idealists, may be 
summarized in the following manner: Dualism is required for reasons 
which are given us by common sense, wherein we know that, although 
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we have a common physical world, we do not all have the same iden-
tical experiences with it. That is, we do not each and all know 
the same list of physical relations and in the same manner. There 
is and must be variety in this kind of experience to mark off the 
individuality of the knowers and thus make them particular and 
individual selves. Yet the manner of our knowing is the same, i ... e., 
we have the same space and the same time. Thus space and time are 
brought within the domain of the knowing self, as being "property" 
which is held in common. How is it held? This is the question. 
Hocking speaks concerning it. 
The empirical idealist is wrong because, says 
Kant, he assumes that space and time and the 
Erscheinungen in them must be independent of 
us, as things in themselves: of course he is 
unable to prove them, and may be led to deny 
the existence of matter because of this in-
ability. But now, if we mean by outer simply 
the 11 ausser einander" of everything in space, 
and recognize that space is in us, we may admit 
the reality of matter and still retain our 
idealism.l 
But there is no satisfaction in that kind of idealism, 
either for Kant or for Hocking, for it does not provide an adequate 
explanation of the way things really work. Kant attempts to give 
structure to the dualism which exists between thought and thing by 
1. THE, 72. 
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making both dependent on the transcendental form of space and 
time. As Hocking says, concerning this attempt on the part of 
Kant, 11It is not at the leven of Anschauung, but at the level of 
Begriffe or of Categorien that this outwardness can be defined. 111 
Kant continues to struggle for more outwardness for 
thing, but with a desire, at the same time, to bring his system 
into satisfactory unity. However, as Hocking indicates, the 
results are not overly satisfactory, for his system is continually 
plagued with the spectre of subjectivity, so far as the internal 
nature of things is concerned. He comes to the position which he 
feels must be final, in this respect, in thinking that the whole 
solution to this problem lies with the categories . 
1. 
2. THE , 72. 
And to this Kant comes at last in this remarkable, 
but not much remarked, passage: 11Fragt man nun: 
ob diesem zu Fotse der Dualism allein in der 
Seelenlehre stattfinds so ist die Antwort, 
Allerdings : aber nur in empirischen Verstande; 
d.i., in dem Zusammenhange der Erfahrung ist 
wirklich Materie als Substanz in der Erscheinung 
dem aeusseren Sinne, so wie das denkende Ich, 
Gleichfalls als Substanz in der Erscheinung, for 
dem inneren Sinne gegeben; und nach den Regeln , 
welche diese Categorie (i:..-e., substance) in den 
Zusammenhang unserer aeusserer sowoh, als innerer 
Wahrnehmungen zu einer Erfahrung hineinbringt, 
mussen auch beiderseits Erscheungen unter verknupit 
werden.~ 
109 
CHAPTER III 
THE ORIGIN OF l>1YSTICISM I N HOCKING 
But even here the solution, so far as Hocking is con-
cerned, remains dark and unsatisfactory. Speaking of it he says: 
The Ich bears the same relation to the 
Wahrnehmungen of the inner sense that 
Natter does to the \.J'ahrnehmungen of the 
outer sense: It is a category Hhich brings 
a certain systematic connection into the 
elements of experience. The Ich-denke 
appears here as the abstract form of the 
judgment of inner experience.l 
That is, we still are faced with an essentially abstract 
relationship between the objects as organized under Vorstellungen 
and the objects themselves. Hocking continues: 
But the relation of these two sets of categories 
is not further defined, and we are left with the 
impression that the T-judgment derives whatever 
assurance it has from inhering in some way in the 
world of R-judgments.2 
As we understand Hocking to interpret Kant, Kant holds 
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that physical things and ideas stand as "co-ordinate" in consciousness, 
which, Hocking holds, is no satisfactory solution. Each is independent 
in it's own realm and form, without any real bond between them, other 
than the recognition in consciousness that they ~ found together, 
(in experience, that is). 
1. THE, 73. 
2. THE, 73. 
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The primary use which Hocking here makes of Kant is that 
of ~ to some ~ comprehensive end. This he attempts to do 
by means of a "widening of the net of empiricism". His medium for 
this undertaking is the doctoral thesis, in which he establishes 
the pattern of the judgment of experience, wherein the whole of 
Reality is brought into one summation. It is this process, to-
gether with its findings, which is of primary significance to our 
study and interpretation of mysticism in Hocking. 
Hocking thus builds 2n Kant in -order to bring about what 
we might well call a 11 government and a constitution for philosophy'', 
the construction of which takes place within the completed form of 
the judgment of experience. Out of this form of the judgment come 
some surprises, one of which is the Ding-an-sich itself, in its real 
meaning, which Hocking derives from other-selfhood, or the 11S-object". 
Kant's difficulty was that he did not include enough in his form of 
the judgment, therefore he lost some of the values he sought. In 
Hocking's form of judgment all essential categories are included as 
part of a total in judgment which cannot exclude anything whatsoever 
that is in any way vi tal to knowledge. All is placed within experience, 
lll 
CHAPI'ER III 
Ttffi ORIGIN OF MYSTICISM IN HOCKING 
albeit an experience vrhich is "thought crammed" \ri.th meaning. 
Kant 's trouble, chiefly, was that he held what he termed the 
11pure 11 in reason separate from its 11practical 11 nature. 
Hocking posits the Ich-bin as in some manner, which 
experience alone can indicate, equal to but in no sense superior 
t o the Ding-an-sich. And, to the extent that this knowledge of 
equality represents a certainty which is given through experience 
to knowledge, experience itself will have to be appealed to for 
its explanation. This is what Hocking~ £y mysticism. Here 
is mysticism at work, not just at worship alone. ~gysticism at 
work represents the theory, generally speaking, as mysticism at 
worship represents (also in general) the practice. Actually , 
both expressions of mysticism are brought together within the 
judgment of experience. But in an attempt to show how Hocking is 
using the judgment as a means of revealing Kant 's defects we think 
of it in the form of mysticism at work (as its theory imposed upon 
a problem). 
1 Gabriel Marcel says concerning Hocking's type of mysticism 
l. Note: The following quotation is from a letter from Hocking to 
this present investigator, concerning Hocking's mysticism: 
11Harcel dedicated his Journal (1927) to Bergson and to me. 11 
Marcel is a "disciple" of Hocking's. Marcel has undertaken to 
extend the meaning of empiricism to include the "mystical object." 
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or empirical idealism: 
11And something else is. 11 This 11 is 11 does not 
create itself by the action of the thought in 
thinking itself; it is the result of some other 
activity, of the act of thought being sustained 
by a medium other than itself, and thus grounded, 
as it were, in the meaning of thought for the 
thinking self. This is mysticism, the coming 
upon Reality t£rough meaning, which reaches back 
into the will. 
5. A Criticism of ~ other types of idealiSm. 
There are some types of idealism which are objectionable 
to Hocking, which do not balance the "active life and its mediation. 112 
Among those forms of idealism which he criticises are the following 
(taken up in order): 
A. Idealism of epistemological monism criticized. 
It may be assumed that it was this type of idealism which 
James objected to, its Absolute standing within it as a tyrant, but 
doing no good. Such an idealism does not "function prospectively." 
Of its Absolute James says: 
The Absolute is useless for deductive purposes. 
It gives us absolute safety if you will, but it 
is compatible with every relative danger. \-That-
ever the details of experience may prove to be, 
after the fact of them, the absolute will adopt 
them. It is an hypothesis which functions retro-
spectively, not prospectively. 3 
l. Harcel, MEr, .31. 
2. HGHE, XIX • 
. .3. James, APU , 111. 
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Hocking brings his own cr iticism to bear upon this same 
kind of idealism in the following manner: 
Whatever doctrine tends to draw the fangs of 
reality, and to leave men unstung, content, 
complacent, and at ease,-- that doctrine is a 
treachery and a deceit. Note well that it is 
not pleasantness but f orce that sets the mark 
for truth: we have to require of our faith not 
what is agreeable to the indolent spirit but 
what is at once a spur and a promise. What do 
you think of hell? The doctrine of hell made 
religion at one time a matter of first-rate 
importance: getting your soul saved made a 
difference in your empirical destiny.l 
The above is an indirect reference, but pertinent to the 
overly optimistic attitude in philosophy as in religion. The ' 
following is a direct reference to that idealism which is "static": 
If your idealism wipes out your fear of hell, and 
with it all sense of infinite risk in the conduct 
of life, your idealism has played you false. Truth 
must be transformed; but the transformation of 
truth must be marked by a conservation of power; ••• 
The flesh and blood of historical contingencies 
cannot be sapped up in timeless issues of a certain 
t ype of idealism without loss of power, hence of 
truth. 2 
This is the kind of idealism against which Kant was doing 
batt le, and the one from which Hocking felt Kant did not free himself. 
1. MBHE, XIV. 
2. MGHE, XIV. 
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It fails from self-enclosedness, shutting out too much. It could 
never be used as the basis for a sufficiently widened empiricism. 
One gathers the very strong impression that Hocking holds 
mysticism stronger at its base, generally speaking, than he does 
philosophy. The "metaphysics", the "epistemology" and the "logic" 
of mysticism are superior to what we ·find in philosophy. It is for 
that reason that Hocking claims for mysticism a kind of universality 
in its metaphysics. It is not restricted, as he says, to any par-
ticular system of metaphysics or of religion. That is due to the 
fact that it is at the base of all philosophy and of all religion. 
"Happily, metaphysical knowledge is the most universal kind of 
1 knowledge." It is because of this implicit and explicit assumption 
on the part of Hocking that we have taken the position we have with 
regard to his use of mysticism. We repeat, Hocking works from 
mysticism to philos~ Therefore, when we undertake to know what 
the mysticism is in his philosophy, \.Je have to work from his philosophy 
backward, tracing its meaning in terms of philosophy, rather than in 
the direction of philosophy toward mysticism. The same would be true 
of formal religion, the function of mysticism is backward, primarily, 
1. NGHE, 215. 
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to origins. Whatever is casehardened in philosophy or in religion 
has passed beyond mysticism and no longer bears any of the peculiar 
f ruit of mysticism. 
He move on to another kind of idealism, als0 an objection-
able form, even if it is 11finishable. 11 
B. Unfinished Idealism. 
According to Hocking there is little choice between a 
philosophy, like the one we just discussed, which is too readily 
closed and one which does not know when to close. That fonn of 
idealism which we are now to take up is of the latter kind . 
Idealism fails to work, I believe, chiefly 
because it is unfinished. Unfinishedness it 
not itself a blemish; is professed even as a 
s pecial excellence by that remarkable impres-
sionist, Henri Bergson. But there are tolerable 
and intolerable kinds of unfinishedness. A thing 
is properly unf inished when it is finishable ; 
when it1has an identity that finishing will not change. 
That which is properly finishable, without doing viol ence 
to its nature, is something the ch~racter of which is enhanced by 
being finished. Such a thing, as Hocking suggests, by way of 
illustration, might be the face sketched by an artist in great haste 
· 1. NGHE, X. 
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and done only in the roughest form. All later artistic labor put 
1 
upon this rough work could conceivably but improve it. The same 
is true with philosophy. If its organization is such that being 
finished in its general structure is the basis of its creative and 
ever-increasing good in service to that kind of understanding of 
\.,rhich the world is in need, then being finished, in that sense, is 
a good thing. 
Once again, using mysticism as our criterion of what might 
constitute a completed form of philosophy (or of religion, for that 
matter) , we are inclined to the position that idealism needs to be 
wide enough at its base so that it is able to continue to grow in 
its experience of Reality, but the base itself must be settled. 
There are various ways of completing the specifications of the base. 
One of those ways we have just discussed, and another we are dis-
cussing. But mysticism ~Hocking sees it prescribes one and only QQ£ 
.way of determining the limits of the base. And , such ~ base as 1<1ould 
~eet the requirement§ of mysticism would also meet the requirements of 
the judgment of experience, wherein is found a ftlil and complete 
l. NGHE, X- XI. 
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recognition of all types of objects of experience, including the 
world as a whole, and in which God would stand as the beginning, 
not the end, of our reason (note herein Hocking's ontological 
argument). 
The mystical process would require that above and beyond 
that base all opportunity possible should be given to experience 
to explain and to justify what is in the base. At this end of the 
philosophical structure we see Ho cking's "tentative mysticism." 
At the base end, and in the 11motion fo!'l.vard 11 , prospectively, 
certainty should rule and govern. This is 11 immediacy 11 , but not 
closed tmo~ard additional truth (of its own kind). Rightly understood, 
immediacy stands for creativity , even for some risk in the prophetic 
and creative enterprise. Thus that which is both finishable, and 
finished where it should be, but also offerine opportunity for 
something ever to be added to that which is finished in it, is the 
satisfactory kind of idealism, as of religion. 
Nysticism , in Hocking, holds that t he wholeness of exper-
ience alone can reveal the \>Thole of Reality. Mysticism is a process 
of discovery, of proceeding from that \.Jhich is known in experience 
to an infinity of possible differentiations of that known. We repeat, 
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what Hocking means by myst icism is that discipline in exper.ience 
which lies at the root of all thought , all progress, all discipl ine, 
all logic, and of all selfhood. It is not something which either 
philosophy or religion can give to us; it gives us these other. 
The purpose of mysticism is to give us philosophies and religions, 
the kind <Thich serve to present man to his ontological origin. 
C. Conclusions. 
Such criticisms as Hocking gives concerning other types 
of idealism can serve as an aid to the discovery of his own 
philosophy. That he is an idealist is a certainty. His position 
is according to what is understood in idea and in \fuole idea. 
Idea and Whole idea, together, correspond to what we mean by an 
understanding of objects, both of sense and of psychology (physical 
objects and reflexive objects). Ideas, taken together as classes, 
serve as the 11bridge 11 across .which the mind travels in its communi-
cation with other selfhood (including that of God and of the world--
the world self being.!! part of God's Selfhood, bearing to him the 
same relation ~.that the body does to a finite self, without vJhich he 
would not be a true self). A physical thing represents the "ground 
of irruption" where other-selfhood is revealed as the things-in-
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themselves. This is God 's body-in-contact with the bodies (and 
minds) of finite selves. The 11mind 11 of God lies both \..rithin and 
beyond the physical world, imparting meaning and purpose through 
the world. Selves are the 11 ultimates 11 , selves of both mind and 
body, for the metaphysical value of selfhood imparts value to 
mind and body. 
Hocking isnot a 11 personal idealist 11 in a strict sense, 
for he sees more in selfhood than is frequently included in per-
sonality itself. The personalist ~ support the finite person 
without supporting the infinite person. That is, the personalist 
can be ~ humanist. However, Hocking prefers the term 11 self11 to 
11personali ty11 • This it appears to us is what Hocking means when 
he says: . 
I do not love the word personality . I want 
whatever is accidental and arbitrary and atomic 
and limited and case-hardened about that con-
ception to be persistently beaten and broken 
by whatever of God I can see in the living Law 
and order of this Universe untfl it also has 
all such totality and warmth. 
Mystical idealism (which can be another name for Hocking 's 
radical idealism) assumes Reality first and selfhood second. 
l. MGHE, 335. 
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The self gets his reality from something other than himself, a 
position to which he is bound to subscribe 1dthout variation. 
It is almost impossible for the mystical idealist to dispense 
with the infinite self. A corollary is that the mystical idealist 
must discover his own reality in connnunication 1dth other selves. 
The "minimum" of this kind of idealism Hocking gives in the follow-
ing account: 
1. TOP, 4.38. 
This amount of idealism one may regard as a 
sort of philosophic minimum. The mystic, I 
believe, is much more adequate in his judgment 
than the world is an almost untouched reservoir 
of significance and value, whose quality we 
touch in passing perceptions of beauty in nature; 
or in love, which always comes as a surprise 
strangely reflecting on our previous inability 
to see, so that we say of ourselves, "Atheists 
are as dull1who cannot guess God's presence out of sight." 
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1. .'!'.!!! value ~ the judgment of experience. 
The study we are attempting at this point 
concerns the theory llh.ich is involved in mysticism. Another 
section will study the practice of mysticism. 1 The following 
suggests the manner of Hocki.ng' s own divisions 
Not every mysticism 'Will do. It is not the 
"speculative mysticism" of the text-books 
that we want; it is mysticism as a practice 
of union with God, together with the theory 
of that practice. 2 
He describes ~tioism in the following wayt 
I have become persuaded that there is anotherJ 
even a necessary mysticism. A mysticism as 
important as dangerous; Whose historical 
aberrations are but tokens of its power. It 
is this mysticism which lends to life that 
value Which is beyond the docility of reason; 
which neither denies nor is denied by the 
results of idealism or the practical works 
of life, but supplements both, and consti-
tutes the essential standpoint of religion. 3 
Mysticism as Hocking presents it is fully 
rational, yet not depending on reason. It includes reason, 
and all that goes into reason. Beginning, perhaps, in the 
primitive as a wild and impulsive thrust of the assertive 
will, untamed by anything external to itself, it brings 
1. Chapter VI discusses the practice of mysticism. 
2. MGHE, xviii. 
3. Ibid., xviii-xix. 
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itself into docility through an expression of reason at 
work within experience. The system which puts reaeon to 
work in experience, which Hocking recognizes as his type 
of .my-sticism, 1 is called the judgment of experience. It 
is this system of ~sticism which we are going to discuss 
ncnr. 
say: 
Of the judgment he has the following to 
A judgment belongs to a judging mind. The 
world of reality, therefore, Which ie the 
world of truth, is the world of a univf'sal 
and final judgment, a universal self. 
That is to say, judgment is of the nature of 
mind, of reality, of truth, and of " a universal self". This 
statement makes the judgment equal to the lmcnrledge which can 
be had of reality. It is not said in that quotation, nor in 
any others by Hocking which we have found that judgment is 
equated with selfhood, but simply that it belongs to a "judging 
mind". Judgment, then, _!! ~ ~ of reality. There is 
more. There is, Bor instance, experience. Of' it Hocking 
says: 
1. Given in personal correspondence with Professor Hocking,l953). 
2. TOP, 270-271. 
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I propose that we consider all experience as 
experience by a self, a 'subject,' and as 
experience o£ a not-self, an 'object.• ••• The 
word 'experience' suggests passivity, as if 
our experience were something that happens 
to us. And indeed this is haltway the case: 
if we were able to anticipate or control the 
detail of each incoming moment, experience 
would not be what it is, the incessant 
arrival of the unexpected, a continuous 
course of instruction, and in its sum the 
unrolling of an unknown destiny ••• Experience 
includes experiencing; and experiencing is 
an activity detailed at its maximum quiescence, 
in acts of attention. 1 
By experience Hocking means that those two 
parts of our world usually designated as subjective or within 
the mind of a knowing self, and objective or outside the mind 
of a knowing self are brought together. Both parts of our 
world are found, through experience, to be active and real. 
In some manner both parts of the world give and receive, which 
indicates a true reality for each. Yet because each part is 
truly real does not mean that each is contradictory of the 
other. Furthermore, there is some clearly designated intelli-
gence indicated in what Hocking says about it. Mind is there, 
and mind is at work in experience, without any artificial 
additions from the outside. "Acts of attention" can mean 
1. Art.(l951), 320-321. 
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n.ething other than ~ at ~ ~ its objects. But it 
also means something else. Attention implies interest, and 
i nterest implies possible value. Some linkage with the 
objects which are in attention is indicated, some participation 
in them. 
The word 'experience' suggests a kind of 
knowing, an interest in what is there, a 
yield of fact. What it fails to suggest 
is that, life being profoundly emotional., 
every i tern of experience is charged with 
feeling. 1 
What we may take feeling to mean here is 
that the knowing and experiencing self has already established 
some connections between his own needs and some fulfillment of them 
from this outer source. Experience of an objective or external-
to-the-experiencing-self situation is, because of the very 
possibility of experience itself, an expectant situation, in 
which the experieneer is already in possession of some ful-
fillment of his needs, at least in anti cipation. In some 
manner the outer and the inner are "geared" to each other, by 
the very nature of experience itself. But the real. joining 
1. Art.(l951), 320-321. 
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of outer and inner, in the experience, comes through the 
implementation of experience with judgment, or reason, bring-
ing understanding and meaning into it. 
The word 'experience' fails to suggest any 
variable in the efficiency of our experiencing. 
The content of experience is subjecf to judgment 
at every point as better or worse. 
Some control, and some exercise of control 
upon the flow o:f experience is needed. This :fact indicates 
a real acti vity on the part o:f the thing-world, an activity 
which is in the direction of the knowing and experiencing self, 
which needs to be brought under some knid of restrictive and 
. . 
selective control. This control, however, is not :far purposes 
of damming up the flow or o:f stopping it, as though it were 
an evil, that is, a contradiction of the needs of the self; 
lt is merely as regulator of the supply and organization of 
it according to the needs of demand on the part of the user. 
What we have seen thus :far, with regard to 
the judgment of experience, is that there is set up some 
practical working relationship between the world of the 
:finite self's individual needs and the base of supply, as it 
were, which is the whole outer world, or the ~-~-self1 
1. Art.(l951), 322. 
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a relationship, then, Which brings together two distinct 
realities. Reality, as harmonizer, is present, then, in 
the judgment of experience. This fact is its value for 
mysticiSill. That is, reality is found at work in it, 
putting together that which individuality, by its Oftl 
nature, is forever attempting to mark off as that 'Which 
is not its own individuality but which nevertheless ma.kBs 
its contribution to individuality and serves as its proper 
environment. But in the judgment of experience individuality 
is saved, at the same time that it is joined with that 'Which 
is not its awn distinct individuality, but which, nontheless, 
contributes to it and is needed by it. 
If we will keep in mind what Hocking says 
that ~sticism is( as was pointed out in chapter II)--the 
recognition of t wo worlds, made seperate by the individual 
selfhood through the principle of negation, for purposes 
of marking out the bounds of limitation, possibility, and 
of individuality, but in it all holding that both worlds 
are real and in need of some re-uniti ng at their source--
we will see that mysticism is not rooted in mere "mystery"• 
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That is, it is not mystery so far as the worth of these two 
worlds to each other is concerned, not is it a mystery as to 
the need of some practical union between them. In other 
words, Hocking does not assume mystery in the nature of 
reality itself. The only mystery which he finds present 
to mysticism is functional only, and is found in the "dis-
connections" in the process of the union of the in'o worlds, 
i.e., in the ineffability, such as in immediacy, which does 
not make clear how the union which is required is possible 
and can be intelligently knom and understood. In short, 
Hocking is establishing, in the judgment of experience, a 
system of intelligible operation, which brings the general 
marks of mysticism, indirectly, under criticism. The judgment 
of experience presents mysticism to the idea, through which 
it can be understood and through which it can be put to 
fuller use by the mystic. "Immediate experience, interpreted 
by the dialectic" 1 is at least a part of what Hocking means 
as the function of the judgment of experience. 
But the judgment of experience, through the 
ideas which it draws out of reality, will never exhaust~ 
reality with which and in which it operates. The moral and 
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the values of the moral are the inexhaustible resources 
of mystical reality. There will always be some reason for 
believing that more value is yet possible, an insight which 
"cannot come from purely thoughtful ~rtioa._. It is the 
result of an effort primarily moral." 1 And, simply because 
the whole of Reality cannot be comprehended entirely through 
idea alone, and because the moral and moral value are end-
lessly perfectible, there will always be some "mystery" in 
connection 'With Reality. However, the judgment of experience 
may be considered to be a wholly acceptable general principle 
of operation for the continued revelation of the value of 
individuality and of Reality. 
As matter of procedure within this chapter, 
therefore, we 'Will undertake a careful study of the judgment 
of experience, not in any attempt to set forth an outline 
of Hocking's epistemology but rather that we may see the 
judgment of experience in operation. The primary setting 
of this operational procedure will be in Hocking's doc:bor&l 
thesis, with whatever excursions to the side as may from 
1. TOP, 398. 
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time to time be necessary. 
A. The whole of experience. 
The fundamental difficulty which is presented 
to the understanding in its attempt to lmow the three primary 
classes of objects which come within the general purview of 
experience--objects of sense or physical objects, social 
objects or other selves, and reflexive or introspective 
objects--lies in the fact that each class is frequently con-
sidered in distinction or isolation from the others, thus 
giving rise to a series of "closed groups". The reason for 
this tendency does not belong to reason itself, as a principle, 
so to speak, of rationality, but is due instead to a demand 
that our fields of investigation be limited for purposes of 
analysis, especially with regard to scientific classification. 
The point which we are attempting to make here is that they 
cannot be so held when we have reality in view. 
Hocking is concerned about the separation, 
made for practical purposes, which is made to appear in our 
theory of reality. His desire is to continue their wholeness 
and their essential unity at the same time that a knowledge 
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of distinction is maintained. The two primary offenders 
w.i.. thin systematic ph;i:losopby are those who attempt to set 
up adequate views of reality from the point of view of the 
physical objects alone, on the one side, and those who view 
reality from the point of view of the ideas which comprehend 
them, on the other. But Hocking is more concerned about the 
"loss" of the physical objects to reality than he is about 
the loss of the ideal world. He therefore presents a criticism 
of that idealism whose epistemology is monistic, assuming that 
a criticism of its opposite w.i.ll follow as a natural consequence. 
He asserts that the reality of "subjective" idealism is of 
"pantomimic character" •1 
In order that we may know what reality is, 
we must know not only the "objects which are the self" but 
those also which are 11not-self11 , i.e., not the individual 
self under investigation at the moment. However, the not-
self objects are difficult to grasp and to know. There is 
something flusive about them. At the same time there is 
a demand that we lmaw them as other-than-my-self. This is 
so because experience forces upon us the realization that 
1. THE, iv. 
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these same not-self objects are the common property of all 
selves. 
The same brick wall may be seen by a multitude 
of observers, not alone successively, but 
at the same time. I eo not so much as need to 
see these other observers to know that the 
wall is thus sharable. How do I know this? 
It goes with what I mean by the 'objectivity' 
of the wall:. it is not subjectively mine, 
because it is in the nature of the thing to 
be observable-by-many. If this is common 
sense--and I believe it is--then common sense 
does say with realism that in knowing I 
reach beyond myself,--the object is independent 
of me; but it also says that in getting beyond 
myself I get into a world in which mind other 
than ~ own has an established concern,--and 
this is no longer distinctively realism. 1 
There is a kind of double action in the above 
argument. That is, when the objects are given their reality, 
the reality of the self is also given. That is, the dialectic 
of experience, through common sense as well as through systamatic 
ju@gment, gives reality to all, at one and the same time. In 
the recognition of this fact Hocking is reducing the amount of 
mystery at the same time that he is making mysticism more 
meaningful. For, if we grasp what he means by mysticism, his 
intention is to make reality internally consistent with itself. 
1. TOP, 300. 
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Hocking's intention in mysticism is, not to promote mystery 
as such, but to reduce elements of myster.y in terms used and 
in logical construction which views the parts and the individual 
selves as though they were independent of other parts and other 
selves. His mysticism, in seeking the values which all reals 
have for each other, is a making of reality an internally 
consistent whole, as a result of which more and more meaning 
will be available for individual selfhood. The mysticism, 
then, which he espouses is one in which meaning and worth, for 
individual selves, are found to be limitless. 
The above interpretation of Hocking's mysticism 
should help us to see that if one set of objects suffers, all 
others suffer with it. Furthermore, we should also see that 
all minds which are in the world of experience are of equal 
value and worth with mine. This determination to discover 
the worth of all selves w.i thout losing the value of individuality 
we might call Hocking's mystical imperative. 
The experience which the individual has of 
the world is a shared experience. The objective world is 
known to exist, not because it is known by an individual knower, 
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but because it is a fact of universal experience, generally 
attested to by society, as though, perhaps, the universal 
experience had somehow become the self which society symbolizes. 
That the world is ! self also Hocking accepts, thus putting 
selthood squarely before us from every quarter, establishing 
certainty of the self as the most important philosophical 
consideration. 
This proposition, that the world is a self, 
I regard as a point of certainty in philosophy. 
And therewith I confess another belief,--the 
belief that philoso~ aims at certaint~, 
and can be contenth nothiiig less ••• ome 
such certainty is necessary to give structure 
to our system of knowledge, as well as to the 
experimental business of daily life. 1 
That the world is a self and that all reality 
is fo\Ulded upon selfhood is worth our notice here, for this 
fact indicates, we may believe, the~ 2!, reality which is 
open to Hocking 1 s mysticism and, consequently 1 to his judgment 
of experience. In assuming that selthood is the basic nature 
of Reality Hocking is making an assertion which is drawn 
from the judgment of experience, as a first truth of judging 
the whole, a meaning 19hich is found in its first operation 
as l'lell as in its last. 
1. TOP, 44J. 
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It is because all is ~ in Hocking that 
he is able to escape from his own local selfhood and is 
permitted therefore the freedom of fellowship with the Whole 
of Reality. It is this selfhood which provides the background 
for mysticism and which gives it i*s 11 auth.Drity". It is 
within the context of this universal selfhood, as its univers-
ality touches the particular, that mysticism "lends to life 
that value which is beyond the reach of fact." 1 
In its vital relation with the universal 
self and possibility for the knowledge of other-self in the 
world of thing and of fact that a deeper kind of relationship 
is not only possible but actual. But this is true not through 
analysis alone, nor through the methods of analysis; a basic 
synthesis, to· go along with analysis, is essential. Mysticism 
includes both in the fonn of its judgment, which is both simpl.e 
and complex at one and the same time. 
But it is also necessary to modify our 
trust in analysis. For there are objects 
in the world which are both simple and 
complex, simple from one point of VieW, 
complex from others. The spot of color 
may well be such an object. The mind 
itself is another. With suoh objects, 
analysis will give us part of the truth, 
but runs the danger of leaving out of a 
account another part equally important. 
The false assumption in the theory of 
analysis is that simplicity is to be 
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found in one direction only, the direction 
of the microscope. It remains possible 
therefore that the entire universe, with 
many varieties of external relation among 
its parts, much loose play and independence, 
has also its ultimate unity and simplicity. 1 
When the 'Whole of experience is brought to 
us with such a burst of insight as to render it simple to the 
I 
understanding, that does not mean that the whole is necessarily 
simple in its own nature, except that it contains a central 
unity. When this fact is seen, and the whole stands out in 
clearness to the understanding, the complexity of the process 
by which the insight came into the understanding is not reduced 
thereby. 
B. The experience of the whole. 
The term "experience" requires some further 
clarification. It is a much-used term, and considerably abused 
as well. Its meaning has become ambiguous through misuse. 
The word 'experience' is tired. After 
1. TOP, 370-371. 
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serving all schools, it ends by being of 
doubtful service to any. It is not alone 
ambiguous; What is more dangerous, it is 
the source of misconception. Through the 
connotations Which have accrued to it, it 
imposes upon the foundation of knowledge 
the misconceptions of subjectivity, passiVity, 
shreddability, indifference. 1 
William James gives us a "psychological" 
definition of experience, using it in connection with ~sti-
cism. He is not "explaining"; he simply reports concerning 
the way it appears when attached to religious experience. 
His ·explanation of those experiences Which are peculiarly 
religious or mystical are in terms of their "ineffability", 
"noetic quality", "transiency", and "passi vity'1• ~ut Hocking, 
as we saw in chapter II, re-evaluates these marks of the 
mystical experience, extending their meanings into further 
terms, and thus also extending the meaning of the experience 
itself. 
Hocking's use of the term experience comes 
closer to a definition-in-use which John dewey gives us than 
it does to that of James. The following quotation gives 
Hocking's comment on Dewey's definition. 
1. SCR, 16. 
2. James, VRE, 371-372. 
137 
CHAPTER Ill 
HOCKING 1 S THIDRY OF JUDGMENT AND IDFA 
Experience, he maintains, is a double-
barrelled word: it denotes the stuff and 
the way we take it. These two are insepar-
able. Without our acti~e response the stuff 
is not experience. As to the matter of 
indifference, the idea that all experience 
is full of emotional concern is being brough~ 
forward by various American thinkers, such 
as John Wild, and is displacing the idea that 
experience can be analyzed into a lot of 
qualityless spots of sensation. 1 
Dewwy's definition more closely approximates 
what Hocking means by experience than does the desc»iption of 
mystical experience which was given by James. We have ·~eady 
referred to James in this connection. We have shown, so we 
thought, how Hocking takes the descriptions given by James and 
promotes them out beyond their psychological enclosure, proving 
the dynamic nature of experience, particularly as it bears 
upon the activity of the self. 
Let us now turn to Hocking 1 a own use of the 
term experience. The following definition is purely provisional: 
1. SCR, 17. 
2. Ibid., 17. 
I suggest that we need at least three terms 
to contain what the word 'experience' attempted 
to compress into one: (1) 11The self" (2) 
meeting the world" (3) "More or less well. 11 
This description is not subjective. It 
evades subjectivity because it brings the 
self and the world together. 2 
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If experience is to be found vital to the 
judgment in the discovery of reality it must be seen to be 
so as the result of its activity within the self, and not as 
something which is e .xternal to the meaning of selfhood.. 
"Experience is always somebody1 s experience; it belongs to 
some person." 1 And, inasmuch as it belongs to a self, it 
must vary with the demands which individuality and selfhood 
make upon it. That is, it is an instrument of the self, not 
its master. As general instrument, through which is met a 
general other, by a general self, it is an abstraction. Its 
concrete form is to be found i~ this, that it is always the 
experience of some self in particular, about particular facts. 
Says Hooking: "I propose that we consider all experience as 
experience by a self, a I subject, 1 and as experience of a 
not-self, an I object."' 2 
What we have thus far had detailed before 
us is the very intimate value of experience to a self of 
facts which are, at the moment they are received as fact, 
not identidal with the self which is in recognition of them. 
1. SCR, 16. 
2. Art.(l951), 320. 
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But as soon as facts are received by an experiencing self1 
they are set aside, temporarily, like letters which have 
been read, to be picked up from time to time to be read again. 
It is the message ,.!!! the letter which we read that is valuable 
to us, particular~ as the message is related to the sender. 
Likewise with facts. Not the facts themselves, but the meaning 
they carry is what is important, together with the additional 
"fact" that there has to be a sender. The nature of the sender 
will be discovered through an analysis of the facts, judgmentally. 
11Receiving11 the facts,and some recognition of them and their 
conveyed intention, is the function of experience. Drawing 
further upon our analogy of ~ letter ~ its message which 
facts in experience are to us, we may point to experience as 
the11messenger11who picks up the message and presents it to the 
receiver, waiting also for some response in return--some mark 
of himself made in or upon the not-himself in nat ure~ich 
can be returned to the original sender. Thus experience, 
functionally, can be called the relayer ~ messages, from the 
not-myself to me and from me to my not-me. The content of 
experience is simply the message of fact contained in the 
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message itself, which content is subject to judgment. 
"The content of experience is subject to judgment at every 
point as better or worse." 1 Whatever return we give back is 
in terms of the "better or worse" which we discover in the 
message of experience. 
It is not the experience itself, then, which 
originates or creates the content--experience serving as 
messenger, which is its "function"--, but rather the content 
is produced jointly, as a kind of question and answer situation. 
The message may frequently present both a statement(of fact) 
and a question, such as, 11This is a fact given as an obligation. 
What will you do about it? How will you use it? Is it 
something you can use, either now or in the future? can 
you add anything of value to it?" The response(also a 
content) could be something like this: " I received your 
message, the meaning of which I partially understand. I 
can see the need for action and I "Will do my best. But some 
. things are not clear. Will you please write(demonstrate your 
meanings through more facts) again soon?" A further phase 
of the judging of the content of the experience would take 
1. Art.(l951), 322. 
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place as reflection upon it, placing it in relation to other 
messages received. Not until it has been so related, coherent~, 
can its whole meaning be discovered and its import to the 
particular be deduced. It is at this point in experience that 
Hocking would insist upon the completed relation of the several 
types of experience. For example(as we have already seen), ·he 
insists on an inclusion of three basic types of experience in 
one composite or whole judgment, which he considers essential 
to internal consistency. They are: The judgment of the fr: 
objects, that of the T-objects, and that of the S-objects. 
There are, then, these three messages which must ~ ~ 
together~ which~ be responded to together. They are 
the three parts of the puzzle, so to speak, which Reality 
presents to us. If they are properly set together, with 
appropriate response to their originator(our own response 
making some contribution to their meaninging, internally), 
we have then come "face to face" with Reality. 
There are numerous evidences of Hocking's 
position as stated above, with physicaJ. nature intermediate 
between the finite self and his situation in the world of fact 
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and God as primary ground of fact. Some of these evidences 
will be listed in support of this position. We must, however, 
keep in mind that Hocking asserts selfhood!:! ~~ultimate 
reality. All other terms and principles which he uses: are 
"mediate" 1 functional representations of self-action which they 
convey to the understanding. Philosophy itself 1 then, might 
accordingly be defined as constituting the whole ~ all functions 
which mediate leality, presenting finite selfhood to the infinite 
Self actively, through co-operative participation~ creativity. 
Philosophy, according to this definition, is the s,ystematic 
organization of all experience, drawn from ~ original experi-
~ of selfhood already.!:!:,~_!!.!: creating power. Mysticism, 
then, would be the assurance upon which philosophy operates~ 
~ original experience of creative selfhood will fulfill the 
demands of its own will-action to become infinite in its own 
meaning. This definition of mysticism we hold to be implicit 
in Hocking 1 s philosophy, philosophy serving as means to our 
"whole idea" of this meaning. The definition given of mysticism 
is theoretical, but with demands made upon itself to be applied. 
Wherever there is any apparent progress toward 
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self-realization, there is mysticism. The primary "problelJ111 
which mysticism contains is that of the relation between the 
human self as finite and his infinite possibility. The world 
of fact is both ! means to that infinite unfolding and !!! 
interpretation of it. Its reality(its actual progress as a 
becoming) is not to be identified with the world of fact even 
though it rests upon the 110rld of fact. With ·these thoughts in 
mind we are ready to employ more of judgment,and. also more of 
experience, upon the world of fact. 
We would be foolish indeed to try to ignore 
our world of fact, for it is the ID!ans of putting 11 grit11 into 
our understanding. That is, it is the place where distinctions 
can be tested, keeping us ou:b of mental "dead corners". If, 
for instance, we try to study mind on its own ground we produce 
abstractions and add up "dichotomies". 11In my own attempts 
to gain relief from such situations I have found myself moving, 
more or less clearly, in the diredtion of physical theory." 1 
Philosophy, Hocking holds, need not be fearful 
of dealing with matter. In fact idealism can best afford to 
1. Art.(l908), 129. 
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be materialistic. 110nly a genuine idealism can afford to 
be thoroughly materialistic in its first explanations." 1 
That does not mean that idealism will need to make matter a 
part of its essential principle. What it does mean is that 
matter will be used as a means to the clarification of mental. 
distinctions. Being so opposite to mind in its appearance, 
it is the best possible medium for making mind clear to it-
self, provided, of course, that it bears on mind. 
Other things equal, the more alien in 
nature the terms i n which a thing is expres-
sed the more successful the explanation: the 
thing has its roots in the utmost corner~ of 
reality--the demonstration i s complete. 
And simply because physical nature is so 
different, so diffuse, and so i ndifferent to t he particular 
concerns of mind i t therefore is a good arbiter of distinctions 
which frequently challenge each other. 
It is a seamless garment of interweaving 
threads; it is -what the mathematician calls, 
in a word, a closed group, and the physicist, 
a conservative system. This complete conceptu-
al independence it i s which chiefly qualifies 
it for serving as a terminus of e~lanations 
for the peculiarities of spirit. 
The only way that the mind can reveal itself 
1. Art.(l908), 129. 
2. Ibid., 130. 
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overtly to other-selfhood appears to be through physical 
nature. 
Conscience, for instance, has no variety, 
no application, no career, except for its 
commerce with our 1 empirical 1 instincts 
and desires; and desire, in turn, has no 
variety nor development, except in the toils 
of a differentiating organism. Very probably, 
also, conscience plits off from desire or 
desire from conscience on some rock of nature.l 
What nature does for the mird, according to 
Hocld.ng, is to produce "a finished analysis" 2of its distinctions. 
This is true particularly when we have so organized nature that 
its several categories represent the distinctions and divisions 
of the mind. The categories in nature then become "principles 
of synthesis" for the mind. In this manner, organizing nature 
in terms of the needs of the several mental distinctions, we 
discover that nature "conforms" to the needs of the mind, 
becoming a unity of physical categories to parallel the mental 
categories. 
The physical world also is model of the 
human self. That is, the concept and the experience of the 
1. Art.(l908), 131. 
2. Ibid., 131. 
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self, although distributed as widely throughout the physical 
world as the various aspects of the self are numerous, 
eventually the "simple" configurations of selfhood can be 
deduced from a general description or togetherness of the 
physical in its meaning for consciousness, via the 11dictator11 
which stands at the center of its operation. For it is out 
of the "obedience of nature" to law that Hocking discovers 
1 
the outline of mind in nature. 
Hocking lists five ways in Which the individual 
appears in experience, one of which is the self which is given 
through the physical world. The five ways are: (1) 11He who 
stands continually in a present Now", (2) 11the discovery of 
oneself as an individual", (3) the "self which.!_!, deeper t han 
all epithets," (4) the self found through the "finding of the 
individual aspect of the world beyond me", and (5) the self 
2 
which is the "individuality of another person." 
Once Hocking has found that the physical supports 
the mental, even to the point of yielding selfhood, empirically, 
he then feels justified in making use of all other types of 
1. Ap.(l908), l32n. 
2. MGHE, 429-432. 
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Experience which in any w~ reveal the meanings Which belong 
to self. This is in part what he appears to mean when he 
1 
speaks of "widening the net of empiricism". Every possible 
representation of experience, insofar as it applies to the 
notion of selfhood, is placed within the "net", and meanings 
in every possible range of experience are also placed there. 
This is what Hocking means by the judgment of experience, as 
it also is what he means by mysticism as process of discovery 
of the maifestations of the self. It is this extension of 
the meaning of the judgment of experience whieh can point out 
the phases of the transformation within the self of his meaning 
toward and into infinity. 
Hocking does not appear to believe that the 
( 
human-se~individuality will ever take the place of or become 
God. His assertion, contextually, indicates that the hwna.n 
will never, no matter how much he may progress, displace God, 
fCJr God's nature is already infinitely complete, whereas the 
finite self has infinity to go. He would appear to support 
Rufus Jones's second position in the following quotation. 
1. Given by Hooking in personal correspondence with him(l953). 
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Either there is far greater depth and comp1ex-
i ty to the inmost nature of personal sell-
consciousness than we usually take into account, 
that is, we ourse1ves are bottomless and inward-
ly exhaustless in range and scope; or the 
fragmentary thing we call our sell IS continu-
ous inwardl.y with a wider spiritual world with 
Which we have some sort of contact-relation-
ship and from which vi ta1izing energy comes 
i n to us. 
It may also be maintained that Hocking does 
not support the position that the individua1 will eventu.al J.y 
be absorbed into the infinite whole of the supreme Se1f. The 
relation is not "organic", in terms of any "content". It is, 
instead, a relationship of activity, a blending of purpose and 
of will, of participation and of apprenticeship in creativity. 
To be "one with God" is to be in partnership with Him. It 
is the final opinion of this present investigator, so far as 
an experience of~ whole has been found in this section, 
that the whole of meaning is found in experience, functionally, 
as moral content of active progression, endl.ess1y, so far as 
the finite sell i* concerned. The meaning of the finite will 
is that of participat ion in the infinite will, but without 
loss of self-identity. The partially developed meaning is, 
as we have seen, a1ready "in" whole meaning, through intimacy. 
1. Jones, TIL, 189. 
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But the intimacy which we have found is moral., an intimacy 
which is brought forward by the concept of immediacy but 
which is not merely immediate. That which is given in immediacy 
is an immediacy of conc~ptual understanding only, a psychological 
position, which., in order that it can be used by the self.,has 
to be translated into moral action. The moral action we found 
in Hocking is that of ~. The transition from immediacy 
in lmowledge to moral love we found in what Hocking specifies 
as certainty. 
We may now indicate how immediacy arises in 
the judgment of experience., into a concept., as a psychological. 
report. Perhaps its first instance was found as a practical 
world.ng in the emotions. This matter is not clear in Hocldng. 
Its conceptual "reporting" nature appears to have developed out 
of the dialectic of Hocld.ng 1 s judgment of experience, lso far as 
his own interest in it is concerned. 
By the concept of immediacy it appears that 
Hocking . means what is accumulated in the judgment., ontologically, 
largely if not wholly as a result of some 11intuition" of 
Wholeness present organizationally, and of the necessary 
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relation. As we have seen, the three separate judgments 
which Hocking believes are necessarily bound together, are 
those of the R-objects, the T-objects, and the S-objects. 
There is a kind of immediacy Which is bound up with their 
necessary relation to each other. This immediacy is what 
we might caJ.l "existential" or ontological, an ontology which 
appears to us to be extracted from the concept of necessity. 
It follows that the three fundamental 
existential judgments contained in the 
three judgments of experience fall, in 
fact, together; and their ontological 
proofs mutually support one another. 1 
This immediacy, then, originates out of 
itself-lmowledge looking in upon itself, as it were. As 
such, it has very little to contribute to a knowledge of 
the whole which is given through experience, inductively. 
What does appear in the judgment of experience, 
'Which might presumably be ~ken . . c ,J t o be a kind of immediacy, 
is a gradual accumulation of certainty, arising out of' 
experience and of the operation of the judgment upon it, 
which then serves as the source of further empiricism. 
1. THE, 168. 
151 
CHAPTER IV 
HOCKING 1 S THIDRY OF JUDGMENT AND IDFA 
There is a connection, in Hocking, between 
that reasoning from immediacy which gives the mind its first 
certain knowledge and idea. Of this we w.i.ll see more in the 
following section, our primary interest at the moment being 
concerned with immediacy in the general structure of the 
knowing process. We are now trying to understand what Hocking 
means by immediacy, with particular reference to the whole which 
some structure in experience gives us. Is the 1b ole of reality 
given directly or indirectly, is the question. Does the logic 
which knowledge uses limit itself to "induction", to analysis, 
or does it also make use of "deduction" and synthesis? ·Hocking 
says we use both types of reasoning, and we use them together. 
"Every induction is induced by a prior 
induction, ultimately by a total induction, 
or judgment about the whole of things, -
none other than ~ whole-idea, derived from 
whatever knowledge of the whole and of God 
my experience has built up for me. Every 
induction is at the same time a deduction, 
then, --an "It must be so," parented, though 
from the background of consciousness, by an 
insight which in its origins is religious. 1 
There is something which is non-rational 
before us. That its non-rationality is given in experience, 
and about the whole, stemming from the background of conscious-
1. MGHE, 477. 
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ness, is matter of assurance. But what is the origin of 
the assurance? If the origin of this "total induction" is 
empiricism applied whole object, it seems altogether probable 
that what appears to be immediately given to experience is 
the result of interpretation, of intended meanings applied 
to results after ~ fact. For example, Hocking's judgment 
of experience in the form of the three separate judgments 
of R,T,andS objects appear to lend some notion of wholeness, 
structurally, but it is a wholeness which is apparent to 
or through experience after the separate judgments have been 
placed together and tried out, empirically, as an interpretation 
of the results. The deduction evident to the situation is 
imposed from outside the particular framework of the complete 
judgment as given. 
A suggestion as to the origin of the whole 
which interposes itself in the inductive process, as some 
knowledge which is given in inunediacy, "through the background 
of consciousness" is found, we may believe, in the term 
"religious". What, then, does Hocking mean by religion? 
Clearly he means that it is a moral demand made upon the 
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experiencing human self. Hocking defines religion as 
"a passion for righteousness, and for the spread of righteous-
- -- ---- -
~' conceived~~ cosmic demand." 1 As we have already 
indicated, ~ is Hooking's ''categorical imperative~' operative 
through the will, Which is taken as the direction which self-
consciousness imposes upon the self. Innnediacy thus reduces 
to some action of inner organization of selfhood, with an 
application of its organizational structure directed toward 
some object or objects "''h ich are other than the self producing 
that particular action. As we have seen, the physical wcr ld 
offers the best opportunity for distinctions of such difference, 
therefore the objects attended to are mostly of this nature. 
But through the attention bestowed upon such objects,and 
through such bestowal their own organization and structure 
is discovered, other-aelfhood is found• indirectly. 
Hocking clearly indicates, argumentatively, 
that immediacy is not 11 immediate11 except as a report of ~ 
certainty, a certainty which is mediated through experience, 
not applicable to the whole ~ ~ experience, only to 
1. LRWF, 26. 
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the cosmic demand, but after it~ been given El experiencel 
That is, mere immediacy is static when retained as concept 
only. But if we should think of it u some action within 
experience itself, as a movement of a self toward its objects, 
seeking to include them in its realm of experience, we will 
come to the notion that immediacy means participation. That 
is, to give meaning to anything, even to immediacy, some 
action of intimate relationship is required. This, it would 
appear, is implied in Hocld.ng's definition of religion and 
also in his notion concerning the relation of induction and 
deduction, to each other 1 functionally, in the judgment of 
experience. In order that something can be given in experi-
~ some activity has to be taking place, from which that 
which is given can be derived, as from the "background of 
consciousness". 
Sorre of the nature of that activity we may 
find in Hocking's meaning of idea. 
~ Idea.!!! function of the whole judgment of experience. 
Ideas, according to Hocking, are functions 
of finite reason. They are "what we think lrl.th11 • They 
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are the means whereby the will achieves its power. 11 In the 
forum of the will to power through ideas the will reaches its 
1 
maturity." Ideas are "variables", says Hocking, 11 in the 
effectiveness of our attentive adjustment to the world ~ 
2 
experience". Ideas and sensations are two sides of reality, 
but particularly do sensations appear as the opposite11 side of 
the shield", of which ideas are one side, in the nature of 
facts. Perceptions of sense objects( in the form of facts) 
present to the understanding the "periphery", the existence 
of objects, whereas conceptions give us the center or the 
essence of them. But perceptions and conceptions do not 
serve as independents of the understanding. They come together 
in reason, particularly in the judgment of experience. "To 
be alive is to perceive; to perceive is to judge.j to judge is 
to use standards." 3The "standards" are derivative from reason. 
Ideas are "alive". ''Values and conscience are functions in 
the life of 'ideas' • 11 4 "Freedom" is of the nature of idea, 
as "obedience" is the law of physical sequence. 5 
All of consciousness is composed of ideas, 
arranged according to patterns of meaning, some of which are 
1. MAS, 316. 
2. Art.(l951), 322. 
). MAS, 2)2. 
4. Art.(l908), 132. 
5. Art.(l908), 132n. 
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contributors only, being more active in the "subconscious", 
but actively engaged nevertheless in the Whole of the think-
ing process. Consciousness and the subconscious Hocking calls 
the "allied consciousness". 
Ideas, so Hocking holds, are units of 
conscious direction and interest which are "thought with 11 
and which are regulative but not constitutive in metaphysics. 
They are of the nature of the self-part of its natural equip-
nent--in its knowledge of reality, both about and of its 
world of things. Ideas are efforts to express 19hat comes 
under the purview of experience, and herein they are "born". 
Once an adequate expression is hit upon, 
the cloudy fringes of the experience are 
lifted; the hovering sense of the infinite 
and ineffable disappear together with the 
humiliating consciousness of impotence: 
and 'idea' is born, and the human self is 
in possession. Such must be the career of 
all influxes to the spirit. 1 
Ideas may be called "prospective'' of the 
apirit of the self as it relates to its world. They, along 
with the thoughts 'Which contain them, are used by the self 
in its outreach toward its world. "For ideas and thoughts 
are the tools of our intercourse with external objects." 2 
1. MGHE, 19. 
2. MGHE, 44. 
157 
CHAPTER IV 
HOCKING'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT AND IDFA 
Whatever drives toward self-realizati.on is released through 
these "tools" of the self, yet is controlled by them as well. 
By means of the ideas the emotions are held in check. 
Except through idea feeling cannot consciously 
communicate itself ••• It is seldom, indeed, 
With oii6 11lDited control of idea, that an 
emotion passes from Bind to mind by idea 
alone, or can so pass: but the communicator 
is bound in good faith to bBing forward 
what idea he can, w.i. th all1promptness, and to rest his case on that. 
But if we interpret Hocking aright, he does 
not hold that idea itself is ultimate, except, perhaps, in its 
own area of idea. For example, Hocking does not go along with 
Hegel in his notion that idea is a "piece of ultimate reality", 
a bit of the eternal spirit. Hocking calls Hegel's notion 
2 11poetic 11 • Neither would Hocking agree with Plato, in the 
latter's interpretation of idea as a "form" of reality. 3 
Hocking uses several analogies to indicate 
what he means by idea and what function it has in helping to 
reveal the meanings which reality reveals are in nature. One 
such analogy i s of the laws of the state. "The state calls 
its own ideas, however, by the name of 'laws'(or institutions, 
1. MGHE, 77. 
2. LRWF, 38. 
). TOP, 344-245; 365. 
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which are congeries of laws) • 11 1 Actually the state and its 
laws provides a good likeness of what Hocking means by idea, 
for 11 a law is always either an experiment, or a statement of 
the condi tlbons under which experiments must be carried on. The 
rigidity and fixity of a law is only such as is necessary for a 
satisfactory experiment." 2 Such is idea, also, according to 
Hocking--always adjustable according to the demands of reason 
and of experience. A further analogy is of a brick wall, 
which does not exist11for a totally unquestioning mind". 3 
That is, it does not exist as independent idea. But to hold 
that the wall, to be real, is dependent on idea for its reality 
is quite different from the position which Hocking takes, which 
is that the wall is there as potential ~~ even when hot 
actually taken up into the mind as idea. What is there when 
idea is not there(for a given experiencer)dye-the sense 
qualia, plus the purpose which is not made by the individual 
experiencer but which is there to be interpreted. 4 That is, 
11in nature as we find it, there is much which is due to the 
mind(not necessarily as knower butt as one term of that 
relation." 5Idea is a part of the mind. It "is a piece of 
1. MGHE, 563. 
2. MGHE, 563-564. 
3. TOP, 362. 
4. TOP, 363-365 • 
5. TOP, 365. 
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of one's rnind ••• a vessel of known contents ••• manipulable, 
destined to do some work. 11 1 Like coins, ideas are"vessels 
of value." 2 Ideas represent continuity of meanings, so that 
we can depend on ourselves to know what we mean in our con-
secutive and various attempts to express our meanings in 
concepts. 
It is possible for the idea to be "valid 
for its object" primarily because objects, while continuing 
as objects, are in themselves meanings, and meanings which 
wither are or can be known. This is so for the reason, as 
Hocking appears to hold, that the world is a "self!, and all 
objects in it have self-value and disclose selfhood to 
selves. If we continue to view mysticism as the uniting of 
two worlds, neither of which can be doubted, in order that 
unlimited ideas can be brought out of the relation of the 
worlds to each other, we will see the value of the relation 
of ideas to their objects. Out of their union can come 
oj 
values which are significant to selfhood. As Hocking would 
.,. 
say, the self which is Reality is in relation to the finite 
selfhood through the order ~ arrangement of the physical 
1. MGHE, 19-80. 
2. MGHE, 80. 
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world. 
Both sensation and idea are in some contact 
with reality, but both from different dirctions. 
If we are right~ then, the idea reaches 
independent reality in the same way that 
sensation reaches it. Experience is experi-
ence of independent being, kn~ both in 
sensation and in idea at once. 
The more we probe the matter of reality which 
lies at the base of both idea and sensation the more we dis-
cover of mind and self, understood in terms of a deeper-lying 
purpose. Hocking holds that this fact needs fuller recogni-
tion generally, particularly among our psychologists and 
sociologists. 
What the psychological and social arts of 
our time need for their success is a simple 
fact about the nature of the world we live 
in, the presence there of a total and divine 
purpose. Given this fact, then the argument 
which we have called the 11d.ialectic 11 becomes 
an epitome of human experience, personal and 
also historical. It is the silent2 and perpet-ual conversation of God with man. 
It is not ideas, and it is not sensations, 
per _!!, which are fundamental. Both are servants of selfhood. 
This fact is important to know, for it indicates considerably 
1. MGHE, 568. 
2. SIG, 119. 
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the direction of his philosophy, Which is idealism, but 
with a distinction. For instance, according to what we have 
found out about idea from him, idea~ and sensations are of 
approximately equal worth in his sigjlt. Ideas are functions 
of the mind, and sensations are functions(so we may say) of 
ideas. But sense objects, as such are not ultimate or "dark", 
for they indicate idea from another direction, which also is 
owned by mind, as mind itself in turn is owned by self. 
Therefore it is not sense object which the self is seeking, 
but it is some other self( and selves) beyond the sense object. 
Everything in reality, ultimately is self or means self. The 
physical objects are real, but not as they appear. Their 
reality is given to them by interpretation, by selfhood and 
in terms of selfhood. It is men, in the finite world, who 
count. 
The great doers of our time may talk 
principle, because the editors, the profes-
sors, and the preachers suppose that the 
world turns on ideas, but in their heart! 
they know it is only the men who count. 
But Hocking does not stop with men, as men, 
for he insists that they assume some of the prerogatives of 
1. Art.(l946), 126. 
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the infinite Self, creativel y, presumably through some 
recognition of purpose Which idea discovers in the physical 
continuum. Out of the sense-datum comes value, and out of 
a recognition of value comes obkigation. 
No sense-datum is a simple, neutral, blank, 
opaque plaque of being. As a "datum," it is 
somthing "given" and that means given to a 
receiving self by an outer activity; it is 
a surface of contact between a living mind 
and a living world. And because of this, 
with the quality is presented also a moral 
alternative. WhatL 'fhe sense-datum i moral 
problem? Just that. For there are two things 
in this oie thing-the stuff, and ~ ! 
take it. 
Clearly, idea is a tool of the self, not just 
------~ 
of the mind, or of reason. It can be called the "handle" by 
which reality is taken into the self, and the self is given 
to reality. In some sense ideas are independent of consciousness 
itself, serving as a means to the latter' a 11self 11 consciousness. 
But they are not real independently of self. 
1. STG, 113. 
2. MGHE, 471. 
The continuous thread of my empirical self-
consciousness is no doubt due to some per-
manent friction in ~plying my existing 
stock of ideas to experience, and the per-
sistent de~d for creativeness thereby 
occasioned. 
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The self is prior to any and all ideas. 
It is the self which puts ideas into operation. The demand 
for idea-activity appears to be deep-seated, coming out of 
some original endowment of selfhood. It is not the ideas 
as .such which are important, nor is it the sense-data. Both 
ideas and sense-data are functions of self toward other-self. 
The problem is not the world of physical things; it is, rather, 
the matching of purpose, as it were, one self with another. 
Ideas and "facts" are the 11incitors", familiar marks along the 
way, or some vision of the object of desire still far off. 
Science itself discloses something of the 
"ought" which lies back of the facts of experience, the 
implication of which is that there is some selfhood beyond 
me, of which I am in search. 
But if science recognizes the "ought" at 
the base of its own existence, it has 
asserted by implication that this "some-
thing beyond me" which gives the datum is 
a source of obligation. And only a living 
self can be such a source ••• This is the 
immediate presence of purpose in the nucleus 
of the 'WOrld, precisely there where science 
begins, and also the mystic. l 
Whatever may be said of idea, then, comes 
back to the self as a metaphysical reality. It derives its 
l. SIG, 113-114. 
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quality from the self whom it serves. Idea does not serve 
itself, then, is no independent reality or strU.cture of 
reality apart from the reality of selfhood. Idea apparently 
suffers loss or gain, along withoother functional capabilities 
of the self. 
Man is made for the infinite; with all that 
is surveyable and enclosed, his fervors are 
finite, and burn down to an ash. The infinite 
restores him to himself. 1 
The connection between the loss sustained by 
the idea as it follows the loss sustained by the individual's 
lowered effective energies, we may believe is due to the 
dependence of idea on "fervors". Any rise and fall which 
is detectable in the efficacy of idea, according to the above 
understanding, would coincide with the efficacy of the self, 
at any moment. Such "low" conditions of man 1 s spirit are 
recognized by Hocking, his recognition of which finding its 
expression in the "principle of alternation", through which 
Hooking sees the self able to control the fluctuations of 
hi s vital energies. Our present inter~st in the principle 
of alternation is simply to call attention to ~ fact of 
alternation between high and low points of interest and 
attachment of the self with Reality. 
1. SIG, 79. 
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Idea, as Hocking conceives it, is ~ content 
in itself; its reality is purely functional, part of .! process, 
the whole of which!! may assume ~be mind, of which the 
judgment of experience is the expression. Whatever of content 
there is in Hocking~ be found~~ self. The ];I'Ocess 
is an expression of the content. But content is never complete. 
It is the nature of selfhood to add to itself, through an 
extension of its awn meaning, which it does through employment 
of idea in the process of such extension of self-meaning. 
Idea serves an analytical function as well 
as one of synthesis. Within the judgment of experience it 
assists in the analysis of values found in the partial structure, 
i.e., in the separate divisions of the whole judgment, as, 
for instance, with those portions of the judgnent which are 
concerned with the different kinds of objects, severally. 
But analysis is a very important function of idea, for it 
keeps facts and sense data separate and distinct, thms 
revealing their "existence". S~hesis, on the other hand, 
reveals wholes, particularly whole meanings or "essences" 
which are indicated by analysis, i.e., called for as the 
result of limitations found which are in need of some 
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The function of idea as synthesis will be 
seen more clearly when we consider Hocking's notion of "whole 
idea", which we may point out here is simply one phase of the 
activity of idea, a function which is not given by idea out-
side the judgment of experience. But whether as involved in 
analysis or in s.ynthesis, idea is a function of something 
other-than itself, as "a report of experience." Idea, then, 
whether serving as analysis or as synthesis within the process 
of the judgment of experience, is no different in its own 
nature. Even as used in the ontological argument, so Hocking 
holds, it is the same in its unitary nature. That is, no 
matter what its object, idea remains a "report of experience". 
"The ontological argument, in its true form, is a report of 
experience." 1 Here, then, We have the two opposite functions 
of idea, in terms of their emphases, merely reporting ~ 
experience. We are led to the assumption, therefore, that any 
difference which appears in idea is due to experience rather 
than to the idea. Idea is !: tool, an instrument of the 
intelligence, and points us to reality rather than being that 
reality. In our dealings with essential reality, then, we 
l. MGHE, 312. 
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are dealing with experience, and with idea only indirectly, 
in the process of judgments made about experience. 
Ideas appear to stand mid-way between 
experience on the one side and self-consciousness on the other. 
In judging experience a.s being "better or worse" our ideas 
carry the burden of the distinctions, distinctions Which are 
not ends in themselves but which are means to some end or ends 
toward Which they point, namely, that of self-consciousness. 
But there is more to the problem of the 
relation of idea to reality. Standing mid-way between the 
sense objects and facts on the one side and self-consciousness 
on the other, it bears in its vehicle the imprint of mind, a 
report of an experience of mind made upon the object-world 
and carried by the object-world, given up to idea-function. 
This, we may take it, is what Hocking means in the following 
quotation. 
1. MGHE, 567. 
The mind has mind as part of the real 
object; and its i deas of ideas are not 
originally got from views of itself, but 
from views of tts very external reality. 
This is a hard saying; but it is the 
truth. The reality which we touch in 
sensation is nature known; and hence nature 
alrea~ endowed with the characters of the 
idea. 
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What Hocld.ng appears to be driving toward is 
some comprehension of mind, and w1 th it of idea, 'Which sees 
mind as no end in itself but,rather, sees it interpreted as 
meaning, full of significance for selfhood. The interpretation 
of meaning will be through mind-action and through idea as 
a part of that action. The evidence of mind-imprint upon the 
sense objects and facts of experience which idea transfers to 
the finite mind is not ultimate. The meaning of that mind-
message has to be taken up into the understanding of the self 
in whose mind it has been registered. That is, Reality is 
not wholly disclosed through idea-action,or mind-action either, 
but it is a significant aid to the meaning which the infinite 
has for the finite. Through idea-action and mind-action the 
self becomes, not just self-conscious but self-realized. Self-
realization seems to be more of what Hocking means by the union 
of the finite self with the infinite Self, through participation 
(productively) in God. 
Symbolically, Hocking employs the use of 
idea as a representation of Reality itself. This special 
idea, or use of idea, he calls whole idea. To it we will now 
turn. 
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A-.-The whole ~· 
Hocking appears to mean by the whole idea 
just about what he does by idea in general. That is, it 
is nothing independently real, it is a report of experience, 
it is 11what we think with, not o£ 11 , 1 and it bears within 
itself the influence of(the marks of) Reality which it has 
found in the thin~orld, which influence it brings to the 
judgmental situation. However, there does appear to be one 
difference, which is that ~whole idea,!.!~ swmna.tion ~ 
~ synthesis-emphasis in ideas in general. In assuming 
that the whole idea represents the synthesis-emphasis in 
ideas in general, we are not saying that Hocking is setting 
up a special class or kind of idea. What we are saying is 
that the emnhasis ~the force of the emphasis which gives 
rise to the Whole-idea concept is not so much an extraction 
from ideas in general as it is a recognition of something 
present in ideas in general which the organizing faculties 
of the mind abBtract from the general process of experience-
reporting of ideas and designate as different. The difference 
which the mind distinguishes Hocking calls "religious". 
1. Art.(l908), 133. 
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The religious interest in the Whole is 
no marginal interest; and the supposed 
religious attainment of whole-knowledge 
no dim reflected luminosity. The religious 
idea will be as positive and primordial 
as any; will insist that it is possible 
for idea to begin with the Whole, as 
readily as with any fragment. 
What, therefore, Hocking calls "the religious 
idea" is but an emphasis in idea-work in general. It is, as 
we have already pointed out, some action of wholeness which is 
generally present in idea. But the emphasis or action-of-
wholeness is there in the judgment of experience all of the 
time. That is, the religious action is an action which is 
normal to idea-work in general. It bears relation to the 
problem of knowledge, normally, as much as does any other 
ki.nd of action in knowledge. 
It is not a true account of knowledge to 
say that it proceeds(always) from the 
part to the whole. The progress of 
knowledge has rather more in connnon with 
the development of a germ-cell than with 
the building of a brick wall; something 
of the whole present and ~ctive in that 
cell from the beginning. 
Hocking calls the whole idea "our reality-
idea11 • But, as we have said before, the distinction is 
1. MGHE, 95. 
2. MGHE, 95. 
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psychological, a matter of reporting. Thus the 'Whole idea 
"reports" concerning the Whole. This is some action among 
ideas in general which the mind separates out as distinct 
among the functions being performed by idea. As idea-work, 
it reports "the simple-total frame of things, in addition to 
reporting the nature of the things which go with the frame 
(!report of content). 
In the beginning was at least the Loom; 
and always remains, the simple-totil frame 
of things. Huge, inevitable, abiding 
Loom, Loom-motion and Loom-law: these, 
we may say, are given; stuff also to weave 
with, and 'Withal the command to weave. 
Such total world-fact, always present in 
idea, contains the growth of knowledge--
is not in its wholeneis any mere final 
achievement thereof. 
A part of the meaning of whole idea is to 
be found in Hocking's principle of alternation, as we pointed 
out in connection with general idea in the section preceding. 
The action of world-viewing which is read into the idea is 
rather that of mind-action, of psychological reporting, as 
Hocking calls it, 2 The mind wearies of the parts in 
experience and turns to the whole. 
1. MGHE, 97. 
2. Art.(l912), 43. 
' But we detect in Hocking s 
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principle of alternation, especially as it applies to idea-
work, that the alternation, from one extreme to the other, is 
not complete. That is, the notion of a clock pendulum which 
the principle suggests to us, is not fully accurate, for there 
is something of the whole present to experience at all times. 
In ideas also, _there is something of the ~ole present, even 
in the parts. "The whole, then, is knowable: is the one thing 
permanently known. 11 1 Should we say, then, that the experience 
of the whole in idea is extracted from the parts? The answer 
must be a firm negative1 ~whole~~ contains~ parts. 
It is not the "circle" that defines the idea contained within 
it, but rather, it is the idea which gives meaning to the 
circle. z This is but another way of saying that thw whole 
is a meaning which has produced from within itself its own 
definition, not as prior to the experience Which gives it 
but as prior to all further experience. 
If we are correct in our assumptions, this 
notion of the whole as its own claim to reality and as its 
own definition is a type of the ontological argument. The 
correctness of this assumption seems to be borne out in the 
1. MGHE, 97. 
2. MGHE, &:>. 
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following quotation. 
As an idea of a fundamental and constant 
experience, bound up w.i. th my equall.y per-
manent experiences of Self and Nature, this 
idea is not prior to experience; but is indeed 
prior to all further social experience, to 
all such as is intermittent and subject to 
error. This fundamental experience, and its 
idea, deserve, from their position in know-
ledge, to bi called a concrete ! priori 
knowledge. 
But does not the suggestion which Hocking 
himself makes, that the several marks which ps.ychology reports 
concerning the mystical object do not necessari~ belong to t he 
object but are more likely to belong to the "report" j apply 
in this case as well? But is the case the same with the 
s.ynthesizing action as it is with the analyzing action in 
idea? Hocking claims that each case is different, that 
analysis depends on synthesis as synthesis ~ ~ depend 
on analysis. 11Any first idea of any dawning consciousness, 
whatever its stimulus-object, must be at the same time idea-
of-the-Whole, never to forsake that consciousness while it 
remains such." 2 And, referring to whole idea as though it 
were a distinct type of idea, he sayss "Every other idea, let 
1. MGHE, 278. 
2. MGHE, 97• 
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me say, is a possible predicate for that permanent subject; 
that is to say, a possible coDmentary upon its nature and 
character." 1 This subject is very simple, either because 
it does not contain much meaning for concepts or because it 
has not yielded its meaning to them. ttit remains true that 
all knowledge of the whole is of the simplest order. In the 
presence of the ultimate we shall always remain primitive." 2 
Let us raise the question again concerning 
the nature of the Whole which is supposed to be in whole idea. 
Has Hocld.ng presented us with another 11 immed:iacy" which has 
to be transposed before it can be taken up into conceptual 
understanding? Immediacy, as we discovered from Hocking 1 s 
own words, J is an abstraction, if we have Reality in view. 
If, on the other hand, we are dealing with a"psychological 
report" in which inunediacy is_ given, the immediacy therein 
contained is "concrete", but only !!:! ! report. Apparently 
Hocking has presented us to such a report, and we are dealing 
with an abstraction, so far as our attempt to gain insight 
into Reality is concerned. 
1. MGHE, 97. 
2. MGHE, 103. 
3. Art.(l912), 43. 
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Professor Stace 1, if we interpret him 
correctly, would agree that Hocld.ng is here attempting to 
do the impossible--attempting to contain the infinite in 
a finite term. Stace says: 
That the divine cannot be made the subject 
of proof is merely another aspect of the 
truth that the ~stical illumination is 
incapaale of conceptualization. For this 
means that God is inaccessible to the logical 
intellect. !be attempt to prove His existence 
is an attempt to reach Him through concepts, 
and is therefore foredoomed to failure. 
Although Hocking does not here state specifically 
that whole idea is equated with God, he nevertheless does 
strongly imply that what we have had presented to us via whole 
idea is the equivalent of what he means by the Absolute-
hi s most general principle of necessity. 2 It is this abstract 
principle within mysticism that Royce rejected, 3 and one 
which Hocking also rejects. 4 
Hocking's whole idea, when taken in conjtmction 
w.i th his notion of other..d.de" emphases which are something less 
than the Whole in what they contain or indicate, appears to 
l.Stace, TAE, 138. 
2. Given as such in personal correspondence,l953). 
3. Royce, WAI, Vol.II, Section II. 
4. MGHE,"Preface11 • 
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present us with the chief problem of mysticism, namely, that 
of holding two worlds together in experience, knowing that 
both are real without knowing how this can be so. "Mystery 
does not lie in either of the two bodies by itself; it expresses 
the effort of each to make terms with the other", and 11 the 
mystic ••• is a possessor of two bodies of experience, neither 
of which he can doubt." 1 
The solution of the problem of Whole idea 
which Hocking presents is decidedly similar to a solution 
of the idea situation which Royce presents. Hocking says: 
ttFor what is the mystic experience but finding the idea of 
the whole, as love finds the idea of a person?" 2 Royce 
comments on the meaning of wholeness in the idea as follows: 
11~ complete content 2!._ the idea 1 s 2!:'!!. purpose is ~ only 
object of which~ idea~~ take note." 3 But we no 
longer are in the region of a mere conceptual report. What 
we formerly beheld as immediacy, a static whole, "nesting" 
at the center of a concept and producing a brood which did 
•• not belong to it, we now are aware ofAsome transpositi on, 
from a concept which had been t Pxown over wholeness to a 
wholeness which has taken concept into its~~f t o give it life. 
1. MGHE 1 398. 
2. MGHE, 433. 
3. Royce, WAI, Vol.II , 329. 
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Once again we declare that immediacy within 
Reality conceptually is an abstraction, truly designating 
nothi ng of any worth. Both Hocking and Royce see this truth , 
and both of them resort to a transposition, from~ concept 
to meaning, meaning which has purpose at its center. For, 
i n order to get beyond the "mereness", the concept, no matter 
what it might seek to name, ~ must present meanings to 
experience. Immediacy, to repeat what we said in chapter II, 
needs to be trassposed into certainty, and into ~ attachment 
of love. This is true of whole-idea-meaning as it is for God-
meaning. 
To summarize, Hocking's ideas are all the 
same, essentially. Whatever difference may appear in them 
is due to the use to which they are put by the understanding. 
Each idea represents both parts and the whole. Each idea 
demonstrates within its action the principle of alternation, 
not as its own "content" but as an action which is given to 
it by the understanding. That is, because idea"contains" 
both parts and the whole, its action in experience is in 
terms of both the parts and the whole, i.e., of analysis 
and of s.ynthesis, induction and deduction. Or, as Hocking 
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would say in connection with the mystic's application of 
empiricistic method: 
But the mystic's peculiarity is that he 
applies this method to objects which empiri-
cists generally insist cannot be given in 
any such immediate, unreasoned manner, namely 
to totals not to elements; to souls, not to 
sensations; to resultants(like history, or 
society) iot to factors; and final~, to God 
himself. 
The whole-idea emphasis in Hocking points to 
an irreducible un1 ty of purpose and of m~aning in Reality. It 
indicates that general ideas draw for their particularity and 
distinction from the whole-idea principle of simplicity and 
unity. They indicate also that the meaning which whole idea 
points to is due to the presence of Other mind in some action 
upon facts and sense data prior to their being received into 
the judgment of experience. This prior-to-judgment notion 
gives whole idea an ! priori quality. It is a "subject" from 
which is drawn all the "predicates" possible to experience. 
Yet, the whole idea if:! a quality in all general ideas. It 
is a derived qba.lity. Wholeness is a quality imposed upon 
reality by Reality. 
1. MGHE, 387 • 
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e~ Ideas ~ the physical self, ~ related to mysticism. 
The body is a datum which is "dark", when 
taken by itself. But so is every other datum when it is 
made to stand alone. The solution, according to Hocking, 
is to relate data into some acceptable group-form. 
Every datum, taken alone, is dark, just 
because it is ultimate. This stranding 
upon 'data' is empiricism' s weak spot, 
and its opportunity. The thing that relieves 
data of darkness is~ not more data exactly, 
but the gro~-form into which data assemble 
themselves. 
To know lVhat exactly to~ with the body 
is a problem in both philosophy and in religion. The question 
continues to be, in what way is the body identical with the 
experiencing self or the knowing mind? The relation of the 
body to the mind, as found in Hocking's philosophy, was the 
primary problem considered by Dr. Fleming, 2 who seemed to 
feel that Hocking had failed in some respect to make good 
his claim that they are a unity. The difficulty which Dr. 
Fleming was not able to resolve in Hocking was found in the 
1. Art.(l908), 130n. 
2. In Neal Bond Fleming's Ph.D. dissertation, Hocking's Philosophy 
of the Human Self, 1941, Boston University. This work of 
Dr.-r!emingfs will be referred to again. 
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"body" ~ body. Dr. Fleming felt that Hocking 1 s system had 
reduced the physical, and along with the body, to mentaJ. 
terms and therefore had no right to insist that the body 
was in any way to be equated with the mind in the human 
self. But the real difficulty, we feel under obligation 
to assert, was not rooted in Hocking so much as it was in 
Fleming's failure to understand that Hocking does~ assert 
(so we believe) that mind is identical~~" and~ 
~ ~ ~ to imply ~ mind, philosophicalq considered, 
"is the most concrete entity we can ever discover. 11 1 What 
' 
he did intend, so we believe, is that mind, psychologically 
considered(as a ps.ychological concept) is ultimate. But 
from the point of view of philosophy(so we believe the 
evidence is conclusive) ~ is a more "ultimate" term. 
We are particularly interested just now in 
the relation of Hocking's understanding of the ~ical self, 
the body, to his interpretation of idea, and of mind. A 
consideration of his interpretat~an of the human self will 
follow in a separate section. 
1. Art.(l926), 215. 
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The particular problem of this section is the 
relation of ideas to the physical self. That is, in what 
manner are ideas and the physical self equivalent and what 
i s the ground of their relation? Also, we are interested 
in the significance of their relation, whatever it is, to 
Hocking's kind of ~sticism, which emphasizes a union of 
all facts, ideas, sense objects, and selves through meanings 
derived from experience, eventuating in an intimate relation 
of selves, morally bound together through acts of participation 
in Reality. 
How, then, do ideas participate in the body? 
By way of the mind? No doubt. For what is mind but an 
expression of all the value for knowledge which is concerned 
with ideas? likewise, what is body but the demonstration of 
the same, perhaps in a different direction? Of the body 
Hocking says: 
With all our inability to gain the exact 
key to the cipher; and with all our inadequacy 
in observing these subtle physical changes; 
it remains true that the body, if' we will 
take it so, is little else than the soul 
made visible. 1 
We may say, then, that the body is but the 
opposite side of the same 11 shield.11 (to use Hocking's figure) 
1. MGHE, 262-263. 
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when viewed 'With mind before us, as the reverse is true when 
seen from the standpoint of body. Mind means body and body 
means mind. Neither one can be independent of the other. 
If we should say that the body has no 
independent reality, but only exists as 
a bulletin of an inner process; being but 
that process itself, reporting itself 
to us in such terms as we can physically 
apprehends--if we should conceive of the 
body in this way 1 we should hardly over-
state the immediacy w.l.. th which it presents 
externally what the mind internally is, 
and not in its passing phases alone, but 
in its most rooted habits, its oldest 
memories, its most permanent wills and 
purposes ••• But, further, the body is more 
than a metaphor. In some phases, it shows 
what that Other's experience literally is. 
Thus time is the same for both body and 
mind;-:-::And this continuous history ••• 
is taken together with its view of the 
Changeless, to form the glound-work of 
its individual identity. 
That is, we have not settled the matter of 
difference between mind and matter by saying that one is 
servant to the other. Bot~ appear to be functionally equal, 
serving some purpose which supports and continues both. 
The thoughts and ideas which we experience 
are all "bound in" with the world in which we live. That is, 
1. MGHE, 2_58. 
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they need some further form of nature through ~ich they may 
be expressed. If reason needs the physical world for the 
discovery of being, as Hocking holds ( as, for instance, in 
his notion that fellowman is discolosed through the physical 
continuum), then idea, a part of a rational proposition, 
needs the body, a part of the physical world. This much 
we can assume, being well supported in Hocking1 s thought. 
The body marks out some determination of 
individuality, as opposed to the general flux of matter 
generally. In some manner not yet fully defined it sets ·a. 
boundary to my mm ideas, but it is also the means whereby 
.!l ideas can be shared, and must be shared, with other 
individuals, and w.i.th 11the will of the world beyond. 11 
The body is the manifestation in spatial 
metaphor of the will-to-live as inborn 
and as modified by experience and choice. 
I do not mean that this metpphor can be 
read by simple inspection; for in the body 
other records are composed with the record 
of the will: the will of the world beyond, 
as it attacks the inner will and ~inges 
on it, leaves its trace here also. 
The external limits of the body, considered 
as its 11 surface11 , llis the shore-line where outgoing and in-
1. MGHE, 363n. 
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coming purposes meet, conflict and cross", 1 can be under-
stood only through idea, and through the implications of 
idea. Still it must be kept in mind that idea is not 
independent of the body, for ideas are expressed through 
the physical context. 
The one quickest way to put stupidity on 
a par with genius would be to make stupidity 
owner of all these ideas which it has, but 
is not yet able to express. 
More specifically, 
An idea shares the history of the body; it 
needs to ripen and mature; it must find its 
way by gradual processes to the surface, 
where it wi~ show itself in language and 
in action. . 
The meaning here appears to be explicit, that 
the idea could not develop into an adequate concept of reality 
if it were not for its fortunate conjunction with the body, 
and through the body with the rest of the world, including 
fellowman and God. This truth is but a part of what Hocking 
means by mysticism, a further truth being that our concepts 
are themselves 11bodie s" which require further interpretation 
and growth in meaning. 
1. MGHE, 263n. 
2. MGHE, 2.58-2.59. 
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Ideas are of necessity bound-in with the 
physical, for the physical is a part of the whole which 
ideas undertake to reveal. In this system Nature, in which 
the body participates, is not hostile to idea. 
The resistance of Nature to the expression 
of a thought is not the resistance of a 
wholly hostile medium; detention is a 
spiritual condtion for health and viability, 
not a physical condition solely. 1 
Furthermore, as Hocking says, the more important 
the idea to be expressed the more "resistance" or 11 detention11 
is needed. 
It seems fair to say that the more significant 
the idea, the more it needs to be lived with 
before it is uttered. Idea as well as Matter 
must be "mixed with labor" before it can 
become property. 2 
Idea must be mixed with body before it can 
express its meaning, and body must also be mixed with idea 
(under i ts control and operating according to its method) 
before it can represent t he self in i ts outer dealings with 
reality. I t is thi s mixing and uniting and expressing of 
what idea and body mean conjointly t hat brings mwsticism 
into the pi cture of the self and Reali ty. 
1. MGHE, 258-259. 
2. MGHE, 259. 
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That reality(as we seek it in the world 
outside ourselves) is identical with the 
equally indescribable essence of the human 
self,--we may find reality, therefore, 
either by looking without or by looking 
within, and What we find in either case 
is the same, not merely alike in kind, 
but identically the1 same thing: the extremes coinci de. 
Therefore, if we are correct in our interpreta-
tion of ~sticism, and particularly of Hocking's view of mysti -
cism, we can assume that what is on the physical side of idea 
i s as important as that which is on its rational or thinking 
side. Realism cores into the situation but does not present 
the whole case for this mysticism. Idealism(as idea and mind) 
comes into the picture, but it also fails in its presentation 
to whole meaning. Both this kind of realism and this kind of 
idealism are needed to complete the whole. The blending of 
realism and of idealism is what Hocking means by mysticism, 
not an addition of the two but a joining of meanings, with 
the result that some new meanings are born out of the relation-
ship. 11It requires the ~stic to be a completely successful 
realist; and the realist to be a successful mystic." 2 Likewise, 
1. TOP, 384. 
2. TOP, 419. 
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"all philosophy is idealism." 1 But this kind of idealism 
ia an idealism which grows out of mysticism, both according 
to Hocking's own views. Idealism, then, to the extent that 
it reveals mysticism, is true philosophy. Realism is never 
and never can be so completely "finished". 
As against the realist, the mystic is right 
in declaring the unity of the world, and the 
infinite worth of that unity. A. world of 
plural substances is an incalculable, and 
therefore essentially hopeless world. And 
aworld devoid of any inherent quality 
commanding reverence or permitting rational 
worship, must be devoid also of that spring 
of mental re-creation and fertility, without 
which nothing is useful. 2 · 
The assumption is that the body, in order to 
comply with the requirements of idealism in general and of 
mysticism in particular, is the ground in which idea comes 
not only to maturity but into expression, thus to reality. 
The body is essential to idea, and idea is essential to body. 
Perhaps the best expression of the maturing 
process Which body exerts upon idea is found in the operation 
of the 'Will, wherein the body is seen to be under the control 
of some power not itself. Evidence of this power in another 
1. MGHE, :xx·. 
2. TOP, 420. 
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is what attracts us to him. 
Power over nature, clearly seen or dimly 
divined in another, is what compels us 
to him. This power is first seen in the 
body itself, wherein wayward materials 
and energies are subdued under an immediate 
capital command, prophetical of much further 
mastery; and beauty of body signifies to 
us an ease of mastery, which finishing its 
task retr-ns with abundance to control 
itself. 
But the best expression of that control which 
mind in general and idea in particular exercise of the body is 
found in Hocking's description of the :tr ocess of negation, as 
that process applies to mysticism. He says in this connection: 
l. MGHE, 256. 
2. MGHE, 372. 
In all acts of will, the body plays its 
part; and it is the physical side of all 
mental acts, Whether one sets himself about 
thinking, or enjoying, or praying, which is 
most directly controllable. In proportion 
as the inner process is subtle and evanescent, 
the physical preliminaries must be extensive. 
The most delicate instruments of precision 
require the heaviest of foundations. If 
attention is preparing for some especially 
fine discriminations, as in listening for 
faint sounds, the larger muscles will be 
called into play as a frame to the smaller 
ones ••• It is only by the enlistment of the 
body, in som:~ fashion, that the body can 
be held in le~sh during the difficult flight 
of the soul. 
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The mystic's body seems to be under some power-
ful control of a principle which operates in close conjunction 
w.i. th the body., not as external to it but as participating in 
it. To be "free from the body" seems to indicate that the body 
has come under submission to the self through some ttwhole ideatt 
which has taken the body up into itself, heightening its powers 
and enhancing its capabilities. It is in these moments of 
great ecstacy that the mystic becomes aware of his true self, 
his awn individuality. Rather than losing himself he is 
finding himself, in his own It solitude", where he is busy in 
preparation for some great announcement to the world of success 
within himself. But first he must discover the purpose of 
Reality by becoming fully subject to it, subjecting his body 
to the spirit of his whole selfhood. "He is not a mystic 
until his own spirit has made its solitary leap to God, like 
a tongue of flame out of the midst of the fire·" 1 
To see ms,rticism in action within the self 
as an effort of whole idea to control both body and mind is 
to see Hocking's mysticism in the application of its empiricism 
to the "Whole of the self and to God as well. There is no 
1. MGHE, 402. 
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experience equal to that of building unity within the self. 
The solitude of the mystic is not binding 
upon him in any except in the requirement, to which he has 
subscribed, that he remain united. It is only in that way 
that he can become moral, i.e., become ready to perform the 
deeds for which society waits. 
Mysticism in its true character is precisely 
the redemption of solitude: it is the process 
which enters one step farther than we have 
yet explored into the heart of our o"Wl'l 
infinite subjectivity, and reclaims that 
new increment for the general use, in the 
form first of a deepened morality and art. 1 
That is, as we would interpret the matter, 
Hocking is saying in effect that the self, in order to be 
truly productive, must bring his whole being into unity, must 
enter into its center, must reduce all superfluous and non-
controlled activity, and in general bring his total being 
into its highest and most complete state of efficiency. To 
do this, the body must be compelled to submit, through some 
participation in it, not~ it, so that it will become 
creative in its submission, giving its best, that is, instead 
of being merely passive. In submitting, the body becomes active. 
1. MGHE 1 404. 
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A second interpretation which seems called 
for is that the control and regulation which is possible to 
the body is to some degree possible also to all physical 
nature. It is there to be brought under control, not negatively, 
but possitively. This fact seems to be implied, not only in 
what has been said about the body itself, but in Hocking's 
position with regard to the overcoming of evil in our world 
and in nature in general, that evil has to be taken into the 
self and adopted by the self, so to speak, in order to bring 
evil into subjection. A moral responsibility develops as 
wrongs and evils are taken i nto the self. Something will be 
done about them, in co-operation with God, if they are made 
our awn. 
More than half the pain of pain is the 
imprisonment of personality, and. the unequal 
struggle of the spirit to get ~ree and be 
itself. Unhappiness is dividedness of mind • 
••• Whatever wipes out our fragmentation and 
induces in us a wholeness of attack gives 
back the happiness which is continually 
slipping from our grasp. 1 
But how is the body able to respond, internal~ 
and freely? 'the answer seems to be ready-made to the need. 
1. MGHE, 491. 
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Here it seems that idea and whole-idea should be brought into 
application within the body. That is to say, the kind of 
action which is possible to idea should also be possible to 
the body, especially when we consider that reality is not 
only brought under same principle of union but that it is 
so through some act of participation. If our interpretation 
of Hocking's mysticism is correct, participation is its 
most valuable single principle. 
What we pointed out above concerning the 
kind of action which is :foun1 in idea, namely, that of 
analysis a:OO. of synthesis, idea standing before us here in 
the nature of judgment itself, should also be seen as the 
action of the body which brings it into submission, creatively. 
That is, the action within idea cannot express itself unless 
it has a physical embodyment. This fact is borne out, indirectly, 
When Hocking sets the action whereby another self is known 
in :facts and deeds, through which the other's idea is given. 
For the other selves are not given directly through their 
own ideas to my idea, but rather they are given through 
their work among the objects of nature, wherein their ideas 
are made manifest. 
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For in finding the individual, one has 
indeed found the individual's idea. That 
'Which explains and unites and largely justifies 
all these various and seeming-inconsistent 
qualities is some view of the world which he 
has, s~me hold on the absolute, some whole-
idea. 
It now seems conclusive that Hocking assumes 
that ideas should be related in practical nature to that world 
in which they carry on so much of their commerce. Ideas are 
not simply there in experience. Whatever thereness they have 
' is given to them by their own action within the situation, 
whatever it might be. That is, the action of ideas is not 
a simple immediacy; it is immediacy 11 interpreted by dialectic. n 
The self is thus a union of opposites. And 
because precisely the same opposites are 
discernable in the composition of the larger 
cosmos and must aomehow be united there, we 
may transfer the problem of this 'somehow' 
in part to the world within, as we do when 
we recognize that the whole is a self. The 
ultimate evidence for the selfhood of the 
whole is net primarily the evidence of 
argument, however, nor of analogy, but. that 
of immediat~ experience, interpreted by 
dialectic. 
And here once again, just as a matter of 
correlation in our investigation, it is well to point out 
that we have found the weakness, the abstraction, of the 
l. MGHE, 433. 
2. TOP, 442. 
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concept of immediacy. In connection with idea itself we 
have found it, far idea is helpless to express itself 
"immediately", even though its action may be known to 
itself. Idea requires body far its expression. Body is 
its "dialectic", and an essential one, if idea is to be 
discoverable, i.e., concrete. 
In ~ we can state that body responds to 
idea and idea to body, each being functionally essential to 
the other. The physical aspect of idea is as important to its 
expression as is its mental aspect. Also, the relation of 
idea and body to each other demonstrate$the value of the 
judgment of experience in making concrete the principle of 
immediacy, without whi ch immediacy is an abstraction. That 
is to say, the value of idea apart from body is negative, 
as is also true of body apart from idea. The value of each 
can be indicated only as sone meaning to and for each other 
can be demonstrated jointly. The essential value for mysticism 
lies in the manner in which body and idea are brought together 
in some activity which indicates purpose within their own 
union and in the implication of further union with Reality. 
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C.: Ideas ~ feeling .!..!! relation to mysti ci sm. 
Up to this point we have dealt considerably 
with the status of reason in connection with Hocking's 
mysticism. We have given relatively little space or thought 
to the undercurrent of feeling which lies at the base of 
11 judgment" and of "idea". Yet we were under no impression 
at any time that Hocking's view of mysticism was devoid 
of this essential driving force. We knew, for example, that 
Hooking supports the position that mysticism, by contrast with 
religion, is more "primordial" and11 elemental11 and "primitive" 
and 11empirical11 than is religion itself. Whereas religion 
has become "tame", mysticism is still untalhed and "impetuous". 
We knew also that mysticism, according to Hooking, is supposed 
to set free within (radical) idealism such forces as will put 
"bi te" and 11 sting11 back into religion. Phi losophically 
directed toward an understanding of mysticism, we have 
attempted to show what the general theory of mysticism is, 
especially with regard to the manner in Which it comes upon 
its object. This we have attempted to show through the 
judgment of experience, with i ts consequent 11widened net of 
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empiricism." 1 But we have viewed the finding of mystical truth 
primarily from the point of view of reason. We have said that 
reason must include meanings, and that it is the meanings 
which count more than conceptual "truths", but we have not 
yet put meaning into reason ~ the tools of reason. This 
we must now attempt to do. 
Idea, taken by itself, is fundamentally a 
rational concept. As such it has served as a "dependent 
variable" of reason, usually quite reliable. But, taken by 
itself, it can be neutral as far as action is concerned. It 
is under no compulsion from its own nature to move from its 
orbit of theory and abstraction (abstract when thought of as 
restricted to the field of theory) and into any battle in 
service to the will as it seeks to express the meaning of 
self, in deeds and action. However, this is not the whoJe 
story about ideas and idea work. They do act in service 
of the concrete self. But that action or spur to action 
does not originate in reason itself. "The independent variable, 
in its slow march through the ages, lies far deeper than the 
idea." 2 This "independent variable" we assume to be feeling 
itself. 
1. Given in personal correspondence,(l953). 
2. MGHE, 46. 
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But only in the form of feeling can conscious-
ness accompany the organism, as it is traced 
back to1its simplest forms or to its begin-nings. 
As ideas are tested it is found that they are 
potential energy, but this energy is not given to them from 
within themselves. There is something which accompanies ilhem 
which can release in them or impart to them their moving 
quality. 
Ideas can appaaently float idle in the mind; 
facts and truths can deserve the epithet 
1mere 1 ; and if they do not deserve it, if 
they have any grit, it is no inherent quality 
of their own, ~ut added by some gift from 
our own will. 
And apparently it is not only ideas which need 
help "from the outside" to move them. Reason itself requires 
"the energy-charge of action, which is feeling." 3 Especial~ 
is it true, says Hocking, that 11our ideas about metaphysical 
things ••• become thus 'mere 1 and dead." 4 Ideas about "heaven 
and hell" can fail utterly to move us unless there is mixed 
into them some will-to-possess or to reject. Religious feel-
ing lies at the root of any stirring which is felt in idea. 
If any stirring of concern or plan of action 
1. MGHE,46. 
2. MGHE, 46. 
3. MGHE, 46. 
4. MGHE, 46. 
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comes out of the idea, that is an additional 
fact, not bound to it qy any definition; and 
rel igion lies in the stirring, not in the view.l 
But there is possible to idea the absorption 
into itself of this agency for action, the feeling. Idea is 
not opposed by nature but, quite the contrary, it is there 
to be used. "An idea stands for a pause between perception 
and action." 2 
Feeling, then, we may say, is as important 
as is idea itself; the two belong together and are helpless 
without each other. Of the importance of feeling in this 
connection, Hocking says: 
There is something unspoiled and original 
about human feeling: it lies beyond the 
reach of dispute, refutation, and change. 
Religious feeling is the adequate counter-
part of those metaphysical first principles 
upon which so much used to be hung. 3 
There is a question 'Which arises in our minds 
at this point, concerning the difference between feeling and 
emotion, with reference to Hocking's mysticism. To what 
extent does the feeling in relation to idea tend to remain 
'mere~ feeling? Does mysticism employ the use of the 
developed emotions as much as does religion? Is Mysticism's 
1. MGHE, 47. 
2. MGHE, 47. 
J. MGHE, 50-51. 
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interest centered in the "lower" strata of the emotional 
structure? Feeling, so it would seem, lies closer to the 
physical in human nature than it does t o the mental. Do 
the more "refined emotions" tend to run down? 
says: 
1. MGHE, 41. 
!. MGHE, 400-401. 
The stream which lies at its source is 
impetuous, fierce, channel-plowing, here 
at its mouth lies lazy, divided, straggling 
off to the dead-level of religious homo-
geniety, through the arms of shallow, 
reasoning sects, where there is hardly 
any distinction b~tween river and bank, 
saint or simner. 
Speaking of the mystic himself, Hocking 
At his worst, the mystic is impulsive and 
childish; at his best he retains something 
of childhood, its tenderness, its freshness 
of impression, its unsatiated wonder, its 
generosity: he has that simplicity and 
teachableness Which are found in the very 
young and the very great. He may, for this 
reason, be a demonstrative person ••• or he 
may, for the same reason, seem to live in 
perpetual calm: in any case, he is one 
whose attachment to the Absolute is so 
secure that he has no fear in embracing 
any insight which can gain the consent of 
that side of his consciousness, though for 
the present it can claim no other. 2 
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1Ve are left with the impression that ~sticism, 
in whatever balance of the emotions it makes( and use of them), 
does so by letting feeling, the "raw product" of emotions, 
join itself to reason and to idea through the ·medium of the 
judgment of experience. Thus that which is untamed at its 
source becomes "broken" to service at its end. 
Hocking's 11widE11ed net of empiricism" recog-
nizes "the ~stical element in knowledge, not a thought-empty 
but a thought-crammed empiricism. The primary object of this 
type of awareness is the Thou of the world, God; and God is 
always Thou, never a mere Absolute, i.e., a mere dialectical 
necessity,-he is this and more too." 1 
By this position I take it that Hocking 
means that the ~stic 1 s feelings are already set, and have 
been set, so that it is not a question any longer for him as 
to the "direction" of his feeling. Its 11 object 11 is so 
complete, and so "original" or 11natural11 , that no other 
object can claim any of its energy or interest. God is 
thus the intimate~~ the one who is given freely by the 
1. Personal correspondence,(l953). 
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judgment of experience, and God is the intimate ground 
upon which any future judgment must stand, the 11experience 11 
given to the judgment. Whatever expenditure of feeling-energy 
and of idea-feeling remains to be made is in terms of self, 
Other-self, ~ ~ world, and in the establishment of the 
bond which is required bwtween all these and God himself. Herein 
lies the region of effort and its need of application. And 
herein also lies any distinction which has to be made in the 
kind of feeling expressed; that with respect to God has 
already been made. 
Perhaps here too, in this region of feelings 
either determined or not as yet determined, lies the need for 
the "principle of alternation". This problem remains to be 
resolved. However, it may be indicated here that the attach-
ment which the mystic has to his object does seem to sever him 
from his fellows and from his world, a severing which is the 
opportunity for hi s greater social production, nontheless, 
as we shall attempt to show farther along in this section. 
The "subjectivity" and the "uselessness" 
which the negations of mysticism seem to impose on the ~stic, 1 
l. Cf. MGHE, 401. 
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may be only apparent, the result of misinformation and 
misinterpretation on the part of the viewers, considered 
as non-initiates. But the true object of the mystic's 
affection, as Hocking states, is God, an object of intimate 
affection. Furthermore, as the mystic seeks his object, 
though it may begin with a search for the reflexive object, 
he turns away from one object after another until he comes 
face to face with God, though he may not be able to describe 
God's appearance to anyone else. He can, nevertheless, give 
society a good account of God's nature through his own deed. 
But however it may be with the mystic's 
ability or inability to give a true report of his experience, 
the fact of Reality Which he has experienced permits of some 
transformation of the so-called elemental in his original 
makeup, prior to the experience, to a more germinal-for-
soci al-good i nterpretation and understanding in his post-
experience character. That is, before the explanation of 
the mystical experience is complete before the world, its 
sanity and the sanity of the mystic himself will be vindicated. 
It is in this manner that Hocking himself appears to inter-
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pret the mystical experience. And here, we may say, we 
begin to see the true nature of mysticism, i.e., in its 
internal transformations, which are greater than any outer 
transformations, even in society. 
What is that other-than-feeling in which 
feeling may end? I answer, consciousness 
of an object. Feeling is instability of 
an entire conscious self: and that which 
will restore the stability of this self 
lies not w.i thin its own borders but beyond 
it. Feeling is outward-pushing, as idea 
is out-ward-reporting: and no feeling is 
so blind as to have no idea of its own 
object. As a feeling possesses the mind, 
there also possesses the mind as an inte-
gral part of that feeling, some idea of the 
kind of thing Which will bring it to rest. 
A feeling without a direction is as impos-
sible as an activity without a directioni 
and a direction implies some objective. 
Feeling 1 s reference is outward. This is what 
Hocking means when he says: 
Feeling is quite as much an objective 
consciousness as is idea: it refers always 
to something beyond the present self and 
has no existence save in directing the 
self toward that object in whose presence 
its own career must end. 2 
And now that we have found a way to the 
object, it is possible, we believe, to show how Hocking 
1. MGHE, 66. 
2. MGHE, 66. 
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·relates the "partial object " to the whol e of mystical 
eJgJerience. For 11he is not a mystic until his own spirit 
has made its solitary leap to God, lile a tongue of flame 
out of the midst of the fire.'' 1 
The m;Vstic 11feels 11 his objects united into 
~ object, as a single and unitary meaning, in which there 
is no division whatsoever. He may start with an idea with-
out actually realizing that it is an idea, for the idea without 
its meaning present to it--in tlrls case its object--is not 
a mature concept, but it has '~thin it the possibilities of 
maturity. Feeling seems to bring about the maturity of the 
idea. What the mystic '!discovers" is what he has "been 
presupposing or unconsciously relying on. 11 2 The object 
which he discovers was there as a possibility all along, 
but it took feeling to bring it out. That is, before the 
experience has idea clearly in it, there is a reaching out. 
toward it as though it were present. This point Hocldng 
brings out quite forceably in connection with the "non-
1. MGHE, 402. 
2. Art .( l944), 189. 
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conceptual Experience o£: God" mentioned in the following 
quotation. He says: 
The characteristic assertion of mysticism 
in all its forms is that there is a vitally 
important and nonconceptual experience of 
God available to men who meet its conditions. 
The si mplest and most usual expression of 
this thesis is that all men at all times 
are directly dealing with God, whether they 
lmow it or not. They must breathe air 
whether or not they lmow it to be air; they 
must eat food whether or not they know that 
it feeds them; if they move, they must be 
in a gravitational field; if they achieve 
effects, they must enter the network of 
causes. And if 8hy of. these appearances 
is a mere si gn of some deeper reality(as, 
doubtless, they all are), then through 
those signs we are in actual traffic with 
that more real, just as through language 
we move the mind of our neighbor; and 
whatever is more real is embedded in what 
is Most Real so that the whole basis a~d 
response of their living is the Real. 
In mysticism, and in a study of it, it must 
be asserted that the objects of our knowledge and experience 
are not independent of the will which seeks them out. But 
it must also be asserted that other objects are real primarily 
because they are the result of something ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
seeker. 
1. Art.(l944), 189-190. 
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There may be no assignable feature of IDlf 
world in which I cannot trace the work of 
my own will: it still remains possible that 
there may be no assignable feature of my 
world in mich I cannot tr:rce also the work 
of something not-my-will. -
It is the union of the my-will and the not-
my-Will which occupmes the interest of the mystic. Into this 
11 interest 11 he must pour all the feeling and passion of which 
he is capable. Yet his interest must be effortless, for, as 
Hocking holds, the chief difference between a mystical versus a 
non-mystical experience is a "contrast betl{een effortless 
~ effortful attention." 2 That is to say, he "must be 
anxious about nothing" in achieving his objective, willing to 
die for it if called upon. 
Feeling, we may say, is a commitment to 
value. The value must be worthy of the commitment, however . 
What, we may ask, would such a value be? Hocking suggests 
that the value which puts passion into our interest is the 
fact of life itself-that life is good, that. self-enjoyment 
. is "our aboriginal value-prejudice". 3 In proportion as life 
is able to express its satisfaction of life it will do so 
1 . MGHE, 1,58. 
2 . MGHE, 413. 
3. LRWF, 217. 
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passionately, for a "right way" of life, a "passion for 
righteousness". 1 It is not, says Hocking, that life knows 
any "law of righteousness" but it is a search .!2£ .! law which 
will answer the demands of the self for such a law. 
Feeling is basic to all thinking, for it is 
the demand made upon thought that it discover the law of 
righteousness. Feeling, or the passion-for-righteousness 
thrust of self-existence, is the "primordial" element of 
human selfhood. It binds the self to his object and drives 
the idea to it with the certainty of self-consciousness it-
self. We may say, then, that feeling in mysticism, according 
to Hocking, _!!~evidence of~ certainty of the value 
of existence given ~ the original datum of self-consciousness. 
Feeling exercises control over ideas and 
idea-making, for it contains the kernel of all the meaning 
which idea is expected to reveal. It is because of this fact 
that~ mystic exp;riences his object before he ~ frame 
that object conceptually, ~ knO\'rledge. 
This fact of an original datum in experience 
which is given over to idea is what we have referred to in 
1. LRWF, 26. 
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connecti on 'With a discussion of inmedi.a.cy, which we said 
was ~ imnediacy, but certainty. What immediacy can mean 
in this connection is "original". Immediacy expresses a 
method of lmowing, not the knowledge itself. But neither 
does immediacy explain anything, even as a way of knowing, 
about the manner in which the content of knowledge participates 
in its object, and about the degree of independence which the 
human self appears to maintain during such participation, 
participation being an act of "love", a self-creating and an 
object-creating affection. 
Henri Bergson suggests that the term love 
may require redefining to restore it to its original meaning, 
a meaning which belonged to mysticism in the first place but 
"Which was "plagiarized" from mysticism by the romantic 
interests of secularism, "borrowing from it its fervour, its 
raptures, its ecstasies: in using the language of a passion 
it had transfiggned~. mysticism has only resmned possession 
of its own." 1 
The refined passion "for righteousness" 
of mysticism is love. Love includes its own certain object 
through participation, creatively. 
1. Bergson, YJlR, 34. 
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p.~ Ideas, intuition, and mysticism. 
As Hocking uses the term intuition it is 
1 
merely a"way of knowing" without conunitment to value. Ideas, 
on the other hand~ are committed, especial~ as they originate 
out of the passion for self-consciousness, as we saw in the 
last section. Intuition means "immediate knowledge" or 
insight into wholes. It 11is capable(relatively speaking) 
of ignoring connections, of seizing a bridge span in mid 
air and holding it while truss and abutment grow." 2But this 
is a function of something, a function which is already 
active in something else, and therefore it is not something 
original. 
Intuition is a part of mysticism, but it 
does not appear to explain anything that we do not al. ready 
know. Hocking's whole-idea contains everything, and more, 
that intuition does. Intuition expresses the certainty of 
goodness in life, but whole-idea does something to explain 
that certainty and the "passion for righteousness" as well, 
in that whole-idea functions within the judgment of experience, 
1. TOP, 382. 
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as its synthesizing action, functioning 11prospectivel.y11 from 
some base of real.ity. 
Intuition has some practical value in indicating 
the wholeness which is present to experience, but it does nothing 
in saying ~ that whole is in its nature 1 or in showing how 
it originated. 
Hocking says that, while Bergson employed 
intuition as a means to a "wider empiricism" throughout most 
of his years, he came to the use of mysticism as the explanation 
. of that wider form of empiricism in his book The~ Sources 
l. 
of Morality ~ Rel.igion. 
If, however, intuition is assumed to contain 
i ts own metaphysical object as the underlying basis of its 
assumption of wholeness, it is valid as a description of the 
knowledge-producing process. Hocking does assume a meta-
physical base for its action, on occasion. But the meaning 
he places in the term when it is so used is similar to what 
he means by "passion for righteousness" and religious "certainty". 
This interpretation seems to be called for in the following use 
1. Personal correspondence(l953). 
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of intuition, a kind of artificial or general use but with 
a special responsibility of meaning. 
Intuition is not a sufficient foundation for 
any philosophy; but we are not likely to 
achieve any true philosophy without it. 
Idealism has its first sources in intuitions, 
very ancient in the race. Indeed, philosophi-
cal idealism as a matter of history might be 
described as an attempt to bring reason into 
~ spiritualiritUitions of manldnd.l --
What is meant in the above, apparently, so 
far as intuition is concerned, is that it is a general reference 
to basic certainties which have been discovered(perhaps in some 
way other than through intuition) and 'Which idealism now is 
appropriating with a view to bringing "reason" into them. It is 
to be doubted if Hocking means to say that these so-called 
intuitions have the ~ of intuition. 
E.S.Brightman defines intuition in about the 
2 
same way that Hocking employs the term. Brightman says: 
"Intuition: imnediate insight, not dependent on argument or 
other experience." But what stands as in truth an "immediate 
insight" does not necessarily impute that same quality into 
Reality. That is, Reality itself is not made explicit in 
this manner. 
1. TOP, 249. 
2. Brightman, POR, 531. 
212 
CHAPTER IV 
HOCKING t S THIDRY OF JUDGMENT AND IDFA 
The conclusion to which we are led here is 
t hat intuition explains nothing that is not already cared for 
in the experience of the certainty of value in life, which 
arises out of an emotional attachment to life itself, an 
"affection for Reality". As Hocking states it, any affection 
which truly -finds its object does so by means of "participation!!. 
Intuition, as an explantion of the process 
of mystical knowledge getting, is as 11 rigid" and as _"emptY'' 
as is immediacy itself. Both of these terms explain some 
pl. rt of the action, but they do ~ ~ ~ attachment with 
~ object of knowledge. That is, as Hocking would say, they 
are not metaphysical or ultimate terms, but they often are used 
!! though they~ ultimate. The complete process is one in 
which the action, considered as participation, is evident between 
the source and the end, judgmentally, i.e., through idea-action 
i n experience. 
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1. The mind-body problem. 
Of special import to the problem of mysticism 
is the relation of the body to the mind within the human self. 
The problem is similar to the relation which idea sustains to 
its object. It also is similar to the relation of the human 
self to the physical world. A still further similarity can 
be found in the relation of God to the world. That is, we are 
here faced with the fundamental task of mysticism, namely, that 
of holding two distinct bodies of truth together without knowing 
how their joining takes place. Both are real in experience, 
but experience is slow to reveal the nature of the connections 
between them. 
Mysticism asserts the unity of all reality, 
through some purpose which all the units in reality serve 
with regard to the Whole, and likewise of some purpose l'lhich 
is the very nature of Reality but which is shared in rome 
manner with the several "parts". That is, the Whole partic:ipa:tes 
in the nature of the finite wholes(perhaps as a shared essence) 
and the finite participates in the infinite in the same way. 
The nature of the participation, so we believe Hocking implies, 
is found in creativity(perhaps as existence). We shall see. 
But first, we will present a general treatment of mind and body. 
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Our general dealings with the self reveal 
both mind and body. The activity of the mind is expressed 
through an opposite activity of the body, not as opposing 
but as obeying and helping to express the mind. Both mind 
and body, then, when taken together as a functional. and a 
functioning whole are equivalent to the self. The mind is 
involved in the body and the body in the mind. The mind, 
to be mind, cannot be either empty or abstract. It 11must 
be occupied with objects; for an empty mind is no mind at 
1 
all." 
We cannot have nature and mind, as if 
mind could be something by itself. Nature 
is so essential to the very notion of mind, 
that if mind cannot be a product of nature, 
nature must be a function of mind. 2 
It is mind which gives direction to the body 
and determines its movements, to the extent that those move-
n:ents are purposeful. Mind is master of event as body is 
master of fact. Body represents the mechanical and the causal 
i.TJ. nature, while mifldl r epresents the potential, in terms of 
purpose made concrete through the vh ole self. The self is 
the actual summation of the mechanical as means, while mind 
· 1. TOP, 288. 
2. TOP, 287. 
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While 'mind is both potential and actual purpose. That is, 
the self is the synthesis, or the continuous synthesizing 
activity which is present in the world. It is concrete reason, 
expressed by Hocking as the judgment of experience--thought 
and purpose crammed-, its lines of "communication" set up in 
the required "three dimensions" of self, other-self, and the 
physical world. In addition there is a fourth term which 
includes all the others, meaningfully. This further defining 
quality of mind and b?dy is God. It is because of this 
fourth term, according to Hocking, that the other three 
constitute any problem for knowledge. That is to say, if 
God were not, there would be no need of an attempt to bring 
such dubious partners as mind and body together, for no 
principle of union would exist. 
The communication of reflexive self, other-
self, the world-self, and God are known to be under some direction 
from the mind of each, which is the instrument, so to speak, 
of inter-self communication. It seeks to hold all selves 
together and to provide for them some explanation of their 
togetherness. The mind of the finite knower operates through 
the medium of experience, which, according to Hocking, is 
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of metaphysical importance, given by Reality for the purpose 
of disclosing values, purposes and goals to the mind(or minds) 
operating in its medium. 
The chance for finding God of general human 
value is built on the prospect that God may 
be found ~experience, 'experience' being 
the region of our continuous contact with 
metaphysical reality. l 
And, inasmuch as God is the real object of 
our search, by way of finite selfhood, we therefore look for 
him in the midst of that which can dis close him to us, namely, 
in experience. "Now God can appear in experience only through 
some working of his." 2 
The term mind is totally meaningless as an 
abstract term. It gets its meaning from the operation which 
it performs, which operation Hocking assures us is empirical. 
The knowledge which a widened empiricism provides is of the 
variety ofSSlfhood which we have mentioned. Some portion of 
the knCJ\Vledge is "new", in terms of additional revelation, 
and some is "original", that kind of essential knowledge which 
has always given certainty to the quest. We may call this 
1. MGHE, 215. 
2. MGHE, 2:!$. 
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latter kind of knowledge~ given goodness of existence, 
-arousing in its subject(finite selfhood) ! passion~ 
righteousness. 1 This is Hocking's interpretation of that 
kind of knowledge which is usually designated as 11 inuned:i.ate 11 • 
When Hocking speaks of mind he means i t 
in terms of relation to the practical workaday world. It 
is the connector, as it were, of time and of space values. 
The mind holds together, for example, past, 
present, and future; it holds together the 
fact and val~e; it holds together the actual 
and the possibJe ••• Every object of physical 
nature belongs to one side of these pairs, 
not to both sides: every such object is an 
actual present fact. The mind, then, diff ers 
from every· object of nature in being in 
addition a hold upon the possible, the 
future, the valuable ••• Its essential activity 
is to bring possible future value into 
connection with actual pr.esent fact; and 
my proposition is that it is the only agengy 
for doing this. Mind is the only o~gan for 
making future possibility actual. 
Our difficulty in conceiving mind as being 
a function within selfhood is due primarily to our faulty 
notion concerning the self, wherein we frequently define it 
in such terms a.s tend to practical exclusion of the ground 
of a. concrete functioning of the mind by denying reality to 
1. ~}. 26-30. 
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the body. In excluding the body we remove one of the 
essentials of the union of all selves and of a real experi-
ence of the total of Reality. As we have seen, the only 
way we can come upon mind is in knowing its objects, either 
of the knowing self or those of other selves. This is 
argument that we need not repeat here, except to say that 
it ,!! fundamental !2 Hocking's judgment of experience, which 
is inclusive of all types of objects possible to expeatenee. 
The body is included in my experience, both externally(as 
object) and internally(as subject). That is, the body is 
included among the objects of nature and may be so viewed, 
1 
as a "common third" of social knowledge 1 even to the know-
ing subject concerning his own body, and the body is also 
a sharer in the introspective object, in that it is some 
of the function of the mind, i.e.,"through the categories 
of will and retention which are in our view the mental 
groundwork of the mind's biological existence." 2 But also, 
"body" may be considered as some part of God 1 s particu.lari ty, 
which is the world of things and the universe in general. 
The body is that connnunicating medium of 
the self whereby it makes its purposes known to itself and 
1. LRWF, 33. 
2. SBF, 96. 
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to other selves as well. According to the position which 
Hocking takes toward the physical-thing world, which includes 
the body, we cannot deny its worth to the self. It is more 
than a mere symbol, or outer expression of the self. It is 
~ self ~ expression of itself. What the world is to our 
idea of interconnectedness the body is to the self. 
Any idea of a thing, is an idea of that 
thing placed in a world of space and energy 
which remains a constan~ object. Our space 
does not move as we move about in it, nor 
does our idea of it alter; our placings are 
~uccessful, coherent, unconfused, and for 
any moment absolute, only because our ideas 
reach an ~arying field for those varying 
locations. 
Furthermore, ideas do not come into existence 
except by means of some stability in the physical continuum. 
An idea shares the history of the body; it 
needs to ripen and mature; it must find its 
way by gradual processes to the surface, 
where it w.i.ll show itself in language and 
in action ••• The resistance of Nature to the 
expression of a thought is n~t the resistance 
of a Wholly hostile medium. 
The world of Nature is a contributing agency 
to idea and to self. It is a part of what Hocking calls the 
truly "widened empiricism". In its medium Whatever logic 
1. MGHE, 270. 
2. MGHE, 258. 
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we have is nurtured and put to work within the self. In the 
body likewise, it is a means to our own self-consciousness 
and the consciousness of other-selfhood as well. 
It is something to note that our b~ is 
the sign of our limitation, and of our 
dependence. Our body is that through which 
we are acted upon as well as that through 
which we act.--'1mt our body is also that 
through which we are found and become 
personally present to other persons. The 
abolition of body is the abolition of the 
recognizable and the understandable in all 
personal relations. 1 · 
By his inclusion of the body into his meaning 
of what a self is, Hocking is setting forth some opposition to 
those notions of the self as a purely mental object. His 
rejection of what he calls the. "limited" in the personality 
or the self results, wa feel, from his mysticism, which seeks 
some bond of union, some participation, of all reality. 
Through the world as limitless ground of experience and through 
the judgment of experience as unlimited application, all selves 
can be known and can be reached. And through the notion that 
all physical nature, when taken in conjunction with its 
"environment" of an over-all selfhood, is in some way a part 
of the Whole which mystical thought seeks to know, it is part 
1. MGHE, 333 • 
221. 
CHAPTER V 
THE SELF OF HOCKING'S MYSTICISM 
of the Whole. Upon its 11 rocks11 and its "jutting edges" we 
split off and become individual. 
Hocking is not saying that physical nature, 
so far as we humans are coneerned, is purely instrumental as 
a revealer of self; it is a revealer of selfhood because it 
also is self. This much we have already seen and do not need 
here to justify. He holds that the 11worldll is a self, among 
other selves. But he also says that llwhatever selfhood we 
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have is an involution of the selfhood of the Whole.tttUltimately, 
then, all is self, although not limited to the human situation 
as merely human or to the world as merely physical. And yet 
one eannot escape the assumption in Hocking that all that ~ 
physical, as well as ~ ~ ~ mental, belongs to that 
ultimate selfhood, called the 1'Whole 11 , and therefore has value 
for our "ideal11 self. That is to say, his position is that 
all reality is so because of purpose, thus making of the boqy 
( and of the mind as well, so far as mind is an object of 
purposive reality) a phenomenal entity. 
T}lere are two kinds of people who deal with 
what Hocking calls the linear mind11 • One kind is the physical 
1. MGHE, 355. 
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scientist 'Who makes a "closed group" of his field and declares 
that it is entirely physical. The other kind is the philosopher 
(or the religionist, as the case may be) who says "all is mind", 
and who therefore makes his mind-data a "closed group". Both 
of these two kinds are wrong, according to Hocking. There is, 
he claims, a more comprehensive view, which makes~ of these 
two by adding a third to enclose them and provide overall 
meaning to the whole. 
2·23 
The ~ which Hocking proceeds to call "ultimate" 
is one which is in full connection with its total world. It 
is a metaphysical self, and because it is metaphysical it has 
value for mysticism. For we may lmow by this time that Hocking 
assumes the metaphysical as the basis of all valid mysticism. 
That is to say, the union of the two worlds which mysticism 
holds in apparent opposition to each other but which are known 
to have value for each other is possible through that value 
which is found in .selfhood, both finite and infinite. It is 
the purpose found in selfhood which is the union of the world 
of selves, and it is this same purposive selfhood which is 
fou.nd at work within the judgment of experience, seeking to 
disclose meanings to the understanding, for 11it is the destiny 
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of meaning to be understood." 1 
We can conceive of no other interpreter 
of meaning than the sell'. Much of his labor to render meaning 
understandable takes place within the frame of his ovm 
physical nature, through his body. It is here that the mind, 
both conscious and non-conscious, performs its acts of fact-
making, evident to itself as well as to other.:-seives. Here, 
within the body, together with what the body performs in 
actions, overtly, lies the secret of making meanings under-
standable. Body and mind together, from some deep-lying 
urge of a self not fully recognizable, are the means of 
producing that necessary combination of "essence" and of 
"existence" to make for reality. This, according to Hocking, 
is the responsibility of mind and body in relation to the 
self. It is this function of mind and body in fact-making 
which is able to bridge the gap between idea and fact. The 
bridging must be within the body of a real self if at all. 
If we are able to interpret Hocking's 
meaning here it is that the urge of ~ ~ to be a real 
self comes from ~ will, which we might define (merely as a 
1. Art.(l929), 41. 
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working hypothesis) as the birth pJa ce of reality, i.e., of 
the self'. From some such starting place as the will the 
essence of being is joined to the existence of fact and the 
self takes its shape before the world, to be seen, felt, and 
understood by the world of selves. It is in this way that 
ideas can reach other selves--thr ough the fact of their 
existing deeds. 
The work of the will is not 11blindn. It's 
effort is toward the light of the understanding. It sets 
the pattern for the use of both light and darkness. (Its) 
"every act is, in its first intention, a success." 
For the first sphere of the will-act is 
the body: the muscles obey whether the 
more outward world obeys or not, or rather, 
the movement of muscle is the outward form 
of the will-act itself ••• The will always 
reaches its first aim. That one can exercise 
will at all constitutes the undercurrent of 
vital satisfaction: external matter has 
accepted the stamp of my idea--this is the 1 elemental and repeated triumph of my being. 
But the work of the will is within idea, 
toward its promotion, not as its own end, but toward the 
building of a real self. The self is not a mere idea or any 
combination of ideas. He is the result of idea~~ork, a 
1. Art.(l951), 337. 
CHAPTER V 
THE SELF OF HOCKING•S 11YSTICISM 
real being, maker and user of ideas. Reali ty, to the self, 
is the result of experiencing, within the self and also without 
the self, the altering of reality. It is in this experience 
alone that the self can know himself as real. Hi s altering 
of reality, i.e., producing work upon reality, is the making 
of himself. 
In so far as I have the experience of altering 
reality, I feei myself to be real. In spite 
of Descarte 1 s dictum, to think is not, in the 
full sense, to exist. EmPirical thinld.ng is 
half-existing; In observing the object I am 
neither the object nor fully myself, I am--
"giving myself to the object," accepting from 
it a loan of its own reality. But to will 
is to exist. For in the will-act I srummon 
my own reality to confer it upon the object. 1 
The will, as maker of the self, promotes one 
act after another, adding portions of essence to the particular, 
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which particular, as we are now thinking of it , is the individual 
self . 
In all will-acts we can discern this promotion 
of essence of the particular. Action, we may 
say, is a marriage of universal and particular 
in which both for the first time are "realized." 
The "essence 11 takes on "existence"; but without 
such existence it is not fulfilled as essence. 
The "existence" on the other hand, in taking 
on its new "essence," comes into its fulfill-
ment. As an abstract physical object, it has 
1. Art.(l951), 338. 
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less meaning than it was capable of; it was 
impersonal fact, now it is a body with an 
indwelling anima. 1 
The point of meaning, particularly, in the 
above quotation can be summarized in the statement that the 
"abstract object" had ttless meaning than it was capable of." 
Here, in the recognition of potential meaning, lies the 11prilne 
mover" of reality for the self. That is, the will may be 
considered to be the urge within potential itself which 
causes the meaning to come forth, not without struggle, into 
facts. Here it seems to us Hocking is suggesting that within 
nature is~' ·as potential meaning, seeking to express its 
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own reality. The expression has to come by way of the promotion 
of the self. Here also we think we see how Hocking intends to 
join the finite self to the infinite Self--through the medium 
of physical nature. Could we say, perhaps, that the finite self 
is the fulfillment of the infinite Self? If so, the participation 
of the finite in the infinite would be of the nature of self-
realization on the part of the finite and of infinite-reality-
extension on the part of the infinite Self. In the infinite 
Self such development as we recognize would be fulfillment of 
1. Art.(l95l), 340. 
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limitle~purpose, the essence of which is given through 
the world of things(including the body of the self) as 
meaning, but which has to be taken up into individualized 
acts on the part of individual selves to be promoted to 
existence. If we are correct, this would mean, then, that 
essence is the potential which is resident in natilre, t.he 
meaning-for-other-Self, of which the finite self is the 
real fact, the real existence. The general objects of nature 
are truly some evidence of existence, but still such existence 
as they have is as "symbol" of mind. All objects are the 
material from which facts are made, facts being a combination 
of 11 stuff11 (which is external) and of 11thought11 (which is 
internal). 1 Will is the means whereby fact and idea are 
fused together. 2And in the building of fact, in the making 
of the self an individual 11existant11 who has his existence 
through the essence Which is in God, there is happiness for 
for the finite self, even in a world where evil is present. 
Happiness, may we say, is the idea of the 
Whole in unhindered operation upon experi-
ence. He who knows God knows how to be 
happy in this world, having in himself both 
the source of positive value and that by 
i. Art.(l951), 334. 
2. Ibid., 342. 
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which all pain ca.11 be transmuted. 1 
Happiness depends on a kind of integration 
of self and of world as will establish obligations, duties, 
and moral purpose. The self must get ~ of himself. He 
must accept the whole world of objects. 
Self-sufficient we cannot be. And this 
truth our theory of value has taken into 
account. For that Whole-idea cannot be had 
by any but the completest exposure to the 
world of objects; nor can the vigor and 
integrity of that idea be maintained by any 
self-enclosed determination of the will, 
but only by ~esorting to its source in 
experience. 
Hocking's ~sticism implies that to make 
mind the whole is to deal with an inadequa.te"particular", the 
11uni versal" of which lies within a self so complete that he 
rises above mere mind and mere body and into a state of happy 
balance between the two-into a production of fact, wherein 
idea is creative, which is its primary purpose. 
Some further quot*tions in support of our 
position that mind and body work together to produce the 
concrete fact are these: 3 
1. MGHE, 488. 
2. MGHE, 489. 
3. TOP, 293-297. 
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If nature is a bridge of communication 
beteen minds, and the body is a part of 
nature, then the body according to idealism 
will be understood as part of that bridge. 
It is away of geeting across to other minds; 
and a way by which they can get across to it. 
But the body evidently differs from other 
parts of nature: it is more intimately con-
nected with a particular mind than other 
common objects ••• The body becomes for those 
who can read it a symbol of the individual 
mind. --
It is for many purposes equivalent to the 
self ••• The body is the visible agent for the 
self: it is, so to speak, legal tender for 
the mind of the owner. 
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We inherit our bodies as we inherit ourselves. 
But here also, the mind is first passive and 
then active: what it receives it re-creates ••• 
Thus at birth we have one body( and the mind) 
bequeathed to us: at forty we have one body 
(and the mind) built by our own wills. 
The body may be considered as one agent of 
the self, as mind is another. The will lies someWhere within 
each, as the urge toward self fulfillment. Thus we find that 
nothing which comes under the direction of mind is meaningless. 
But nothing is outside of meaning, and therefore everything is 
potentially meaningful. This is the type of Hocking's idealism. 
But the idealist, who recognizes that Nature 
with its ppparent indifference to his purpose, 
and its resistance to his thought and will, 
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ought to be there, has certain assurances 
about his--own place in the doings of the 
universe. If wverything is subordinate to 
mind, then, he infers, 
Nothing in the world can be meaningless; . 
for mind acts i!ways in View ofmeanings ... 
Our interest _in knowledge, in beauty and in 
rightness cannot be entirely off the target, 
or, to put it possibively, in these appreci-
ations of ours, we must come close to an 
immediate grasp of the ultimate sense of 
existence ••• 
Nothing is foreclosed ~ impossible, 
in the direction of our profounde8t will. 1 
The self which Hocking presents to us we may 
say is a process of fact-making, a fact-making, however, which 
is a constant fulfilling of meaning through deeds, full of value 
for happiness. The self is in himself a fulfillment of the 
"passion for righteousness". To the extent that a self is 
self-conscious, according to Hocking, he will be so in terms 
of his production of existence in the world of things. His 
happiness results from having found the "right way" of life, 
and the right way is a process of fact-production, of putting 
into fact the idea~ualities of mind, interpretations of the 
inexhaustible supply of meaning, all done through the will, 
the primary functional agency of the human self. A self who 
is in process of becoming more and more 11existent11 is the one 
1. TOP, 296-297. 
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who is himself passionately in the business of experiencing 
the potential of essence and is building that essence into 
fact, i.e., he is expanding individuality according to its 
potential of reality. His experience is of God and of the 
human selfhood as well. His judgment (his idea-action) 
interprets the value of the experience(participation in God) 
and creates individual selfhood out of it. 
2. The ontological argument and the mystic object. 
The ontological argument reasons that 
because the world is not, God is ••• It 
is because neither my world nor myself 
can serve as a foundation for thought and 
action that 1 must grope for a deeper 
foundation. 
Hocking appears to build the process of reality 
out of the fact of process. That is, he starts from experience, 
an experience which is placed on the ground-level of self and 
thing. He makes use of present fact and present mind as both 
are found in the empirical situation. He does not reason from 
something which is· non-existent to the existent. His argument, 
instead, is from that which exists to greater existence, because 
that which does exist contains the possibility of the greater. 
1. MGHE, 312. 
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That is, that which ~ existent is ~ largely ~ process of 
becoming more meaingfully existent. This may be called the 
- ---= - . 
"conceptual" argument--~ interpretation .£!: experience . A 
contributing argument Hocking calls "non-conceptli.al11 , which is 
a position primarily of assertion, not of interpretation. The 
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non-conceptual emphasis in experience appears to be given through 
feeling. This latter experience, says Hocking, is ttthe character-
istic assertion of mysticism in all its forms", namely, "that 
there is a ••• conconceptual ex~frience of God available to 
:roon who meet its conditions. 11 l · The conditions are that men 
11breathe11 , 11eat11 , "move", " have weight" and generally ~.!!! 
the world. 
A fair interpretation of Hocking's position is, 
we may believe, that he incorporates the non-conceptual i nto 
the conceptual, making of the latter the 11 criterion11 whereby 
the other is established. The actualized situation is viewed 
from its empiricism and from its judgment of itself. As 
Hocking would say, "Empiricism must be thought-crammed" . It 
is this kind of empiricism which Hocking says is applied to 
such objects as Reality and to God. It is the combination 
1. Art. (1944), 189. 
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of the non-conceptual and the conceptual, mentioned above, 
which represents Hocking's approach to the ontological question. 
In other words, the fact of existence is taken at its face 
value, but only in so far as reason declares what its face 
value is. 
The face value which both non-conceptual and 
conceptual mysticism discovers in existent fact points to some 
value as yet unfinished but in the process of being finished, 
i.e., meeting the needs of fac~ in terms of some recognition of 
obligati on not yet realized. 
In its simplest definition the ontological 
proof may be called "an appeal to evidence foe existence". 1 
That is, there is something in personality itself which is 
fo~~d also in fact itself, not given by either one to the 
other. That which is found in each but not given by the 
opposite is a fundamental category of essence, namely, the 
category of meaning. But meaning implies particular individuality, 
for the reason that the potential of meaning is never exhausted 
in any given particular individual. Also, when the qualities 
of meaning inherent in the several objects of experience are 
1. Art.(l932), 55. 
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compared, there are found to be differences. The self gets 
his reality(as an individual) from the fact that he is able 
to disvover differences. That is to say, he is himself 
because something else(which he finds in experience) is not 
himself. 11 I can be only as actual as the things I am at any 
time dealing with; I get my reality in part from what is over 
against me." 1 But the contrary is also true, in that that 
which is over against me gets its reality(. in part) from rre . 
"That which is over against me gets its actuality./ f rom the 
fact that I am dealing with it." 2 But the data of experience, 
in being distinguished as actual because they cannot be found 
identical with me, do not get their reality from me. Yet I 
am benefitted by the fact that they yield differences to me, 
as they are benefitted by the fact that I am different from 
them. We become useful to each other through no direct 
intention of our own. There is present son:e meaning for 
intelligence in the situation which is not given by the 
objects concerned. Here, so Hocking would say, is true 
objectivity. Things are real because of something other than 
themselves which gives them reality. What is true of things 
1. Art.(l932) , 64. 
2. Ibid, 64. 
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is also true of selves. Selves are known by what is~ 
them-selves, not merely as a contrast of finite objects, 
individually, but also as a contrast with that which is 
infinite, which infinite is judged to be essential meaning. 
The infinite is essential meaning for the reason that it 
supplies the meaningful connections between the finite objects. 
"The natural situation may be stated thus: the essence of God 
must be real, because it is an essence inescapable from my 
continuous consciousness or experience of reality." 1 
God, according to this argument, is true 
essence, while the finite self is an existent. "Both God and 
aeil.f are factors of reality which span the distinction between 
existence and essence." 2 Here God is referred to as "the 
whole". 
The whole precedes in our thought and in 
experience the two partial aspects of ego 
and non-ego; the necessary precedes the 
possible, the probable and the actual. 3 
God is produced to thought through experience, 
but it is thought which asserts his reality. In the discussion 
given above we have used some of Hocking's judgment of experience. 
1. Art.( 1932), 65. 
2. Ibid., 65n. 
3. Ibid., 65. 
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In the judgment of experience, as we have seen, Hocking 
insists on that combination of separate judgments which ~dll 
place all types of finite objects together for purposes of 
compprison, holding that all types are needed together to get 
2)7 
true knowledge about any. But the 11form11of the judgment of 
experience itself appears to contribute meaning to its 11 contents11 • 
The form of the judgment(its frame) would seem, therefore to 
be equivalent to what Hocki..11g has been called the 11 essence 11 
or the "necessary" basis of actuality. This, however, is an 
untenable position ( not finally ultimate) for the reason that 
what we have found thus far is not God but the Absolute, an 
abstraction. If God is "necessary" he is not God-only a 
principle of logic. But Hocking does not stop there. He 
appears to make God equivalent to the Absolute, but also 
something more besides. In other words, the Absolute is in 
need of differentiations. As the f~ame or the form of the 
judgment of experience, God is not differentiated. But if 
he is the principle of necessity-and more--, he can become 
God. Instead of being a mere principle of necessity, God is 
an intimate Thou. That is, as Hocking holds, God is essence 
and he is actuality. He is the frame of the judgment of 
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experience, but he also is identified with the meaning of 
the separate judgments within the whole judgment, which gives 
him differentiation and meaning for actuality, a meaning in 
wnich the finite selves participate. This is God as given 
in and thi-ou.gh the whole judgment of experience. 
There are, however, those who would say 
that Hocking's concept of God is drawn from a single of the 
several judgments within the judgment of experience, namely, 
from the judgment of S-objects or the social judgment. 
A. God !:! given by society. 
Hocking's ontological argument is challenged 
from two sources which will be brought forward here, especially 
since both critics attack him from the same side and in almost 
identical words. The critics are Dr. Neal Bond Fleming and 
Professor A.K. Rogers, 1 both of whom hold that Hocking arrives 
at his conclusion concerning the reality of God as a result of 
a consensus criterion. 
According to Dr. Fleming: 
Hocking maintains that the idea of other 
mind involves(or is at the same time) an 
experience of other mind. This reduces 
1. In Neal Bond Fleming's Ph.D. work, Hockillf's Philosophy 
of the Human Self, Boston University, 19 ; and in 
A.K.Roger 1 s book, EA.P. 
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the concept of objectivity to social 
agreement. 1 
According to Rogers: 
The idea of an Other Mind, it is urged, must 
be at the same time an experience of Other 
Mind, and carry existence with it ••• Now it 
is possible to see how this might be a valid 
argument, provi~ed we first accept the re-
duction of the concept of "objectivity" to 
social agreement ••• This however is only a 
dialectical triumph unless it can presuppo~e 
an acceptance of the original definition. 
The anSNer on behalf of Hocking's position 
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lies in the use which he makes of reason, wherein the individual 
self, his social other, his physical world, and the indubitalhle 
form of judgment itself, function together as a single unit 
to produce the proposition that reality is self-like. It is 
not society but Selfhood which gives us God, a Selfhood which 
is wholly active. What is meant by Hocking is that Reality, 
being of the nature of self, will respond to the demand of 
general Self; that is, that Nature will be adaptable to rational 
principle. The 11 other-selfhood11 which is natural to our 
environment as individuals is a mark of that likeness which 
nature bears to Nature. 
l. Fleming, HPHS, 243. 
2. Rogers, EAP, 306. 
CHAPTER V 
THE SELF OF HOCKING'S MYSTICISM 
One thing we may take as established, that 
what ever the S-experience may be, it does 
not arises every attempt to explainits 
deVelopment presupposes a thinner form of 
it already there, and all these attempts 
succeed in doing is to shaw how it thickens 
up. Neither individual nor race history 
discovers man first psychologically alone 
and gradually enlivening his environment. 
The course of development is rather that of 
defining and individualising the various 
expressions of other selfhood in what is at 
first a live world, an S-life in general. 1 
As this above quotation indicates, what the 
social other proves is a continuity of the self-experience, 
thus indicating, not that self-numbers give reality to the 
God-idea, but that reality is self-like. And, inasmuch as the 
human self is so constituted that.!!!~~ social, the social 
emphasis is bound to enter into the picture. It could not be 
otherwise. To leave the social-other out of the equation, when 
he figures to oount for a possible third of the whole of our 
judgment of experience, would be to destroy the value of the 
equation. 
The social self, being continuous in experi-
enee and in reality, is able to take up the objects of experi-
1. THE, 13.5. 
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ence as found in the physical world and invorporate them 
into a general pattern of ecperience which becomes available 
to each indifidual as a consequence. Thus the world as a 
whole belongs to eacn individual, .!!! the social other. 
It does not appear that physical things, or 
Other Mind, or individual selfhood;which, by itself, can give 
us Nature and Self. The meaning of Reality is something given 
2 ! right way of thinking, ! basic attitude, which is brought 
to experience and which results in an objective understanding 
of Reality. A part of that attitude is to be found in the 
demand that there be "communication" of reals and between reals. 
Let me but think what I mean by the Other 
Mind, and there, as I find my Self, I find 
the Other also. As an idea of a fundamental 
and constant experience, bound up with my 
equally permanent ecperience of Self and 
Nature, this idea is not prior to experience; 
but is indeed prior to al~her social 
experience, to all such as is intermittent 
and subject to error. This fundamental 
experience, and its idea, deserve, from 
their position in knowledge, to be called 
a concrete ! priori knowledge. 1 
That is to say, a fully rational attitude 
doea already contain experience in it, which must be an experi-
1. MGHE, 278. 
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ence of a "something". It is the proper attitude which puts 
the self into a right frame of reference to Reality. This 
fact has been known and practiced by mystics. This attitude 
is object-directed as its own inherent quality. That is 
what it means. 
B. Knowledge of God and of man. 
The mystic consciousness contains a basic 
attitude toward Reality, not because it is an imitator and 
has seen the attitude worked with success and therefore adopts 
its method for its own. On the contrary, it has but made use 
of the normal and natural resources of the mind and the method 
by which Reality is given has been disvovered as an "original" 
discovery by mystics in general. 
The truth of my assertion means that it is 
valid for you and other real persons in the 
same way that it is valid for me. This 
association of minds which we call "we", 
accustomed as it is to sit in united judgment 
upon facts external to itself, cannot in 
like fashion sit in judgment upon itself. If 
we doubt 11we", we know not to whom to appeal. 
We can hardly find our fundamental society, 
because we can hardly get so far away from 
it as to doubt it. 1 
1. MGHE, 279-280. 
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Other Mind does not give us validity; it is 
validity which gives us Other Mind, and self. It is as simple 
as thatl Truth and validity go hand in hand, and, because 
they do, Selfhood is discovered as their normal and their only 
rationally sound resultant. That is, they~ Selfhood. 
Neither experience or idea can be said to 
be anything but the natural workings of reason, within the 
self, to give the self to the understanding. Experience in 
abstraction, as something apart from the meaning of self, 
ca.rmot serve the purpose which experience implies. "That 
experience, thus held off at arm's length and criticized, is 
not the Real Experience." 1 
It is through my present inseparable community 
with The Other that I know that2abstracted 
"experience" to be incomplete. 
The idea likewise is there, as matter of 
experience and of reason, even when subjected to its own 
criticism. It stands forth as the Ideal, for "my ideal and 
my idea are the same,--they refer me to what I have." 3 
The argument concerning the basic "thereness" 
of both idea and of experience, and through them of the self 
1. MGHE, 281. 
2. WlGHE, 281. 
3. MGHE, 277. 
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and of other~selfhood, i s an acceptance of a logical nature 
which cannot be denied without at the same time denying ~ 
denial. To be in use of that which belongs to the real will 
surely be the best method for obtaining the real. 
The individual self in search of Reality is 
himself in possession of that Reality before he begins his 
search. He is himself the type of the judgment which can 
discover Reality, for in himself he is in possession of idea, 
mind, body, and of an environment which provides him with 
experience of the several kinds of situation which involve 
other-selfhood, the world, and world self. This is enough, 
according to Hocking, to set in operation the judgment of 
experience, within which is to be found the validity and the 
meaning, the intention and the attitude of the mind, mysti-
cally turned, to find the Whole of Reality. 
Hocking's definition of the human self, 
then, would be in terms of the judgment, in which we find 
mind, body, other-selfhood, the world self, and God. These 
are all incorporated into any real definition we could. give, 
entirely by implication, but surely there. 
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Any definition that would meet the demands 
made upon it by the judgment of experience, Hocking's 11widened 
net of empiricism", would approll!imate Reality. 
But a judgment belongs to a judging mind. 
The world of reality, therefore, which is 
the world of truth, is the world of a uni-
versal and final judgment, a universal 
self. 1 
\~e would draw from Hocking's form of the true 
judgment a definition of the physical world, of the S-object, 
or our finite social continuum, of body and of mind of the 
individual self as knower-all of them would come out the same, 
as involving each other. And a basic certainty would stand as 
object of immediacy, wherein God would stand forth as knower of 
all and meaning of all, without which the structure and content 
of the other would contain anything positive whatsoever, for 
11if there are none but empirical knowers in the world there 
is no social experience." 2 What could this mean other than 
that God is the bond of the whole of experience, of the type 
which Hocking means, of the kind just now outlined? 
1. TOP, 270-2?1. 
2. MGHE, 292. 
3. MGHE, 315. 
The object of certain knowledge has this three-
fold structure, Self, Nature, and Other Nd.nd; 
and God, the appropriate object of ontological 
proof, includes these three. 3 
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1. God as other than the Absolute. 
Hocking frequently speaks of the Absolute as 
though it and God were the same. That is, God is the Absolute, 
and he does the work of the Absolute, but he is more than the 
Absolute. 
We · could not live without the Absolute, nor 
without our idea of the Absolute. I do not 
say that the Absolute is equivalent to God; 
I say that· God, whatever else he ~y be, 
must needs also be the Absolute. 
According to Hocking, God is the Absolute, 
but as double, not single; God is a "pair of Absolutes". 
Another way of saying it is that God is an "Absolute-pair". 2 
What is the meaning of God in relation to 
the Absolute? It is primarily this, that one member of the 
Absolute-pair stands for psychological subjectivity--What 
Hocking calls the "reflexive turn", the 11 object11 of the 
psychological self considered as the 11 frane" of reality. 
But God is more than mere subjectivity, for subjectivity 
in itself is an "irrelevant universal." To dwell forever in 
the reflexive turn is to dwell in the irrelevant and to make 
no difference within the world. 
1. MGHE, 206. 
2. MGHE, 203. 
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Yet the reflexive turn is important, and it 
is "necessary", for without the retrospective glance there 
would be no prospective interest. In some manner the two go 
together. In working with one, the other comes into view, if 
for no other reason than for purposes of contrariness; one 
thing alone cannot carry on even its own work without some 
help from that which it at that moment is not. Which is to 
say that something of the opposite is always carried within 
that which is being currently used; no whole can exclude any 
of itself. And the Absolute-pair will work together if there 
is to be any practical meaning revealed. Thus Hocking shows 
the value of retrospection, in the field of science, where its 
"formal arrangement of the materials of a problem is the 
1 beginning of an explanation." 
1. MGHE, 197 • 
2. MGHE, 197. 
Science has begun to question whether any 
other conquest of Nature is either possible, 
or desirable, than just this of establishing 
order and law among phenomena--not trying 
to penetrate their objective interiors, doubt-
ing at last whether there be any sucn interiors, 
external to ourselves; doubting whether we 
are not the interior of Nature. Here the-
product of the reflexive turn is accepted by 
nearly eve~ybody as the only practical thing 
in sight. 
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That is, 11 the assemblage and comparison 
of unknowns generates known-ness 11 1 and meanings begin to 
come out. Something besides the isolated or the indifferent 
is contained in every arrangement. This is what Hocking means 
by the Absolute-pair. To the extent that our ideas are put to 
work, a wholeness within the world appears. This is an inescap-
able "absolute" of reason. 
So also in moral affairs, the person who 
"wills to have a good will, already has a good will-in its 
rudiment." In the seeking · for reality, even in retrospective 
glances, there is already some of the finding. There is an 
external value even in an internal problem. 
1. MGHE, 197. 
2. MGHE, 198. 
Compatible with everything it rises upon, 
and there is presumably nothing so Vicious 
that the absolute cannot rise upon it in 
the form of idea: yet not compatible with 
remaining therein. This merely formal con-
ceiving of the facts of one's own WPetched-
ness is at the same time a departure from 
them--placing them in the object. It is not 
idle, therefore, to observe reflexively that 
i n that very Thought, one has separated 
himself from them, and is no longer that 
whic~ empirically be still sees himself to 
be. 
But it is possible to over-emphasize one side 
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of the equation, Which can give the impression og wholeness, 
temporarily. But defects show up, which reason can detect, 
as for instance in the overemphasis of the reflexive(intro-
spective) turn, which becomes mere "sentimentality". 
Offered as a sufficient answer, the rellexive 
turn is indeed the essence of sentimentality: 
hunger is not relieved by Stoical reflexion on 
the inward conditions of happiness(mentally 
inward). But to offer the hungry a meal with-
out any of that spaciousness of idea which 
the sentimental soul too fulsomely invokes; 
to omit, I say, your re~erence to the Absolute, 
somehow s~oils the value of your practical 
charity. 
There is no ignoring of the fact that the 
Absolute within the self is an important ajunct to the whole, 
even though it is not the whole. Netertheless, without it 
there would be no wholeness of rationality. 
1. MGHE, 199. 
2. MGHE, 201. 
The irrelevant universal to all out experiences 
is collectively named, the Self; the Subject , 
present to all experience, inclusive of all, 
compatible with all; yet if this self were 
indeed indifferent to all, useless for deductive 
purposes, Self could never have become its own 
object, self-consciousness would be impossible. 
In being thought of, the self is made a member 
of the world of experience, and acknowledged 
as active there. It is thought of, because 
in being ~bought~' it has hadldifferences 
to make. 
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As Hocking uses the term Absolute, it 
is the equivalent or subjectivity. But it also is the means 
whereby objectivity can be obtained, for the "reflexive turn 
reveals never alone the Absolute within, but always the 
Absolute within in conjunction with ~ Absolute without." 1 
That is, there can be no satisfactory subjective experience 
without some reference to values, values which, by the way, 
have a source other than that or the experience or a present 
subjective content. Values are discovered as having their 
origin in something other than a present experience, i.e., a 
merely innnediate past. One might say, then, that retrospection 
(and thus subjectivity), if pushed for origin, is compelled to 
reach beyond itself, into some history or creation, as it were, 
which is itself a kind or objectivity. But also prospectively, 
the subjective consciousness( Hocking's reflexive Absolute) is 
compelled to look beyond its present situation, to values 
desired, deemed possible but not at present actual, for the 
satisfaction or the subjective reality. In other words, its 
own limited reality is inadequate to its own purpose and to its 
own intended meaning. This, apparently, is what Hocking means 
1 . MGHE, 202. 
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when he says that Descartes was wrong in holding that the 
reality of the silf is to be found in the "I exist, knowing". 
That is , there is a content of experience lacking in Descartes' 
explanation. It is an abstraction, a present content, without 
external connections or value. In other words, his subjective 
experience is no real union of idea and fact. His "essence" has 
no "existence", and therefore his equation is not complete. 
The consciousness that there are "differences 
to be made" is the beginning of content to be placed within the 
"irrelevant universal". In the recognition of difference is 
some escape from indifference. 
If we could accept. the differences of experi-
ence as they stand, there would be no problem 
of unity; but i f we cannot accept them, there 
is nothing to l ook for but an in-different. 
Either we ar e content with conditional certain-
ties, or we seek a certainty that holds every- 1 Wher~,-and thus is pompatibJe with everything. 
The changeless has now become a first principle 
in support of change, a change in terms of self-action and 
of self-development. That which began in our experience as 
an abstract content of subjective interest is showing itself 
to be something positive through the very action of that 
internal glance. The r eflexive turn~ as Absolute, is now yielding 
1. MGHE, 204. 
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to the quality brought to it through selfhood. 
As a First Pr~1ciple, the changeless is 
of course insufficient. Our Ultimate 
Reality must have qualities of both 
changelessness and change. 1 
The kind of questions put to the Absolute 
include those regarding dissatisfactions either felt or 
regarded as possible. This is what is meant by saying that 
the Absolute is able to 11 rise upon" the facts of experience, 
in allowing them to happen, but also in bringing about 
such changes in the happenings as will meet the needs of 
selfhood. The questions put to the Absolute would not 
be valid questions if there were no possibility of some 
anS"Ner in return. And whatever the answer may be, the 
Absolute is held accountable for all that is contrary 
to the best interests of selfhood, for the self has entered 
into the Absolute as the Absolute has entered into the self, 
for the self has the Absolute upon which i t can attach 
blame for any fundamentally wrong situation not remediable 
1. MGHE, 188. 
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by man. 
This merely formal conce~v~ng of the facts 
of one's own wretchedness is at the same 
time a departurl from them--pjaeing them . 
in the object. 
The self needs the Abaolute if for no other 
reason than for the lodgment of its complaints, giving the self 
an objective reference which can take it away from its own 
subjectivity and consequent inadequacy to meet the trials 
and the exigencies of everyday living. The defects of 
a mere subjectivity have been surmounted by referral, a 
referral to Reality itself. And, in so referring our dif-
ficulties, as well as our general needs, we have put more 
meaning into our Absolute, who now is no "ultimate indif-
ference. 11 
1. MGHE, 198; 
2. MGHE, 186. 
Must not Reality be a Real Force, a Real 
Mover, and no Eternal Fact of changeless 
order? Whether for worship, or for theory, 
or for common practice, we need to reach an 
Ultimte which is no ultimate indifference: 
something, rather, like an ultimate Grit, a 
principle that lends friction between wheel 
and belt, which gives bite to the tool, 
plunge to the earth-drive of the plow. 2 
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The Absolute, conceived as a mere principle 
of changelessness, is inadequate to express all that it 
should mean. This fact is a matter of experience itself. 
But when this fact is taken up in what Hocking calls the 
judgment of experience and is given its setting in totality 
of judgnent, it falls short of providing the meaning required 
by the judgment of e xperience, for the judgment req'fu.i:res some 
real action and some internal:cy consistent meaning of that 
action. The fault is not in the Absolute, but such fault as 
there is will be seen to be the result of a failure of the 
judgment of experience itself, in the action ·which is given 
to the Absolute, or wi. thheld from it. Our problem, then, so 
far as the Absolute is concerned, is one of organisation of 
meaning, in terms of action in the world and of attitude toward 
Reality. The Absolute is but a part of a general principle 
of validity, and therefore it belongs to some pary of reason, 
i.e., of reasonableness, incluSive of the meanings and the 
purposes in experience which make their contributions to 
reason. 
Something like the Absolute appears in the 
history of religion; but it is noteworth that 
it is not worshipped. There is no temple to 
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Brahman. The Algonquins did not pray to 
Manitou. Unkulunkulu, as most primitive 
near-Absolutes, is too far off and has no 
interest in the affairs of men; whence 
petitions must be addressed to the nearer and 
more finite spirits. The same judgment occurs 
~Lhundred times in the various religions of 
the world. In all religions have mediators 
of some kind corrected the tendency of the 
great God-father to fall in with the Absolute, 
giving the Deity effective human sympathies 
and fighting interests. Ahura Mazda must 
have his group of · nature-gods and his retinue 
of Amesha Spentas. Even lahweh as he tends 
to be thought of as Absolute ceases to deal 
with men in person and works only through 
messengers or through the Logos. \~at we 
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need to worship is the seminal, disturbing, 
creating, and destroying principle of Reality: 
for which purpose would not Siva be a better 
Deity than Brahm, the ineffable and inlllifferent? 1 
The Absolute is what one might call the conscious-
~~Reality. But as mere consciousmss it is of dubious 
value. To be valuable for the self, whom it must needs serve, 
the Absolute must stand in some valid relation to the self, as 
an aid to the fulfillment of purpose in the self. It must be 
set within the context of man 1 s work, wherein selfhood is 
revealed and realized. 
The Absolute which Hocking presents to us is 
the ~-absorbing idea of an epistemologically monistic 
1. MGHE, 185-186. 
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idealism, both of which he rejects. Neither that form of 
idealism nor that form of God can privide the earth-contact 
necessary to meet the needs of finite situations. For instance, 
the Absolute is too remote for purposes of worship and af 
intimacy, both of which latter are essential to Hocking's 
interpretation of mwstic experience. God, to be God, must 
touch earth, so to speak. That is, he must include the earth 
in his meanings, i.e., in his own nature. The objects of 
experience must be found real in the real world, where men 
transact their regular business and where -they do most of 
their living. Any-thing less than thi s kind of practical 
expression of God will not do. That is, God 11 is no mere 
Absolute, a principle of necessity''. As Hocking says, he 
is that and more too. He is at least that, but he also has 
to be more than that. 
Here in the Absolute, we are led to believe, 
is the same problem that we have found elsewhere. For example, 
the problem which Hocking showed us in connection with the 
will is similar. In fact there is little difference between 
Hocking 1 s notion of the Absolute and the finite will, if any 
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actual difference whatsoever. We may well identify the will 
with the Absolute, both very subjective prineiples, and bath 
in need of interpretation. 
If we are correct in our assumption that the 
will and the Absolute, for all practical purposes, are identical, 
then we are led to the same kind of release from subjectivity for 
the Absolute that we found for the will. That is, the will, so 
we found, was made concrete in some connections between idea 
and fact. ·we found that it 11 is not real except in 'fiat• when 
it fuses fact with idea11 • 1 Considered as fiat will is seen 
to be a mediating force or principle bwtween nature as matter 
and nature as idea. Both idea and matter we found to be but 
the opposite sides of the same reality, both sides of which are 
needed if meaning is to cone forth. \Ve found that fact means 
individuality and existence. And, inasmuch as"the individual 
is the only true universal", the meaning which is implied in 
the universal as essence must become particularized in the 
individual to becorre real. In fact this is the interpretation, 
and the only interpretation, which appears to make sense. 2 
1. Art.(l951), 342. 
2. Note: It was this arti~le which Professor Hocking sent 
to the present investigator,in which it was implied the 
meaning of his mysticism was to be found in the interpretation 
which he gives to fact and to idea. 
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If the concept of the Absolute is found 
to be defective as including God in its meaning and as 
standing in the place of God, or as identified with God, 
it ~s because, as the result of being judged defective by 
our use of the judgment of experience, it assumes to be the 
whole without being the Whole. By Whole is meant here whole 
meaning, which God is assumed to be. As the symbol of that 
wholeness of meaning, he becomes identified with ideas and 
with facts. God is thus the changeless ground of all meaning, 
but he is also the process of fulfillment of all meaning. It 
is this latter which constitutes his Reality, and which makes 
possible any tests of the changeless ground and which also 
" . -
puts essence(changeless meaning) into facts of existence. 
The changeless and change belong together. 
Together they bring "character" to the world. It is this 
character, found in the world( and so in the finite self), 
which indicates the selfhood of Nature. 
This pair of Absolutes, or Absolute pair, 
which -we have described as Chznacter in 
presence of Nature, is well capable of 
producing practicsl difference; might well 
be described as the original source of all 
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difference, perhaps, for if we Qegin with 
simply a consciousness, and its object-
absolute (not Sein and Nicht-sein, but Sein 
and Bewusstsein) we have all that is necessary 
to develop change0ferden)~ It is notorious 
that what endures before consciousness does 
not endure the same ••• Its essential explanation 
may be this, that any -object of consciousness, 
simply as object, i.e~, as case of Reality, is 
so far good, and therefore~to be approached, 
or increased in vividness ••• Briefly, SJ:in 
and Bewusstsein together give Werden. 
It is this bringing forth of meaning out of 
the~ being which constitutes the change which can be found 
in facts and in things and which gives them their existence. 
Once again, it is the relation between ideas and facts which 
constitutes the meaning implied in each. And it is the 
movement of the w.ill toward meaning and its fulfillment which 
brings ideas and facts together. Therefore, we may say that -
the Absolute, conceived as pure potential meaning, changless 
simply because it is potential, requ.ires the "fiat" of purpose, 
as it were !!: cosmic will, to promote its actuality. God, 
according to Hocking, would be the potential and the actual, 
together, both the activity of purpose and the potential of 
meaning, brought forth as creativity and as creation. His 
nature would be thus of ultimate moral quality, designating 
1. MGHE, 203-204. 
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the 11right way", as Hoc:dng says, 1 and impl;P.ng a relationship 
of righteous response o:1 the part of the created, who thus 
enter into the "fiat" o:r creativity itself. A "passion for 
righteousness" on the pl.rt of the finite selfhood is the normal 
response to the 11rightn~ss 11 of God's nature and of his activity. 
God, th9n, takes over, not only where the 
Absolute "leaves off, 11 ·::mt where it begins as well. This is 
the God of Hocking's mysticism, worthy of the finite! s partici-
pation in him and requiring that the finite self join him in 
acts of creativity. The amount of neaning. which God has to 
bring forth from his own lature requires the assistance of 
all finite selves. Fact and idea are the evidence that the 
finite selfhood is accomplishing his responsibility, his 
responsibility being that of revealing the meaning of the 
righteous value of selfhood. The Absolute cannot serve as 
object of righteous passion; God can so serve. 
God as transeendent and as immanent. 
It is possible to hold that the general con-
text of Hocking's philosophy will support the position that most, 
if not all, of what he means by the Absolute is to be found in 
God 1 s transcendent nature, namely, that which stands over us as 
1. Cf. LroMF , PP• 26-30. 
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further possible meaning , which must be held to be 
differentiable as need and occasion arise in experience. 
The transcendent is the source of novelty, of the creative, 
and of the prophetic in mystical experience. 
The traDscendent in God is that which stands 
outside my fellow finite companions, as not included 
in their total experience nor in the thing-world . 
Fleming and Rogers are but partly wrong when they assert 
that Hocking's concept of God is a proof from consensus 
gentium. One part of God is found~~ consensus, but 
another part, perhaps larger than the other, is not so 
found. If there can be any definite allocation of parts 
within t he judgment of experience as an interpretation 
of Reality, we perhaps can say that the non-consensus in 
Hocking's notion of God is validity and that the consensus 
in it is truth. Roger's accusation that Hocking 's Absolute 
represents 11validity in knowledge 11 is a confirmation, out-
side Hocking himself, which iends some strength to our 
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present assertion that God is known in both ways, through 
popular opinion and expression, largely through the practice 
of his reality in formalized religion, and through what might 
be called the proof of systematic thought. In the former, 
the formalized religion method, we may say that in general 
we recognize content of knowledge and experience, primarily. 
In the latter and more dynamic method of indicating the 
truth and reality of God we recognize the process . If we 
were asked which of the two methods of recognizing God at 
work in the world Hocking would prefer we would of necessity 
have to suggest the latter. With him religious expression 
is largely one of obtainigg ever more truth. His interpretation 
of mysticism, and his use of mysticism, is in accord with this 
latter emphasis. Truth-getting and truth revelation are 
paramount in his type of mysticism. 
But mysticism is on the whole more interested 
in the process of God and of his truth. It is always in search 
of more experience and of more me~ing. Once that meaning has 
been put into service, once it .has become custom, it has lost 
most of its appeal for the mystic, who must always be out 
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prospecting for more truth about Reality. 
Hocking does not discount the value of the 
immanency of God, but he does suggest that there is a danger 
in being too intimate with God through the social formalities 
and thereby losing perspective. "In proportion as the religious 
horizon is drawn close, the gamut of religious experience 
becomes trivial." 1 It is relatively easy for man to identify 
God with all the little pettinesses of life. 11 1 This thing is 
God.,-and that, and t hat. 111 2 This is the way of pantheism. 
It also is the way of humanism, wherein God is too nusefu1 11 • 
But Hocking feels that men are becoming more and more aware 
of the dangers of having God too near. ''We shall outgrow the 
days when we make man great by making God small and useful." 3 
And the reason far this fact is to be found in experience. 
The near-by deity of a religion that betones 
immanency proves in experience to be a baff ling 
object of worship. Paradoxically enough he 4 is not so accessible as the unreachable God. 
On the other hand, the transcendent God is 
much more interesting. 11 We need not fea:b that God will be 
1. MGHE, 327. 
2. MGHE 1 326. 
3. MGHE, 328. 
4. MGHE, 328-329. 
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thrust out of consciousness by this effort to assign him ultimate 
otherness; for God-thinking can not well expell God from thought11 1 
That is, the more one has to struggle with the idea of God, the 
more real he becomes. And, in order to perform the act of 
approach to God, the worshipper must act as an individual, not 
as a social group, although he often makes his approach within 
a social grouping. But in the main, worship must be an individual 
and a private act. nYforship must be always in some measure, as 
Plotinus puts it, a flight of the Alone to the Alone." 2 This is 
so because~~~ religion i~creative of individuality. 
The individual, however, brings the results of his experience to 
society and shares with society all that is meaningful in the 
experience. 
But Hocking is not saying that transcendence 
is more important than immanence. What he is saying is that 
our experience of God must contain and retain whatever is 
important in God 1 s nature. If the principle of transcendence 
will produce more of the importance of God within our experience, 
then transcendence must be emphasized. What he appears to mean 
is that transcendence is more difficult, and it is the difficult 
1. MGHE, 327. 
2. MGHE, 329. 
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which offers the greater challenge to the soul. He who can 
reach the transcendent God can also reach the immanent God. 
This fact seems to be what Hocking means by the following 
statement, where he says that "only the transcendent God can 
be truly immanent. 11 1 In reaching the transcendent we also reach 
the immanent, for to reach the transcendent it is necessary to 
experience the immanent. 
An illustration of what Hocking could possibly 
mean when he says that the transcendent God is the immanent God 
is one which is familiar to us, namely, that of the "shield", 
both sides of which refer to the same reality. Transcendence 
is the 11far 11 side, which to know means also the knowledge of the 
11near 11 side. 
But most of all, we are led to believe that 
Hocking recognizes in immanenc,y the old problem of subjectivity, 
in which the world of things is taken in as idea, a merely 
psychological object. This is his constant fear, that reality 
will be absorbed into idea alone. Idea is valuable, but it is 
only one aspect of reality, a tool of the self. And idea is of 
value to the self only as it joins with fact, on an equal footing, 
to indicate what is real. It is in the combination of idea and 
1. MGHE, 330. 
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fact that we have reality, the joining coming through the 
"fiat" of the will, as ·self-conscious experience. The God, 
or that aspect of God, which is transcendent represents fact, 
which truly is nothing without idea, but which is the means 
whereby idea can turn into self-consciousness, and into indi-
viduality. This is the important point to keep in mind. The 
fact, as transcendent ap:re et of God, stands farther off and 
consequently requires more attention and labor to reach it. 
Therefore, we have reached the following 
conclusion: The relation .which we thought was between the trans-
cendent aspect and the Absolut~ is now reversed, and we see in 
its place the similarity of the Absolute and the immanent. For, 
if we were correct in our analysis of the Absolute, this latter 
is~ subjectivity of the self. It i s what one sees first 
when he says, "I ehink11 (myself). Thi s is immanency of the 
first order. It is the 11 I think" which Hocking is attempting 
to put in second place to an experience of something which 
transcends the mere think • The danger of immanencr,y is that 
it will assume too much concerning the subjectivity of the 
self. But if we achieve transcendent selfhood we have escaped 
the limitation and the defect of mere s~bjectivity. God is 
266 
CHAPTER VI 
MYSTICISM AND THE MEANING OF GOD 
closely identified with the particular view we have of the 
self and its reality. 
In our worship of God, so mysticism teaches 
us, we get beyond our own irranediacy and the mere immediacy of 
God. Neither we ourselves nor God himself can afford to be 
identified with psychological subjectivity. Reality is not 
a psychological content; it is a metaphysical process of be-
coming more and more individual, i.e., more and more actual, 
the particular taking on and realizing more and more essence, 
according to its potential. And, according to Hocking's view 
of mysticism, the potential, in terms of the fulfillment of 
cosmic meaning, is infinite in capacity. 
We have now to investigate how mysticism 
"functions" as a process of self-development, which will be 
the problem of our next chapter. 
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1. It is a revelation of truth. 
Mysticism, as we have said before, is the 
creative urge or tendency within individuality,of the self 
as it prospers creatively in functional reality, i.e., in 
God's Mature. It is this development of individuality which 
is of particular importance in this chapter. We have thus 
far outlined the process as a theory, wherein we have seen 
that it is not content per !! that is important but it is, 
instead, the creative process, particularly as that process 
functions both subjectively and objectively, as idea and as 
fact, bringing in more and more essence to the fulfillment of 
individuality, which is important. 
This is the central fact of all mysticism: 
namely, that the discovery of the individual 
is always a discovery of truth, of a power~ 
fully synthetic idea, a~d yet not by way 
of effortful thinldng. 
There are two main parts within the "functionJt 
of mysticism whioh wiJJL1require our attention in this section. 
One division will concern the "discovery of the individual" 
as we view mysticism functionally in religion, in philosophy, 
1. MGHE, 433. 
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and in science. A second division will attempt to show com-
parisd>ns of Hocking's mysticism with that of some other mysties. 
A. Religion ~ the practice of !IVSticism. 
We here are taking Hocking's definition of 
religion as "passion for righteousness,. and for the spread 
of righteousness, conceived as a cosmic demand" 1 as normative 
for this study, both with respect to mysticism and to religion 
as well. The definition serves the purpose of mysticism in that, 
while it does not state the process ~ truth~getting directly, 
truth getting and originality are implied. It serves as a good 
definition of religion in that it implies some body of truth 
which can be put to practical use. 
Religion, as we have suggested abobe, is 
the application of the truth discovered by mysticism. 
Religion becomes the arbiter of ends, and 
thus the primary organizer of the practical 
life of man , an office not le~s important 
than that of science itself. 
Without religion man would drift aimlessly, 
not knowing for sure whether or not he was headed in a right 
direction. It is religion which holds the gains which 
1 . LRVIIF, 26. 
2. SIG, 5. · 
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mysticism makes. Religion "takes the human mind at the point 
of its farthest reach ••• the human soul, and keeps it from 
slipping back." 1 
Religion appears to be the recognition 
and the application of the truth after ~ ~ found, whereas 
mysticism is ~ recognition 2f truth ::!?.£ be found, together 
with the experience of finding it. Mysticism, then, is the 
operation of the whole self(reflexive-transcendent) wherein 
the finite makes its encounter with the infinite, the two 
11 great powers" meeting each other mid-way. This meeting of 
the powers causes truth, with all of its evidence, to vecome 
joined to its valid vehicle, the judgment of experience. 
Mysticism is thought in the form of deed, 
through channels of thought-crammed experiences of self vd. th 
self. It is not thought in its effortful aspects, but it is 
instead effortless, as the result of having brought its 
judgments into proper focus and internal adjustment with 
Reality, through arduous practice, until it can function with 
quiet patience and with natural obedience. It is life at 
the business of living in happy relation with its obligations, 
1. Tolley(ed.), PTP, 32-33. 
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not struggling and not resisting, thus retaining the unity 
of the self. Whatever of Reality is available through the 
unification of the self, as applied through a system of 
unified judgment-of-experience, is thus, through the mystic 
process, made ready as some content to use in the business 
of living and in worship. 
The mystic process, as we refer to it, is 
an adoption of the right-way, a basic attitude toward Reality, 
which wi.ll reveal the truth which the mystic takes for granted 
as being obtainable from the Whole Which he is in process of 
experiencing. 
For what is the mystic experience but finding 
the idea of the whole, as love finds the idea 
of a person? Worship seeks the self of the 
world as an individual being; but in finding 
this self, it gains, or regains, a tolerating 
conception of this world, a view which can 
make life as a wh~le once more acceptable, 
inviting, great. 
Mysticism is the adoption of wholeness into 
the self. In :so doing, no part of reality is left out of 
consideration. All physical things, ideas, and selves are 
taken up into the form of the judgment which he uses. He is 
1. MGHE, 433-434. 
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the original practicer of wholeness. It is this kind of 
practice, particularly, which di stinguishes him from all 
other truth-seekers. His is the most complete form of 
whole-practice, for he submits himself to it and participates 
in it through his whole self. 
A contrary opinion regarding Hocking's 
mysticism is given by Dr. Ahern, who summarizes Hocking's 
mysticism i n the following manner: 
In order to gain the experience of worship 
the mystic must turn from the things of sense 
experience and physical activity. He must 
also continuously remind himself that all 
intellectual concepts of the Real are in-
adequate and therefore must be rejected. 1 
We hold that Hocking 1 s mysticism does just 
the opposite. Rather than turning away from things physical 
and of the senses, he takes them all in through the all-
inclusive judgment of experience. And, rather than shying 
away from the intellectual, he imparts more intelligence and 
understanding to life generally, through the application of 
interpretation to experience. He rejects no valid concepts, 
but he insists that all concepts, all ideas, and all selves 
1. Ahern, DIS, 139. (Note: This is from a Ph.D. dissertation 
on Hockll1g 1 s philosophy of religion, written in 1941, by Alvin 
A.Ahern, at N.Y. University). 
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be made actual through an infusion of essence, to the extent 
of their capacity. What he does, and what Dr. Ahern means 
to say perhaps, is to change concepts and ideas from mechan-
ical ends-in-themselves to instruments of means. No idea, 
as we have seen,- is an end in itself. It is what is thought 
~' not ~. And to equate the rational whole with the whole 
self(reflexive-transcendent, subjective-objective) is not to 
lessen the value of the rational but rather to increase it. 
Mysticism is more ''radical" than is religion. 
The former is more "elemental" than is the latter, stemming 
from some intimate experience of the whole of reality within 
the individual himself. Mysticism specializes in the individual, 
while religion specializes in the group. It makes men solitary, 
while religion welds men into social patterns. 
Radical mysticism, religious ~sticism, with 
its sweeping negation and equally sweeping 
affirmation, seems to sever a man from his 
fellows as well as from nature: it tends to 
make him solitary, anti-social, and useless; 
to give him over to subjectivity. 1 
\Vhat the mystic discovers of individual self-
worth is taken over by religion and enhanced by it. Religion, 
considered as the application of the truth found by ~sticism, 
1. MGHE, 401. 
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is not a creator of truth. It is a "domesticator" of the truth 
which mysticism brings forward. Religion patterns its beliefs 
in creeds and its practices in forms and ceremonies, particular-
izing the truth which it has received but making it at the same 
time less and less individual. 
Now the mystic is a bearer in his own person 
of the questioning out of which he was born. 
IVhen he joins his community in worship, he 
joins in its questioning--for worship when 
it is alive contains a new groping of the 
soul, not a wearing deeper of old ruts. And 
if he finds an answer, he must bring it back 
into the context of yhe questioning to which 
the answer applies. 
There are two things here in particular that 
should be mentioned. One is that the mystic brings something 
to the worship service, namely an attitude of mind in quest of 
more of the meaning which Reality has to offer to individuality. 
The other is that what he finds that is new( original) he places 
within the context of the whole, i.e., within a whole judgment 
of experience. The mystic is the specialist in whole judgment, 
and in whole experience, both of which he keeps together. But 
what he finds ~ good for religion ~ ~ practice. 
1. LirNF, 46. 
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Hocking's vi~N of mysticism is that it is 
the specialist in building strong individuality. It practices 
the relation of the individual to Reality, joining him to 
Reality through participation in creativity. But it also teaches 
that the individual becomes that Reality in hi mself, thereby 
making of him an authority in his community. He has practiced 
"wholeness" until he has become whole. 11He has made his solitary 
leap to God, like a tongue of flame out of the midst of the fire." 1 
He returns to be the fire itself within his community, serving 
its needs, and therefore being "social" in the true sense. For 
" he alone is utterly unsocial who refuses when his own watch 
comes to go out and meet the absolute in the darkness. Solitude, 
I say, is the essence of mysticism: and, I add, the basis of its 
supreme social importance." 2 
Mysticism and religion are two sides of the 
same thing. One represents the creative and the other the 
applicative emphasis in the making of individuals, which is 
the real business of all religion. The mystic is the prophet 
who brings back to his social group new insights about man 
and about man-making. His task is "not creating anything for 
men, but creating men, conferring on them power and freedom 
to create." 3 
1. MGHE, 402. 
2. MGHE, 403. 
3. MGHE, 485. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE FUNCTION OF MYSTICISM 
The prophet is always needed in the community, 
for it is the natural tendency for truth to run down and to 
lose its application. The "ritual" becomes a deadening influence 
and requires some fresh emphasis of faith and its application. 
But the very ambition of ritual ••• is so 
great and so difficult of realization that 
one may fairly say that it requires for its 
success a parallel development of private 
mysticism. It is for this reason that 
highly organized and highly ritualistic 
churches give rise from time to time, as 
if by reaction, to moyements emphasizing 
"personal religion." 
Mysticism, then, is a specialization in 
truth-finding and in the creation of individuality. And while 
religion and mysticism overlap, as is natural, the two being 
so closely related, mysticism is the real originator of that 
which is practiced by religion. Both of these great forces 
are seen closest together, and yet most distinctively, in the 
practice of worship. 
(l} What happens in worship . 
\~orship represents a primitive impulse toward 
self-preservation, self-placing, and toward identification of 
1. Art.(1.944), 194. 
276 
CHAPTER VII 
THE FUNCTION OF MYSTICISM 
selfhood with existence. 
In worship one touches the bottom of that 
bottomless pit of the Self and perceives 
at h~~d the real Origin of things; gaining 
not the whole of any knowledge, but the 
beginning and measure of all lmowledge. 
May not worship be described as the will 
to become, for a moment and within one's 
own measure , what existence is; or more 
simply, as the act of recalling oneself to 
being? 1 
Worship , as a specialized form of religion, 
seeks to promote the value of individuality. This is true in 
set forms of practice which include a "congregation" and it 
is true also where the individual makes of worship a private 
experience. That is , the ritual seeks to do for the whole, 
and through the whole for the individual, what private worship 
also attempts to accomplish for the individual. Even in a 
congregation, a public service, the individual can worship 
privately, and must do so. 
1. MGHE, 366. 
2. MGHE, 365. 
Worship may be regarded as an attempt to 
detach oneself from everything else in 
uniting with God. It seeks God first as an 
object, that Other of all worldly objects; 
and it seeks to join itself to that absolute 
Other. The mystic proceeds by negation; 
this and that he says, are not God; ••• The 
effort of worship measures the soul's power 
of detachment. 2 
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Worship is the best possible demonstration 
of what happens to the individual when he is re-creating him-
self in the presence of Reality. Through the worship experience 
there is released an objectivity of interest, through which the 
self is taken outside his particularity and made "universal". 
That is, through the act of worship , .the individual becomes 
an activity, a process as it were, through which his limitation 
as a particular self is givmn some additional meaning-for-
reality. It is in the worship experience that the self knows 
itself as becoming more than it before was. Its potentiality 
is made actual and its 11 idea 11 is joined to 11fact 11 by some 
action of its ovm will-to-become. And, while the action 
of the mystic at worship appears to be negative , a cutting 
away of his own positive nature, it actually is doing just 
the opposite. Its rejection is of the limiting, within the 
self and within the world. "Not this" and 11not this" is for 
the purpose of finding something which is the opposite of 
all the not-this 1s possible to experience. 
The worshipper by the nature of his 
profession, must first humble himself 
before his object, and with all his 
strength suppress his strength until 
it begins its assertions at the zero of 
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all historical content . None but God 
can reach the all-mighty will in its 
solitary origins. It is the destiny of 
religion to find that difficult and all-
important center of a just infallibility, 
which curbs and defines all absolute 
asSU£ance, wit hout disastrously abolishing 
it . 
·when the worshi pper reaches his 11 zero11 he is 
ready t o participate ~th God ( None but God can reach the 
all-mighty will in its solitary origins) . It is at the 
"zero-point" of the soul's reality that true reality is dis-
covered. It is at that point in experience that the superficial 
nature of the self is removed and the self is made ready to 
be created. 
The zero which is reached through worship, 
whether the type of worship is formal or informal, is, as 
Hocking insists , 11no i~effable zero" . :tNo one insists more 
than I that it must contain something, and can be no ineffable 
z·ero . 11 
2 The reference here is to the content of individuality 
after its negations have been completed. That the remainder 
of selfhood following negation is not ineffable ~ not ~ ~ 
points to a reality which lies at the base of individuality, 
1 . MGHE, 456. 
2. HGHE , 455. 
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which we might call the self's "attachment to life" . 
"Attachment to life is the substance of all positive wo:t:th, 
conferring upon 'contents' what quality they have . " 1 That 
is, the self , in getting rid of all of that particularity 
which has grown over it to obscure its real character, finds 
its individuality as a relation to the intimate Whole of the 
experienced Reality, which intimate Object is God , who is 
the individuality-conferring agent . 
God , who is truly said to explain man to 
himself , must explain ~ ~ myself ••• This 
is what the mystic is trying to make plain--
that the idea, as a universal(an abstract 
universal), is not sufficient for any man 
to live by. 2 
But what the worshipper finds is ~ experience 
of Reality. Idea slone is not able to express what this unique 
experience is, and idea will never be able to express it alone 
and by itself . This is what Hocking means when he says that 
the experience is no ineffable zero . It i s idea which nakes 
it appear to be an ineffable zero. But , as we have seen, 
Hocking does not despair of the articulating power of idea. 
He simply recognizes that until idea is joined to fact , by 
1 . MGHE, 203. 
2.MGHE, 4.50. 
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some original will-action, as an attachment to life and a 
passion to achieve life, the idea will be helpless. The 
fact is the living deed, as the idea is the notion of its 
value. 
(2) The value of prayer. 
If worship i s the discovery of the worth of 
individuality through a process of relating it to its source, 
i.e., to God, who must "explain me to myself", as we have 
seen, prayer is ~ communication between that source and ~ 
individual. That is, prayer is the conversation in which is 
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contained the 11explanation11 • Prayer is a response by the individual 
to the universe in terms of the soul's justifiable demand that 
an explanation of its own reality be given. 
No motive to prayer is more fundamental than 
this, '~ich in presence of such a limit of 
insight as makes the soul a subordinate in 
the universe re~ires of existence the power 
to surmount it. -:I. 
Prayer is the question asked by the individual 
of intimate Reality about its (the individual's) apparently 
"subordinate" nature and it is the answer back from Reality 
regarding the equality of the individual's worth. 
1 . MGHE, 362. 
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Prayer makes genuine once again those 
artificially held situations which have separated from 
each other as a result of the routine of living. The need of 
keeping active the channels of communication between selves 
is done by prayer. By directing the self outward, objectively, 
even to the ultimate end of existence, can one rediscover the 
rooaning of comradship wi. th God and with one 1 s fellows. For 
11 the only net that can be spread for the loving of men and 
things is the consciousness of the absolute." 1 
There is a love of life in us which we 
never let go. But that love of life, if 
we can discern its true nature, is at bottom 
a love of God: it is that mystic thread 
which 11in ground of the soul" is never broken.2 
Prayer is the giving of oneself, and the 
willingness to give, to its supreme Object, the source of its 
own worth as an individual. It also is the response which 
comes back through experience of the need which the supreme 
Object has of companionship in creativity. Prayer may be 
said to be the submission of the finite individual to a 
responsibility to create. It is his questions concerning 
that responsibility and it is the answer Which indicates 
1. MGHE, 435 • 
2. MGHE, 436. 
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the nature of the task. 
If we will return to Hocking's definition 
of religion which, we believe, contains the values sought 
here, we will see that both worship and prayer are related 
to that "passion for righteousness" which he mentions there. 
Worship is the passion for righteousness as a seeking of some 
union with Reality. Prayer is the same passion extended into 
a responsibility to create, within the individual himself, 
more of that righteousness. In worship the responsibility 
is recognized which in prayer is carried out. Prayer is 
the act of co-operation with God in the discovery of meanings 
which will be put in the place of the negations made by the 
act of worship. Prayer, then, is restoration of activity. 
It is the 11fiat 11 · of the will to join idea and fact together 
into an individuality which is commensurate with the experience 
of Reality. Prayer is the return to the world to do that 
work which worship revealed as being necessary. Prayer, then, 
is the active love of God, of self, and of fellowman. 
The love wherewith God loves the individual 
may reappear, perchance, in that love where-
vdth the individual loves God,--himself,--
and all men. 1 
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Worship and prayer, taken together, are a 
part of the process of truth-getting and individuality- build-
ing which mysticism represents. They are a considerable part 
of the total experience which is taken up and used in the 
mystic whole. That is to sa:y, the type of experience which 
is called mystical is an integrating experience, in which 
the general well-being of the individual is enhanced, emotion-
ally, intellectually, physically, and spiritually. But the 
individual cannot integrate himself alone. His private experi-
ence of Reality is not an isolated privacy. If it were such 
the individual would be desolate. His individuality is the 
result of sociability and of social responsibilities. 
The mystic in his highest moments feels 
himself bo be and believes himself to be 
in vital fellowship with Another than 
himself-and what is more, some power to 
live by does come in from somewhere. 
Mystical SfPeriences ••• permanently integrate 
the self. 
(3) Religious psychology~ the whole self 2£ mysticism. 
It would indeed be of the utmost interest to 
see how present-day clinical psychology makes use of certain 
principles known and applied by the mystic to himself. 
1. Jones, TIL, 191. 
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The "responsive listening" applied to counselees is 
a case in point . The religious counselor seeks to "unite" 
the self of the counseled person through various techniques, 
the counselee responding in such manner as to cause 11 insights 11 
to arise vri thin himself. These insights have the tendency of 
lo 
illuminating the self~ the point that he can take conscious 
charge of himself in given situations . 
The pastoral counselor is not to lead the con-
versation by choosing topics, but to follow 
with accurate responses to emotional content. 
This is responsive listening, reflecting moods 
and stimulating progress by selecting for emphasis 
what is most significant to the client.l 
That vrhich takes place within the self as he is led 
into his insights by means of "purposive listening" represents 
a t;ype of the judgment of experience, wherein the self is able 
to unite his own personal forces in the light of the help t-~hich 
the other judgments provide--judgments which take in other 
selves and the physical objects of experience as well. 
The "integrated self" is the one who operates as a 
whole, without friction between the parts, happily and 
1. Johnson, Art. (1945), 265. 
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contentedly , but ever stimulated to more happiness through 
ever greater insights. 
Because the united self is a restless self, in terms 
of a greater unity and a greater creative capacity, his 
greatest happiness is in seeking to become ever more complete 
and autonomous, working for supremacy over evil and relat ive 
ignorance . He seeks "total meaning." 
.Even for the psychiatrist there is need of some 
approach to total meaning if an effective cure is to be 
wrought in the patient. Nothing less than the ultimate can 
perform the task of integration of a self . The psychologist 
must become "metaphysical" in his objective as well as in his 
treatment. "There is no cure for mental diseases without con-
1 
sulting the total meaning of the world . " 
The religious psychotherapist is interested in confes-
sion for his patient , not merely in denying a sense of guilt. 
11The privilege of confession and forgiveness releases tension of 
guilt and restores self-respect. 112 
l. Hocking , SIG, 42 . 
2. Johnson, art . (1945), 268. 
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But Hocking puts the matter philosophically, in 
asserting the need of a pattern of sound judgment . 
Confession is an act of opening one's life 
to the eye of a true judgment ••• Confessi on 
exists because at bottom men vlish to know them-
selves as they are before a judgment of complete 
unders tanding and complete justice : they confess 
to those who most nearly reach that ideal , or 1.JhO 
can most nearly represent it . The valid confessor 
must stand in loco Dei , v1here Deus means all 
morality as well as all science . l 
Both the religious psychotherapist and the philosopher 
must recognize the autonomy of the self . The individual 
seeking to be 11 cured 11 must ; t o some extent, be thrown back on 
his O'.m resources , for 11no ~ without §: conscience has any hope 
of being integrated . 11 2 That is, Hhatever rejection of disunity 
11must come from the patient ' s own conscience, not from any 
external rebuking agency. 113 The counselor must 11draw out 11 of 
the patient the judgment of self-integration . 
It is meaningless , in terms of the total self, to suppose, 
as some psychologi sts do , that any partial i nterest or emphasis 
within the self can be self- determining , unless the self is so 
divided that he can discover no self- conscious meaning. 
l . Ho cking , SIG, 43 . 
2. Ibid., 45 . 
3. Ibid . , 45 . 
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Leuba holds that the love which draws the mystic is a 
derivative. of sex. 
The thesis which we shall maintain is that 
the delights said ~Y our great mystics to 
transcend everything which the world and the 
senses can procure,1involves some activity of the sexual organs. 
Hocking criticizes Leuba in the following manner: 
I cannot but believe that this apparent con-
flict and incompatibility of motive has been 
created by Leuba himself, thr~ugh the view 
he takes of the divine love. 
But Hocking agrees in part with Leuba in hold-
ing that it is possible for the self, either as immoral (in 
the sense of being a sexually perverted individual) or as moral 
( in depending too exclusively on God), to become disintegrated 
through dissipation. 
This apparent conflict which is evident in 
things partial is also possible in things 
total: it entangles the mystic not less and 
not more than other men. The love of God 
then becomes a path of dissipation, antago-
nizing moral ambition; but it is not true 
that this is its natural character. 3 
1. Leuba, PRM, 138. 
2. MGHE, 574. 
3. MGHE, 575 • 
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By "things total" Hocking does not mean the "total 
self , 11 for that \WUld be a contradict i on i n terms . The 
total self is already _,integrated and balanced between his 
reflexive and his trans cendent natures . Hhat he means, 
apparently, is that the self 1-1ho attempts to remain remote 
from his world of exper i ence is 11 total 11 in the sense that he 
has 111>ri thdrawn" i nto God and is content to remain there . Such 
conditi on as that , from the point of vieu of psychology , vrould 
represent a pathological condition , just as , from the point of 
vievl of mysticism, i t would represent a judgment out of relation 
to other necessary j udgments in the total pattern of the judg-
ment of experience . In other 1-10rds , it would represent an 
abstraction. 
We are bound to defi ne the motive of mysticism 
by its normal condition , if it has one--even 
though this normal condition has never yet been 
realized . And vre are still more bound to give 
the mystics credit f or their best achiivements , 
and for their deepest discr i minations. 
That is to say , there is an ideal in mysticism Hhich 
must be recogni zed even though it is not r ealized , for the 
l . Hocking , HGHE , 575. 
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mystics themselves recognize their own incompleteness, and 
in doing so they stand above t heir mm present successes. 
The love of God is the one natural i nstinct of 
man : worship is the one deed which ansvmrs as 
an echo all other deeds in history.l 
Here , in essence, is the ans\oJer to Leuba and to the 
partial self at one and the same time. The moral self is 
that one 'vJho sees his duty to himself through his obligation 
t o Other-Self and to God, the partial self, determining to be 
a whole self, sees his own need of a subjective-objective 
totality for himself. Neither one may fully achieve his ideal , 
but the fact that he knows that ideal is to some extent its 
achievement. 
Both kinds of "illness" are referred to the judgment 
of experience, in which the ideal can be found, whether or not 
the actual fulfillment of it can be accomplished. 
A solution to the above lies in the definition of God 
which Hocking gives in the follovTing: 11Iv ay we not say that 
God is the lavt of normal mental life? 112 That is, if God is 
such a nla\-111 which represents the 11norrnal mental life, 11 vie are 
1. Hocki ng , HGHE, 577. 
2. Hocking , SIG, 49. 
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back to the original position which we have held belongs to 
Hocking's mysticism, namely, that the judgment of experience 
determines the whole "substance of things hoped for; the evi-
dence of things not seen." In it resides all of the possibility 
and the actual 1.rhich is in the self. It is the SUJ!l!!lum bonum of 
the intellect as well as of the spirit of the self, greater than 
which there is nothing which the self possesses . As the self 
takes his place within its frame he makes the discovery of his 
potentialities, and as he adjusts to it he discovers how his will 
is made powerful through it, how, in fact, he can be a self -full 
and ultimate entity, at least potentially, if not actually . But 
it is his potential , once he is able to discover it, which deter-
mines his "normalcy ." 
There are three types of mystics, two of which represent 
"sick souls. 11 The tv10 \·Tho are sick may be called (1) selfish , 
and ( 2) selfless. The heal thy self 1-1e may call, in terms of the 
11will-to- po1trer 11 principle, the self-full self, the one who kno1.rs 
himself in relation to all other selves, and to God , and who 
co-operates with them all through the only whole-instrument 
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available to the whole self , namely , the judgment of experience. 
Hocking 's mysticism can be called 11 practical 11 for the 
reason that it serves the whole self, leaving nothing out of 
consideration whatsoever. The body is included in the construction 
of the self, as is mind also. But the entire world of experience 
also "belongs 11 to the self , and in it all other selves, v1ho are 
kno\m to be "other knot-Jers of physical nature. 11 And in addition 
to everything else, God is brought i nto the equation, as object of 
intercourse and as meaning which is contained in the judgment of 
experience . The mystic has entered into the "council" of Reality. 
In some way he is admitted to the council of 
the maker of this world of things. He has 
become an understander of the heart of it. 
And in evidence of his truth he is able to 
walk about among things and men ,--do we say 
as an alien?--on the contrary, as one for the 
first time fully present and at home, able to 
recognize himself and God in vlhatever decl ares 
itsel~, ablr to open himself to the whole of 
exper1ence. 
The "mind" which is attributed to the finite self, 
generally speaking, is not to be equated \-Ji th the self, for it is 
permissive of "divisions" within the self , is itself split off 
into "faculties" such as become hierarchical, assuming an abstract 
1 . Hocking, MGHE , 388. 
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subjectivity, as though the self could "have a self" instead 
of being~ self. \~ile functionally such divisions can be 
useful, practically they become contradictory and the ground 
of illusion and error \-Ihich find their place in those forms of· 
judgment which are irrational by comparison \..rith the complete 
f orm of the judgment of experience . In the complete form there 
is room for all partials, those divisions within consciousness 
and the self which, left to themselves, destroy the unity of 
the real self. 
Practical mysticism is more than any partial or series 
of partials; it is the whole self, dynamic and functional , 
yielding itself to the physical on the one side and to the 
mental on the other, but uniting them into a "concrete" and 
practical self. The "mind" which practical mysticism recognizes 
is one of purpose, not a mere abstraction in terms of theoretical 
reason. It is for this reason that Hocking 's self cannot be iden-
t i fied with any form of "mentalism" which makes of the physical 
world a mere pantomime of reality, nor can it be identified with 
an 11 ego 11 which is merely finite or which is in any isolated from 
Other Hind and from God. The value of pract ical mysticism lies 
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in this, that it makes of the world of things , of other selves, 
and of God one great living community, bound together by common 
ties of purpose. 
Practical mysticism is neither exclusively "negative" 
nor 11posi ti ve" vii th r egard to Reality. The negative and the 
positive are phases of one onera.tion . 11Thus mystic experience 
1 
comes within the range of law, ••• within some law of rhythm." 
Effort and effortlessness , self- seeking and Other-Self 
seeking , love of self and love of God--all play a part in the 
"alternation" bet\-.reen parts and the whole , until the self is 
finally ident ified , in his own purpose , '1-Ti th that ultimate 
purpose which defines Reality. 
With the idea of God , one loves the world ; and 
then Hith the idea of the world , one loves God 
again,--and the two loves , or ambitions , are of 
one substance , though they involve alternations 
in the history of the empirical '\>Till. 2 
But these "alternations in the history of the empirical 
will" ~the self, once he has discovered his own self- meaning 
in terms of that kind of rationality vlhich is more than rational-
ism, abstract and logically mechanical. "Thus each .aspect of life 
1. Hocking, NGHE , 391. 
2. Ibid., 424. 
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1 
apart from its alternate becomes a mechanism ." . It is this 
mechanism, in ideas, in logic , and i n life that Hocking in-
tends to break down until they will not break any farther and 
then to build them up again i nto one functional unity, a single 
operation , \·Therein is variety enough to give interest and par-
ticularity but where there is at the same time a comprehensive 
togetherness to permit the free fl0\·1 of universality in it all . 
It is this exchange between the particular and the universal 
which makes for the true individual. 
Practical myst icism reveals the true nature of Reality 
as being like the self--neither abstract or mechanical , par-
t icular or universal in the extreme, and therefore empty . "For 
the life of each is that it may lose itself, from time to tline, 
in the life of the other. 112 That is, the full and complete life 
is the one \-Jhich participates in and is also the object of 
participation in return, of all those units of a common purpose 
'1-Thich "communication" yields to us through a full pattern of 
experience in thought, the combination of which is given t hrough 
the lived-through judgment of experience. 
1. Hocking , £.1GHE, 426. 
2 . Ibid ., 427 . 
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B. It is truth through the totality of experience. 
If we have been correct in our assumption 
that Hocking means by mysticism the total summation of all 
that experience which presents Reality, accompanied with 
all its meaning for self-realization, with the self in actual 
membership in a world of rationally understandable pt~ose , 
then we must be led to this thought, namely, that mysticism, 
generally speaking, is religion by inclusion, as mysticism 
~ 1!! E,hilosophy by inclusion. However, these statements 
are true only when we view Hocking's mysticism as process of 
knowledge through the judgment of experience and as functional 
in application. That is to say, in mysticism the application of 
reason, while used extensively, is not formal . The use of 
reason, as that of idea, is practical, i .e., reason follm~s 
the direction of experience , which latter is "metaphysical" 
or ultimate in a sense which reason and idea are not. Both 
ideas and facts are matters of experience, each as one part 
of a whole which experience represents. 
However , we must recognize that the more formal 
disciplines of both religion and philosophy are ne~er~the~less 
active upon mysticism as criteria of its own judgments. 
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Especially is this fact noticeable in connection with the 
judgment of experience, the prL~ry operating principle of 
mysticism in Hocking ' s thought . In the judgment of experience 
there is evident a formal arrangement of the several separate 
judgments, without which the ~ judgment could not be deduced. 
Here we see that the informal is dependent on the formal . But 
·t.here is much more evidence that the pattern of myst ic experience 
is regulated, as it were, by the formal 11 contenttt disciplines . 
For example, ideas and facts are "formal" concepts used in mystic 
patterns, used in its process. Likewise in religion, the more 
formal concepts, such as God, worship, and prayer, are in them-
selves, although also included ~ ~ experience, are regulatory 
of the process itself . 
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The practical expression of formal religion, though, 
tends to become too particular, too local, and too factual to 
satisfy mysticism. It loses contact with reality in proportion 
as it loses its perspective . The same is true of formal philos-
ophy. The human self becomes a competitor , as it were , of God. 
In the dealings of the formal disciplines the hard lines of 
the formal are imparted to the individual. But in mysticism 
the frame of experience, remaining generally informal, can 
give rise to the real and true self, a self-creative entity. The mystic 
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enterprise gives him status in the whole of Reality. That is, 
mysticism provides the frame out of which fact arises. Without 
that frame of reference the fact, just as fact, is powerless . 
In order that it may serve the world as fact it requires that 
something other than itself stand as its basis of operation. 
Likewise with all particulars. By themselves they are of little 
significance, but they can become meaningful, through some agency 
which holds wider intercourse with the meaningful. Through some 
other agency "the particulars which environ us prove to be such as 
we can clothe little by little with the meanings forwhich they 
have waited. 111 
Hysticism is the prophetic in informal religion as con-
trasted with the sacerdotal in formal religion. It knows God's 
will and seeks to enforce that will upon the individual. In this 
respect it i s authoritative, but it is so from the outside, seeking 
no private judgments whatsoever. It is §. total judgment. 
1. MGHE, 1;17. 
2. IvlGHE, 511. 
The prophetic consciousness is possible in the 
same way that reflexion is possible, in the same 
way that a total present judgment upon the world 
is- possible ••• The prophet is but the mystic in 
control of the forces of history, declaring their 
necessary outcome: the mystic in action is the 
prophet. 2 
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It is something similar to what Hocking means by the 
prophet in action, or the prophetic will, that is meant by mys-
ticism. It operates within religion but it comes to religion 
from a source other-than religion, an "environment" which lies 
around religion. Speaking of this environment in connection with 
the prophetic spirit Hocking says: 
Every prophetic will is something of an 
environment for every other; as the group 
widens, and pervades human life with its 
principle, it becomes, as an environment, 
more adequate to its task, and may reach 
complete adequacy.l 
But how does Hocking's mysticism conform to his own general 
criterion that "mysticism is strongest where it is most universal"? 
Let us explore Hocking's mysticism from this standpoint, with a 
special reference to religion and its influence upon religion. 
Further, let us attempt to see whether Hocking actually conforms to 
the usual interpretations given to mysticism. Is he a mystic in the 
traditional sense? 
First, as to his attitude toward the great mystics and to 
their findings. Of them he says: 
1. MGHE, 519. 
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The position of mankind toward the whole wonder-
ful history of mysticism would be vastly improved 
if attention were given to the extent to which the 
reports of the great mystics corroborate one another 
and indicate a common nature in the paths proposed; 
and if it were further shown how deeply the more 
extraordinary varieties of mystical experience are 
akin to very normal and, indeed, inescapable exper-
iences of men everywhere. 1 
In what manner does Hocking concur with the findings of 
the mystics, which he takes to be 11most universal"? Our best method 
of trying to know how he does concur with them may prove to be by 
letting him speak for himself. The following, then, will deal with 
Hocking's interpretation of mysticism, according to the manner in 
which he accepts the universal truth which mysticism yields . 
Accordingly, the mystic is a better "logician" than is the 
so-called non-mystic, or the one who approaches truth from non-
mystical ways. ~fuen someone says (of God) is it so, yes or no? The 
mystic replies that it is so, but not either yes or no-- not in terms 
of what is meant by a conceptual yes or no. 
But the mystic is a better logician than all these. 
He has, in fact, made a fundamental logical dis-
covery-- that there is an important middle course 
between yes and no. If you ask the mystic whether 
there is a God, yes or no, he ought not to answer 
without knowing What you mean. by 11God 11 ; at which 
point he should say, 11 No, not that God. 11 ••• He 
stoutly affirms 11 that 11 God exists while denying 
that he knows 11what 11 God is. 2 
1. Art. (1944), 189. 
2. Art. (1944), 188. 
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In his knowledge "that" God is, the mystic is expressing 
a "universal", a universal which has in it some of' the 11marks 11 of' 
a mystic as set forth by James. Here we see something that looks 
very much like 11 inef'f'ability 11 • But what appears to be inef'f'able 
becomes clarified through further experience until it becomes 
"noetic"; that is, it is some kind of' knowledge, not yet ready 
f'or the public market and f'or public consumption. 
Let the mystic, then, be certain of' his "the truth," 
his 11God 1 s truth, 11 and do not enviously require him 
at every turn to say what the truth contains. No 
one insists more than I that it must contain some-
thing, and can be no pure inef'f'able zero, but in 
human language we must be willing to wait f'or1its deposit, and even to put up with much error. 
What Hocking appears to mean here is that until the "logic" 
as used by the mystic has had an opportunity to broaden out upon 
the depth which it manifests, in experience, it is not ready to be 
made public : it still is urivate knowledge. As private, such truth 
or knowledge as the mystic may have before him, being partial in the 
sense that it is not fully integrated into the f'ull pattern of' ex-
perience, it is not ready f'or conceptualization. What knowledge it 
has is as meaniqg for the whole of' any finite expression or use to 
which it will be put. 
1. MGHE, 455. 
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1 Hocking is not against James' catalogUe of "marks", but 
he would not consider them as in any sense adequate in revealing 
the nature of mysticism. This fact is implied in the whole pro-
cess of the mystical dialectic which Hocking gives us in the 
judgment of experience, which is, practically speaking, the means 
whereby the end is given its differentiating makes wij:,hin the 
structure of everyday living. In this relation Hocking speaks as 
follows: 
Now, practical mysticism continues to exist 
only because men in considerable numbers have 
come to believe that there is a mode of exper-
ience which can properly be called "an exper-
ience of God" or "an exnerience of union with 
God, 11 and that this mod~ of experience is (1) 
of the utmost practical importance and (2) 2 attainable by following the right discipline. 
No_w it is our contention here that the 11right discipline" 
of which Hocking speaks, which can clarify the knowledge and the 
certainty within the mystical experience, is to be found in the 
dialectic of experience itself which Hocking has worked out so 
carefully, if not too explicitly, in his general writings. That 
he has used this method in his own treatment of philosophy we have 
1. James, VRE, 370-372 (Ineffability, noetic quality, transiency, 
passivity, all of \>Thich are transformed in Hocking's judgment 
of experience) 
2. Art. (1944), 188. 
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attempted to justify in what has preceded this section, and we 
now are attempting to show how it is used when applied to 
"practical religion". 
Using Hocking's criterion of universalit~, we may say 
that by "universality" Hocking must be understood to mean that 
which comes as a result of "right discipline", of the right kind 
of logic, rather than as the result of a "trial and error", hit 
or miss kind of approach. In other words, the "insight" which the 
mystic receives is something "come from above", a truly transcendent 
outpouring upon the finite selfhood of the world, upon all those 
selves so organized within themselves so as to receive it. 
The characteristic assertion of mysticism in 
all its forms is that there is a vitally im-
portant and nonconceptual experience of God 
available to men who meet its conditions. 1 
To some extent all ~do deal mystic~.ly. With reference 
to the above statement, Hocking says: 
The simplest and most usual expression of this 
thesis is that all men at all times are directl~ 
dealing with God, whether they know it or not. 
But the point we wanted to make here, in connection with 
Hocking 's use of mysticism, is that such knowledge as the mystic has 
1. Art . (1944), 189. 
2. Ibid, 189. 
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(some of which is available to all men at all times) is the result 
of a rational form which we have been trying to call and to define 
as being "transcendent". We have been trying to put across the 
notion that Hocking asserts the validity of mystical truth as a 
direct result of this "transcendent" quality, which we have thought 
was evident in "right discipline" interpreted as the judgment of 
experience. If we are justified in this position we free Hocking 
from any taint of the "consensus argument," which we believe can be 
done. Hocking, so we have attempted to say in several connections, 
has defended himself against this criticism. 
Such agreement, then, as \ole find among the mystics does not 
result from a consensus criterion. It results from the mediating 
influence of ~ right discipline. This discipline which mediates 
t. P"; ... tov..l 
truth, we have been tryihg/\throughout this investigation of Hocking's 
kind of mysticism, constitutes, we believe, a new and important inter-
pretation of how such universal truth can be obtained. In using his 
kind of mediating principle, Hocking does not resort to the common 
practice among traditional mystics to employ a system of esoteric 
"steps" or stages from man upward to the Absolute or God. That is, 
God, as conceived by Hocking, is not transcendently independent of 
sense and sense experience. 
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1 
Marquette may help us to clarify what we mean. In 
reference to the universal truth which the mystics have given to 
the world, he speaks of the method used, which, as we have noted, 
is contrary to Hocking. 
There are some general features of' the reports 
of mystical experience which have achieved a 
sort of' definable clarity because of' the many 
similar and cumulative evidences given by almost 
countless mystics from all times, belonging to 
all races, and most of' whom knew nothing of' the 
faiths of' mystic schools other than their own ••• 
The first great fact acknowledged is that there 
are two species of' mystical experience, those 
dealing ~dth objective perceptions and those of 
a purely subjective nature. The first are con-
stituted by the perceptions of metaphysical 
objects, angels, lights, Divine persons, effulgent 
and radiant glories and other undescribable entities. 
In their higher forms they lead to active contempla-
tion. The others consist of the consciousness of the 
progressive attenuation of the limits and character-
ising attributes of the soul until it finally empties 
itself as it were in the Infinite, in self-obliterating 
passive ecstasy. 2 
'l'his is not at all what Hocking means by mysticism. Such 
"progressive attenuation" as is mentioned in the above is contrary 
1. ICM, 188-190. Note: In this section Marquette summarizes the 
traditional schools of mysticism and finds them in accord in the 
way in which they "intermediate" between earth and heaven. 
2. Marquette, ICM, 188-189. Note: Here also is the passivity which 
is characteristic of most mysticism and which, although not 
totally lacking in Hocking, is given a positive and active in-
terpretation. In him it is 11 effortless vrill 11 , activity of the 
subjective and objective together. (MGHE, 437). 
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to the union of the finite with the Infinite that we find in 
Hocking 's 11-.ridened empiricism", which is an empiricism which 
comes within the reign of reason at every point. Hocking does 
not posit a non-rational element in his mystical "series". That 
is, in the series which Hocking uses we find all references to the 
so-called subjective content of the individual selfhood related to 
t he objectivity of things in the world and to other selves, not as 
more content of subjectivity but as that external to that content 
which can stand as its opposite and give it meaning. This is what 
he means when he speaks of the necessity of uniting all types of 
possible objects (and all possible types also) into a meaningful 
pattern of experience which yields rational value. 
Also , in Hocking there is no "silent night of the soul111 
where self is lost. This fact is brought before us as a general 
emphasis in Hocking, but there is a specific reference to it in 
connection with the Buddhist seeks Nirvana for the purpose of gaining 
some positive values, values which are of worth to practical living. 2 
1. Note: In worship, as an act of surrender , we find Hocking 
meaning, not negation and renunciation of self, but the 
purification of the self in terms of the meaning of Infinite 
selfhood. Cf., HGHE, 419-423. 
2. Cf., HNR, 434, where love of power becomes metaphysical in 
its status. 
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In other words, Hocking does not "detach" the soul from the body, 
nor the spirit from the world of things. The statement, "My king-
dom is not of this world" becomes to Hocking a challenge to make 
this world according to the ideal of the heavenly kingdom. There 
is ample evidence in Hocking to support the notion that we are in 
the business of building this world according to a process of 
transformed values. 
It is an evidence of the rational content of Hocking's 
mysticism when he insists that the aim of religion is to find the 
corunon denominator of religion, its most general and universal 
qualities and to make them apply to humanity. And it also is evi-
dence that this world is to be made over in terms of some recognizable 
standards of perfection-- finite selves in cooperation with the Infinite 
Self, working through the world ground-- to eliminate evil and error, 
which serve as a means to an end which is caught up in Hocking's 
interpretation of mysticism.1 
In the mysticism which Hocking considers to be "practical" 
there is no place for any division between this present material world 
and the values it represents, especially in terms of persons or real 
1. Note : This is the emphasis in LRWF, especially the chapter 
Ways to ~ World Faith. And HGHE, section on Evil, especially 
pp. 485-514. 
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selves as they are seen to be bound up with the world. Such 
"universals" as mysticism in general has envisioned, as being 
separate from the actual world in which we live and out of which 
grow our experiences, are .in no wise a part of Hocking's system. 
Such universals as he recognizes are all bound-in with his system 
of selves, in which we find material things and ideas caught up 
into a metaphysical type of experience which yields values which 
can be expressed in terms of Cbd, the world, the things in the 
world, and the finite self. 
Hocking does recognize a type of transcendent substance 
as the quality of the physical world, which, however, is n9t a 
merely undifferentiated "cosmic substance" but which is differen-
tiated into the social objects and their ground. Here the trans-
cendent spirit, as it is displayed in the thing-objects of the 
world of sense, reveals itself as meaning-for-self. However, the 
line between finite and infinite grows ever thinner in this relation-
ship. J11eanings and will-to-be are closely i dentified. Yet one can 
never say that the S-object, the finite selfhood, is ever fully 
absorbed into Cbd, even though there is a union of the two required 
in the dialecti c. Such union as there is, is a union of function 
in meaning instead of an identity of concept. The function and 
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meaning, as found in Hocking 's judgment of experience , becomes 
an action of deed and of moral purpose . Thus we see the iden-
tification of the finite as one of reason-in-experience, 1.rherein 
the self and its action (its purposes and its will) become the 
ideal judgment. But it is the judgment of the finite action and , 
although containing within it the ttthat 11 of the transcendent 
reality, this finite action becomes the 1rwhat 11 and the differen-
tiating activity of Reality. The two realities are bound together 
to make what Hocking means by Reality, just as the self is composed 
of mind and body together. It is this kind of union which is 
significant in Hocking . 
To summarize this position we may say that Hocking 
recognizes no mediating series in the divine-human relationship, 
except that which is given through idea-in-experience and as found 
in the judgment of experience. In this setting there is no loss of 
the finite self as it works in cooperation (through the judgment) 
vli th the Infinite. 
Hocking's empirical type of mysticism does for mysticism 
(and for idealism in philosophy, and for religion) what Royce's 
"abstract universal" as a concept of the meaning of mysticism could 
not do . Of the nconcrete 11 type of the absolute in his kind of 
mysticism, Hocking says: 
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The true experimental spirit is t hat of the 
mystic, who regar ds every fixed habit as ten-
tative, and every conceptual standard as 
provisional, not because there is nothing 
absolute, but because there is: and because--
since there is this absolute standard-- every 
conceptualized mental property must recurrently1 be brought to court to bear comparison ~rlth it. 
A further difference bet~reen Hocking and the traditional 
mystic, yet in general support of his truth, is in the i nterpre-
tation of the nature of God. To the traditional mystic God remains 
transcendent and separate from this world. Man must surrender him-
self and yield to God to achieve the rapport and union which is 
required. Speaking in connection of the traditional mystic, 
Narquette says: 
For most mystics, the Absolute is perfectly 
independent of the Universe. itJhereas the Holy 
Trinity, in its differentiated characteristics 
may be considered as coincident with the sum 
total of the achievements of chronic duration, 
the Absolute was not before the Alpha, nor will 
be after the Omega of Cosmic Being, but transcends 
being and non-being. 2 
Hocking, on the other hand, whether speaking of the 
Absolute (which he does not equate fully with God) or of God does 
not place the transcendence in any place other than the realm of 
1. TOP , 445. 
2. Marquette , ICM, 199. 
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experience itself, vlhich keeps. the Infinite in close working 
relation with man. This is the transforming power of mysticism 
which Hocking calls 11t..rorld making" . 
It is this close relation to and with the world through 
a dialectic t.rhich is fully consonant with both finite and infinite, 
with the transcendent Idea and experience, vihich gives to religion 
its dynamic . It also is this practical working-relation vnthin 
the world of experience which makes for the principle of univer-
sality in religion. It is this principle of universality which 
Hocking seeks to put into practice in producing a "reconception" 
1 
of Christianity. 
Hocking does not consider that God is 11hidden 11 from 
reason as do most of the traditional mystics . For Hocking reason 
has no value apart from experience, but in experience it has great 
practical value, for theory as well as for practice. This latter 
view is perhaps implied in most of mysticism but it is not vmrked 
out. As Kant found the 11limits 11 of reason, so the mystics, too , 
l. Cf., LRVJF, 190-208, t.rherein the pri nciple of "reconception 11 as 
an on-going function of dialectic works within religions of the 
t·TOrld , as well as in Christianity, and where something original 
develops out of the experience of religion, which serves to 
illustrate the judgment of experience in a practical demonstration. 
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have found its limitation and therefore have tended to discount 
its val ue as an aid to ultimate truth. For example Boehme says 
concerning it: 
Reason is an existential life whose basis rests 
upon temporal beginning and end , and it cannot 
come to the supersensual ground where God may 
be understood. For , even though it may thus 
conceive of itself in this world, discovering 
in its self- cont emplation no other kind of 
ground , it still does experience within itself 
a longing for a higher ground where it may find 
peace . 1 
In Boehme it is only by the abandoning of the rational 
principle that harmony and peace can come to the soul . In Hocking 
reason is not 11abandoned 11 but , on the contrary, is picked up and 
used as a means and a help which the self has discovered can effect 
a union of himself and God. It is by means of differentiations in 
the nature of God himself that man can develop his experience of 
his world to the point of knowing the inmost nature of that world. 
And here again we notice a f'undarnenta~ difference bet,.reen the 
traditional mystic and the mysticism which functions practically 
in the world as set forth by Hocking . For example , the traditional 
mystic seeks to bring himself , by himself, into a condition of 
. 1 . Boehme , WTC, 161-162. 
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"absorption" into the eternal principle o.f life. Hocking, on 
the other hand, in recognition of the natural inclination o.f 
the soul to union with the eternal principle, does not "abstract" 
the individual from his world, but keeps a union with other 
.finite selves, and the world, for 11he must assert ••• his unity 
vrith his human spiritual context." And "unity with the Absolute 
becomes significant in proportion as the worshipper is first one 
1 
with the spirit of God as already established in the world ." 
Hocking does not negate the nature of the self as he 
brings it into relation with the Infinite, but he does seek to 
unite it. However, such unity as he brings into it is by vmy of 
a unity in the world of total experience. The self, according to 
Hocking, is no abstraction. Likewise, the Absolute (and God) is 
no abstraction, for the one does come into existence apart from 
the other, functionally . 
It is the separation of self from other-self, from the 
world, and from God (by way of a negation of the self, by itself) 
which gives rise to the "mystery" in mysticism, which is abnoxious 
2 
to Hocking and Which has given rise to a prejudice against mysticism. 
1 . MGHE , 522n. 
2. MGHE , XVIII . Note: This 11 zero-•rorshipping mysticism" is to be 
rejected, according to Hocking. 
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One might almost call this kind of mysticism superstitious, out 
of which it might be conceivable that much of the superstitious 
in religion has come. For example, that only God exists and has 
true being. This is a denial of the real nature of the self, in 
the only manner in which we can understand self , with mind and 
body (something through \..rhich to express its selfhood). If God 
is thus so entirely alone as to have no others about him, he is 
of no consequence to us and can have no meaning for us. Any 
reference to such a God can do little else than put us under a 
spell of fear. This, one gathers, is the reaction to be expected 
from Boehme's "dialectic", so different from that of Hocking's. 
Boehme's dialectic begins and ends in the unity of God . 
The selves in the world (such as ourselves) are the result of some 
movement vrlthin God's own soul to differentiate himself to himself, 
in order that he might come to some knowledge of himself . Man 
(the finite self) seeks by whatever means he can to return to God, 
thus to reunify the godhead, which, as a result of the "revelations" 
to man, have caused him to want to return to peace and rest in God. 1 
This is not the thing at all which Hocking supports, and it is 
nothing which can inject reality into the religious situation, for 
1. Boehme, TiiC , cf., 161-194. 
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it is so unreal. 
Hocking uses the concept of God differently, drawing 
upon him for the certainty which will give certainty to the 
world. "God is kno\-m as that of which I am primaril y certain; 
and bei ng certain, am certain of self and of my world of men and 
men' s objects . 111 Against the abstraction of Boehme's kind of God, 
Hocking says: 
He who loves the whole has resources beyond 
himself in his own evil hour. But the question 
of that particular evil is not met; one is 
simply lifted above it or borne t hrough it by 
his attachment to the absolute . One is colsoled, 
but not restored to confidence in the worth of 
his own action . Our principle has no launching 
po,..rers; its attitude toward evil and misfortune 
is essentially passive: it is always one of 
comfort after the fact, never of adoption before 
the fact . 2 
Boehme 1 s position vii th respect to the unity of God can 
produce no real benefits in an active and creative situation. Life 
will simply have to pass this kind of program by. God can be no 
such abstraction and at the same time contain meaning for our kind 
of living. 
·1. lvlGHE, 296. 
2 . t'IGHE, 500 . 
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Hocking's mysticism includes not only the whol e of God 
but the whole of man as well. It sets God into the worl d, and 
man into the -vmrld as well. His is a world-centered mysticism. 
But his world is internally meaningful, which meaning has onto-
l ogical value, values which man helps to make, because of the 
fact of a real participation of I nfinity in the midst of the 
f inite, and vice ~· 
The religion which Hocking's mysticism implies (and makes 
cogent) is one of quietness and of deed, but of 11power11• Speaking 
of it, he gives us the fol lowing: 
Unless vTe can discern at its silent work in 
human affairs this power, self-consciously 
eternal, actively communicating its own scope 
to the feeble deeds, the painful acquirements, 
the values, the loves and hopes of men, we have 
no right to such faith as we habitually assume. 
And without such faith there is for us no val id 
religion. 1 
One has the feeling that the primary thing which Hocking 
gets from the traditional mystic is the assurance of some basic 
certainty with respect to God in the world of human affairs and of 
the worth of that certainty, in a framework of experience, to the 
unification of selfhood, not only of the individual self but of all -
1. HGHE, 524. 
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selfhood. In this kind of inter-self 11 corrnnunication11 there is 
"redemption" and the possibility of immortality (which has to 
1 be made). 
The one thing, above all others, which Hocking seems to 
contribute to philosophy and religion through his interpretation 
of mysticism is the notion that originality is the premium which 
living sets upon life itself. The~ to this originality, for 
every individual self, is provided by that chief instrument of the 
soul , the judgment of experience. Out of the action of the judgment, 
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caught up in the deeds of living, found within the act of "predication", 
is a common essence of certainty, distilled from the act of living 
(which is itself a predication) which is called the Absolute . Each 
forward action-movement of living has its backward reference to its 
own internal certainty (already taken up into itself by the predica-
tion inherent in life), but which moves it forward in turn to ever-
new understanding. From the ever-new and creative, the original 
knowledge , will be something added to the certainty already at hand. 
2 This is the ,judgment of experience, and this is Hocking's mysticism. 
1. Cf., TOP, 450. 
2 • . Note : In an effort to assist this investigator to grasp what 
his mysticism is like Hocking sent pamphlets on "Fact and 
Destiny" to show the empirical nature of his approach to 
mysticism, and the meaning of the judgment of experience. 
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The amount of certainty, and the amount of "revelation" are 
infinite, to the extent that experience itself is infinite. 
~~at does this kind of mysticism have tb.udo with 
religion? Hocking, we ca.n believe, would say that it is the 
foundation ~ ~ promise of a.ll religion ~ is redemptive 
and that is universal. In this kind of setting, so he implies 
generally, is the possibility of all the thrill of creativity 
itself. To be found in this pattern is to be seen at worship, 
in the search of ~ ~ for the best, and this puts "zest" 
into the doing. 
Yve have been looking for the function of mysticism in 
religion and, just as in the case of philosophy, we found 
religion in mysticism instead, which we have come to believe is 
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the only way we ca.n ~Hocking's mysticism. And if we are asking 
where we may find mysticism itself, the only answer which we can 
obtain from Hocking is that it is found in the act of livir..g and 
of being, and of becoming !: ~. 
2. The function o£ Hocking's Slsticism compared. 
A. With that of Rufus Jones. 
Hocking's mysticism is thought-filled and idea connecting. 
Its setting is this present world, but with a view to its rebuilding 
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in terms of an ever better world . The amount of knowledge 
possible to man is inexhaustible . Such knowledge as man has, 
when coupled-in with the wholes of experience, can produce 
understandings of Reality. It is experience which provides 
the basis of the understanding which man develops concerning 
Reality. But it is an experience which is "thought filled, not 
thought empty. " That is, such experience as is valid for that 
initial insight into the meaning of Reality is a related experience, 
an experience of wholes, therefore able to comprehend the ~fuole. 
Hocking's mysticism, as we have found, is double acting. One 
action is inward-outward, and the other is outward- inward . What 
we have referred to as the "inward-outward" action provides the 
ground of immediacy. Its opposite action, the "outward-inward" 
emphasis, is the basis of "revelation" and o.f "creativity". This 
latter action is mediated through the effort of predication in its 
outreach to more evidence of Reality, but always carrying with it 
its solid ground of certainty. The mediation is possible through 
the hold which knowledge has of the immediate, but only as it is 
realized that such knowledge as is immediate directs the attention 
to something which is not contained within immediacy. That is, 
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according to Hocking, the merely immediate is a good starting place, 
but it is no satisfactory place · .to end. By its very nature the 
immediate drives the self to further discoveries-- especially to 
the discovery of other selves, which are found only through a world 
context. Such outward motion, therefore, as is contained in Hocking's 
mysticism looks toward the ethical in the ideals and the moral in the 
actions which concern other-selfhood. Hocking's mysticism, by being 
something more than immediate, is moral. 
Hocking's primary emphasis in his mysticism, and thus also 
in his philosophy and his religion, is outwa_~-reaching from ~ 
inward base. He uses thought combined with experience to discover 
the "raw material" which can produce more of thought and more of 
experience (but never is thought separated from experience; the two 
are but modes of action and of meaning within the judgment of exner-
ience). Thus his mysticism is occupied, with every aspect of Reality 
which is possible to an empiricism which is sufficiently "widened" 
to receive it. The follo\dng quotation i ndicates the direction which 
such an empiricism will take when active in the "mediating" process: 
Thought is occupied as a rule ,,J'i th a stuff which 
is not thought. What could thinking mean without 
a topic , a grist as from outside ordinarily supplied 
by the sense? As cognitive beings we can have no 
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quarrel i.Ji th the supply-- we accept; as 
practical beings we never simply accept ••• 
To alter fact is not to escape fact. The 
degree to which fact is alterable, and by us , 
is itsel f a fact . Our problem is this unremoved 
enveloping factuality, the cosmic web into which 
all our struggling, shattering, reshaping more 
deeply enmesh us . What if anything our philos-
ophies do with fact is today the chief1test of their grasp of their proper business . 
Inasmuch as our primary concern in this investigation is 
wit h Hocking 's type of mysticism we will continue to view it. 
But, using Hocking's own method of seeing what a thing is by also 
seeing what it is not, we can serve our interest in Hocking by 
turning to some other person's approach to the function which is 
considered normal to mysticism. The person whose mysticism \-Till 
be used in this connection is that of Rufus M. Jones, it having 
been selected because of the fact that its emphasis is different 
from the emphasis in Hocking. 
It is next to impossible to obtain from Hocking a strict 
definition of mysticism. He defines a "mystic" in the following 
manner: "The mystic is, in the first place, an original knO\-ler 
2 
of old truth. 11 But also, "The mystic needs to judge the truth of 
his exper ience by its bearing on other experience. 113 Hocking equateq 
1 • . Art. (1951) 319. 
2. MGHE, 4};3. 
3. NGHE, 449n. 
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the mystic with the prophet, as one who in a sense mediates the 
certainty which he possesses to the world through the judgment 
of experience. 
The prophet is but the mystic in control of 
the forces of history, declaring their neces-
sary outcome: the mystic in action is the 
prophet. In the prophet , the cognitive cer-
tainty of the mystic becomes historic and 
particular; and this is the necessary destiny 
of that certainty: mystic experience must 1 
complete itself in the prophetic consciousness . 
The emphasis in Hocking is on activity. He can hardly 
give a definition of mysticism which is not at the same time a 
description of it, of its action. 
An opposite emphasis is noticeable in Jones, who defines 
mysticism in the following way: 
I shall use the word mysticism to express the 
~ of religion which nuts the emphasis gn 
immediate awareness of relation with God, gn 
direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine 
Presence. It is religion in its most acute, 
intense, and living stage. 2 
This immediacy Jones asserts to be the "normal" emphasis. 
In this connection, he says: 
1 . MGHE , 511. 
I shall first consider mysticism in its normal 
aspect, as a type of religion which is character-
2. Jones, S~ffi, XV. 
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ized by an immediate consciousness of personal 
relationship \dth the Divine. 1 
Jones is not speaking here of a purely individual 
experience of immediate awareness. He broadens the base of what 
he means by mysticism by an inclusion of "whole groups" of indi-
viduals , but in so doing he still is limiting his emphasis to the 
individual. 
These mystical experiences in a perfectly 
sane and normal fashion often come over 2 
whole groups of persons in times of worship . 
Quate apparently, this emphasis which we find in Jones is 
different from that which we believe we have found in Hocking. In 
Jones we discover a tendency to drift away from the rational whole 
and to become lost in some strange kind of knowledge which is neither 
perception or thought . Let us have Jones speak again . 
At the highest moments of appreciation there comes, 
not a loss of consciousness, but the emergence of 
a ne>v level of consciousness in which neither the 
I nor the object is focused in perception or thought. 
There is in these experiences an absence of self-
consciousness, and an absence , too, of the conscious-
ness of any concrete, finite object contemplated, a 
penetration into a region more real and all-inclusive 
than that of finite 11things . 11 3 
l . Jones, SMR, XVIII. 
2. Ibid., XX . 
3. I bid ., XXI- XXII . 
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Yet it is not in his apparent rejection of knowledge 
which distinguishes his differences. Hocking, too, proclaims 
a type of knowledge which is superior to ordinary discursive 
1 
thought. The problem, \dth refere.nce to Jones, is something 
else. It is that God becomes identified with the Whole of all 
possible value in experience. This is what we have called in 
Hocking "the backward reference". It posits all reality in a 
single phase of the judgment, as immediate, ~rlthout any credit given 
to any mediating principle whatsoever. In Hocking the mediating 
principle is the ~ of immediacy. This fact is greatly minimized 
in Jones, if not totally overlooked. 
Jones appears to make of mysticism a means of escape from 
tension and of effort by resting the case of individual selfhood 
back on the Infinite Self. This he does ~J implication, but the 
evidence is clear. What he looks for in mysticism is the incorpoP-
ation of the principle of immediacy into the individual, rather than 
its reverse, with the individual containing immediacy within himself 
and being able to use it for the production of something which is not 
mere immediacy. It is not the kind of knowledge which is recognized 
1. Cf., THE, Introduction, wherein Hocking sets forth his own 
opposition to a dominant and controlling discursiveness in 
much of our thought. He prefers "understanding", 11meaning11 , 
and 11 significance 11 to arbitrary fact. 
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but the manner of obtaining it that constitutes the chief and 
primary difference between Hocking and Jones . Jones appears to 
come by the certainty which is given to experience by way of 
gratuity, as a free gift , while Hocking comes to it by way of 
his ontological argument , wherein the certainty which is achieved 
is the result of an approach to reality as being something other 
than the subjective outreach. That is, for Hocking, what was found 
was by way of some mediating agency-- what we perhaps should call 
the original form of the judgment of experience, in its barest 
essentials . This we have already seen in the argument which has 
preceded this present argument . In this minimal judgment the !-
think is given the status of "thinking" , of thinking something else, 
therefore the reality of the self . In this process the element of 
psychological subjectivity, of a pure internal operation of the mind, 
w~thout any necessary connections beyond itself to objectify and so 
universalize the knowledge, is materially reduced . According to 
Hocking, this manner of approach does provide objectivity and 
universality. 
Jones does not indicate any such kind of operation. To him 
the certainty of reality remains a subjective experience and can not 
make any claim to universal validity, in the respect of being able 
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to impose its importance with equal effect upon all men. Jones 
reports concerning this problem: 
But it is useless to claim that mystical 
experiences have such ontological bearing 
that they settle for everybody the reality 
of God. No subjective experience , however 
momentous and significant it may be for the 
person who has it , can settle f or everybody 
else the question: Is there in the universe 
a God who is personal and all- loving? 1 
But someone will say, Hocking did not assert a fully 
differentiated concept of God. That is so , he did not, not at 
least as the basic knowledge of his minimal judgment, in which we 
see the ontological argument standing clear of conceptual and dis-
cursive knowledge, a simple declaration of Reality ~ there, without 
defining marks other than its Being. In asserting the mere "that" of 
reality no special burden was placed upon his ontological argument, as 
is true of Jones . That is, Hocking does not place all of the filling 
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out of Reality in his minimal judgment of experience. That is certainty 
enough to propel thought forward to ~ further marks of Reality, which 
is the intention of the judgment as Hocking uses it . It works from 
what it has to more than stands as promise . Any uncertainty, then, 
would take place within the forward motion, into the uncertain future. 
J-.. Jones, SNR, XXIX . 
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The defect in Jones, if defect it is, appears to stem 
from his assertion of too much without an adequate basis in 
experience and in reason . That he does resort to experience is 
borne out in the follovdng assertion: 
We have thus much more to account for and 
explain than a few rare, subjective exper-
iences, a few cases of heightened feeling . 
We are bound to realize that mystic exper-
iences have a life- value, and validify 
themselves in action . 1 
But the dependence upon "heightened feeling" is much 
more pronounced in Jones than in Hocking. That is, his use of the 
judgment is less complete than in Hocking . A further evidence of 
this fact is that in listing the mystics and their experiences 
which go into the record of mysticism, Jones emphasizes immediate 
awareness and what looks like a surrender of this \oTorld. The types 
of experience and of mystical insight which he calls 11normal 11 are of 
the kind mentioned . According to Hocking's position, Jones does not 
exercise enough of the 11 alternation 11 between parts to produce a valid 
whole in e..xperience . His mysticism is ~ which is dominated :Q;z: the 
religious demand for union with Reality . This particular 11error11 was 
not found by us in Hocking, in whom \.Je found that !!!ISticism included 
1 . Jones, S~ffi, XXXI . 
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religion and metaphvsical systems in itself, rather than the other 
'!tray around. 
B. Vfi th tHat ail rA.ltier_t:,;schwei-"er. 
---~-- -· ·- -- . 
An entirely different situation exists when we attempt to 
compare Hocking and Sch\vei tzer, for we find in each of them a com-
prehensive use of the judgment of experience and a balance of the 
several parts of the judgment in their interpretation of mysticism. 
If we were to characterize Hocking, Jones and Schweitzer we would 
be inclined to say that Hocking is essentially rationalistic in his 
use of mysticism, Jones is religious, and Schweitzer is ethical. 
However, these characterizations are not intended to be wholly 
definitive, but they are only suggestive, for there are evidences 
of some crossing over the boundaries set for them. But in the by 
and large they hold. 
Regardless of the final means of validation of the mysti-
cism expressed, whether rationalistic as in Hocking, or as primarily 
ethical as in Schweitzer, the judgmental basis is similar. The 
following is an example of the judgment of experience as used by 
Schweitzer and such as would be approved by Hocking: 
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\·Jorld and life affirmation consists in this: 
that man regards existence as he experiences 
it in himself and as it has developed in the 
world as something of value per ~ and accor-
dingly strives to let it reach perfection in 
himself , whilst \ilthin his own sphere of in-
fluence he endeavours to preserve and to 
further it. 1 
The above is not a fully complete pattern of the judgment 
of experience, as Hocking would describe it, but there is enough of 
the essentials present to give it value. There is not, for inst ance, 
an explicit reference to the ontological certainty with which Hock-
ing's judgment would begin, but its emphasis is positive and wor ld-
affirming , and it seeks to discover more of the content (and t he 
value) of the "mrld of experience . 
There is some question "rhether Schweitzer means by "Nature n 
all that Hocking does. For instance, does Schweitzer recognize the 
metaphysical value of the finite self, or is self but a revelat ion 
of such value, such as will discover its worth only through union 
with infinite Being? We know where Hocking stands on this score. 
Hith him the finite self is metaphysically real, discovering its 
worth through a functional relationship with the infinite Self. 
The following description of mysticism by Schweitzer may help us 
to know what he intends its meaning to be: 
1 . Schweitzer, ITD, 1. 
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Mysticism is the perfected form of \.rorld-view. 
In his Horld-view man endeavours to arrive at 
a spiritual relationship to the infinite Being 
to which he belongs as a part of Nature . He 
studies the Universe to discover whether he 
can apprehend and become one with the myster-
ious vrlll which governs it. Only in spiritual 
unity with i nfinite Being can he give meaning 
t o his life and find strength to suffer and to 
act . 1 
Yes, it looks as though the finite self retains his worth 
and status in Schweitzer. The finite self "belongs 11 to the infinite 
Being ~ virtue of the fact that he is found in Nature, the assump-
tion being that Nature contains or is vrhat infinite Being means. 
The principle of affirmation, vTith respect to the world and to 
Nature , suggests that the f inite self is real. But he is real, not 
through factual kno1.orledge and through pure reason, but through an 
ethics and an operation of ethics in experience. 
Up to the present age, Schweitzer holds, the emphasis in 
mysticism was largely other-worldly and life negating. That is why 
so many systems of mysticism sought to be absorbed into the infinite 
Being. But now the finite self is not absorbed, but instead is 
"spiritually one" with the infinite Being. This is a functional union, 
which would be acceptable to Hocking . "According to this ethical 
1. Schwei tzer, ITD, 10-11. 
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explanation of the Universe, man by ethical activity enters the 
1 
service of the divine world- aim." 
In both Hocking and in Schweitzer there is a strong 
tendency to assume that mysticism, togetl1er with its essential 
content of truth and its self-contained validity for Reality, 
comes from "right discipline". That is, the summary description , 
together ~dth the operation, of mysticism establishes its categorical 
and transcendent 1.rorth . To this end Sch\-Ieitzer speaks: 
It belongs to the nature of mysticism that 
it is timeless and appeals to no other authority 2 than that of the truth which it carries within it. 
But how, we may well ask, can any system rest its case for 
authority on its own inner content or form? The ans\.rer would be 
essentially the same by both Hocking and Schweitzer. As Hocking 
would say, it is by reason of the fact that the judgment is complete, 
i.e., it includes all of the reals in its several movements, such as 
the full list of various types of objects. Schweitzer puts the 
matter very simply, as follows: 
Only a complete ethic has mystical significance. 
An ethical system 1...rhich is only concerned -,Ti th 
the attitude of man to his fellow-man and to 
society cannot really be in harmony -vri th a 
1. SchHeitzer, ITD, 1.3. 
2. Schi·J"Si tzer , ITD, 256. 
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world-view. It has no relationship with the 
Universe. To found an ethical vJorld-vie-v: on 
ethics which are only concerned vii th our fell.mJ-
man and human society is a logical impossibility •• 
Only when ethics embrace the whole Universe is an 
ethical world-vie\-! really possible. And then only 
does it become apparent that the ethical world-
view is ethical mysticism.1 
Both Hocking and Schweitzer include the whole of experience 
in their mysticisms . In addition Hocking includes all of reason in it 
as well , while Schweitzer includes all of ethics in his. Schweitzer 
says of his position: "Ethics consist in responsibility towards all 
that lives-- responsibility which has become so \ilde as to be linlit-
2 less ." 
Neither one of these two mystics is bound to the principle 
of inunediacy. Such immediacy as we are able to find in Sch\olei tzer 
is less easily defined than it is in Hocking . But it appears to 
stand forth most readily in his ethics, the mgnificance of which has 
irr®ediate worth, i.e., in and of itself, as that elementary experience 
which determines everything else and which imparts self-realization to 
the participating self. This is a kind ofontological assertion, quite 
siinilar to that of Hocking's, vrhichis the "primordial" beginnings of 
the judgment. 
A single summarizing conclusion to this section would be that 
it is evident how dependent is mysticism upon some ontological base, 
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out of which can come both immediacy and mediacy of a\.fareness of reality. 
1. Schweitzer, ITD, 256. 
2. Ibid ., 260. 
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ABSTRACT 
'rhe human self is the most ul·timate entity found in 
Hocking's philosophy. Its reality as a self-among-selves in 
the world is found through what Hocking means by ~sticism, 
wherein both the process and the form of reality are united 
in each self's consciousness of self-meaning. This is a self-
meaning, however, which is completed only as it is conscious of 
other-selfhood at the same time that it is conscious of itself. 
The individual human self, his social other, his physical world in 
general, and the indubitable form of what Hocking calls "the 
judgment of experience" function together as a single unit of 
reality-recognition within self-consciousness. 
The judgment of experience, which defines Hocking's 
mysticism, is both process and content in Reality. As process, 
it functions prospectively among the several types of objects 
in experience. The several kinds of objects in experience are 
known in general as "reflexive" or introspective-objects, social-
objects, and thing-objects . But the form of the judgment itself 
"contains" them in a singleness of meaning which signifies Reality. 
The judgment of experience is the general application of the 
individual human self to his own subjective reality and to the 
objective world of reality as well. 
The judgment of experience has its origin in idea. 
It is idea which contains the "pattern" of the true judgment of 
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experience in its own nature . For at the bottom of idea is 
"some passion for objectivity, for reality", a passion -which 
gives the "drive" to the human will. Both will and experience 
are thus "grounded" in idea. The process and the content of 
the judgment of experience ar e given validity through their 
o~~ form, a form which Hocking designates as controlled by an 
innate quality of "righteousness", a quality to which process 
and content of ecperience aspire . However, the form is not 
· self-validating apart from the expressed "passion for righteous-
ness" which it signifies , a passion which is without meaning 
ap~rt from the production of social deeds and the creation of 
objective facts. 
Ideas, according to Hocking, are functions of 
· finite reason. They are 11what we think with." They are the 
means whereby the will achieves its power. Ideas are "variables" 
in our self-conscious adjustment to the world of experience. 
Ideas and sensations are t wo phases of reality. Perceptions 
present the "existence" of objects, whereas conceptions provide - · j 
l;the :."essence". Both perceptions and conceptions are brought 
under the regulation of the dialectic , Hocking's judgment of 
experience, wi-f?hin which arise 11 standards 11 or values, regulative 
principles contained within the judgment of experience which are 
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realized through ideas. These values which reach their maturity 
in ideas via the judgment of experience keep the ideas "alive", 
i . _e., they build into ideas the possibility of conscience and 
of freedom for the self who owns them. 
Ideas indicate the kind of activity which belongs 
to the self and- inasmuch as seL.~ood is the most ultimate 
entity ~mich we can know-- to Reality. There are two activities 
which are evident in ideas, both of which are seen to be the 
result of a single function. One of these actions is analytic 
in nature. The other is synthetic. Analysis reveals the 
particular, such as the objects of the phenomenal order. 
Sy~thesis reveals the universal qualities generally associated 
~~th the noumenal world. The former activity within idea 
is primarily· inductive and the latter is deductive in emphasis . 
Accordingly, the particular indicates the "existent" and the 
universal the "essence" of the real world. Both of these 
activities are found in the judgment of experience, which 
j udgment is their singleness of function. That type of idea 
in which analysis is most evident is what Hocking means by 
idea-in-general, or concepts of things. The type which is 
more closely identified with synthesis is Hocking's "whole-
idea". Actually, however, there is or can be no distinction 
ABSTRACT 
made between these two activities in idea other than that 
of function, of emphasis and direction. 
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What we call "existence" and "essence" refer to the 
same reality. One cannot be experienced apart from some relation 
to the other. The reason we think of one as distinct from the 
other is due to t he disposition of the mind to specialize, 
i.e., to think of one thing at a time. Hocking's "principle 
of alternation" is the psychological explanation and "report" 
of this tendency. But it is the functional principle of 
mysticism, the judgment of experience, which brings both emphases 
together and operates them as a whole. The result is not 
analysis or synthesis , singly, but analysis and synthesis 
together. Reality is given through their union, a reality 
which is charged with limitless possibilities for self-fulfill-
ment and of self-realization. 
Mystic union does not mean loss of individuality. 
The relation of the finite to the infinite Self is functional 
rather than organic; it is primarily content in process of 
realization. Mystic union is a relationship of activity, a blending 
of purpose and of will, through ! participation in and ~ apprentice-
ship to Reality, resulting in continuous creativity. To be one-
with-God means to be in partnership with him in the r ealization 
of self-meaning. 
ABSTRACT 
Much of the self-meaning which is produced 
through the creative partnership with God is found in the 
world of things, which things are the "common thirds" among 
selves and which are the means whereby selves can meet each 
other. That is, the thing-objects have meanings for inter-
self relationships, which meanings are given up to the selves 
who deal with them. Therefore, the "internal" values of thing-
objects are equivalent to the meanings contained in selves. 
It is for this reason that Hocking suggests that the thing-
in-itself is other-selfhood. 
God himself is also revealed through the objects 
of experience. The w:>rld of physical things, so Hocking holds, 
is s.rmbol of God. That is, the world is God's own body to the 
extent that the world reveals God 1 s purposes. God 1 s nature 
is differentiated through the world of physical things just 
as the self is differentiated by means of his own body. God 
is able to mediate his will and his intention to the finite 
self through the world of things, as the human self mediates 
his own will and intention through his body. Both mind and 
matter are thus caught up in a more meaningful reality, a 
reality in which there are tangible connections for all of 
the activities of the selfhood. 
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ABSTRACT 
The body is included in my experience, both 
externally (as object) and internally (as subject, i.e., as 
object of introspection). That is, the body, being a part of 
physical nature, must be included among the objects found in 
nature. It thus becomes a 11connnon third" of social knowledge, 
as a l:a.sis for the sharing of ideas. The body is thus a bond 
of union with all physical nature. As such it becomes the 
practical and visible principle of sharing of a common world 
among selves, producing as part of its practical results a 
true objectivity for the operation of the mind. The body, 
considered as a principle of sharing of mind-activity, through 
which human selves can reveal their intentions through deeds 
and acts to each other, is necessaDy to mark out the objectivit,y 
of other-self. But the body is also an aid to the argument 
that God is "transcendent" as well as 11imma.nent 11 • That is, 
the body considered as a part of the physical world does not 
contain all of the physical world in itself, nor do the bodies 
of all human selves put together contain all of the physical 
world. Yet the physical is always 11body", for experience finds 
it as body of our shared ideas and of our deeds which express 
ourselves. If not body of finite self, the only alternative 
is that it is body of infinite Self. 
ABSTRACT 
Hocking's mysticism is a support to his idealism. 
It holds together the world which reason splits apart. Yet 
the operation of mysticism is within reason itself. It is in 
idea first, but the meaning-for-reality which is a part of 
every idea is given up to reason. Through reason the implicit 
purposes which are contained in idea are given up to the 
judgment of experience and are there made explicit. The value 
for wholeness which is contained in idea becomes differentiated 
through the judgment of experience into that intimate object 
whom the mystic calls God, a "Thou", not a mere Absolute, a 
mere necessity. But wholeness, as applied to God, means wholeness 
of function in righteousness. In this kind of wholeness the 
finite self can"participate11 without losing any of his own value, 
increasing his value for individual selfhood as he participates 
in God. 
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